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Abstract
This thesis broadly investigates the evolution of voluntary cooperative behaviour among indi-
viduals in conflict in non-egalitarian social groups. This work is partitioned into three sections.
In the first section, we study the emergence of non-egalitarian social groups by examining
leader-follower relationships in the context of group dispersal. We construct an inclusive fit-
ness model to demonstrate that group dispersal is more likely to emerge when followers are
given a greater share of resources. relatedness among individuals is higher, and costs of disper-
sal diminish rapidly for larger dispersal groups. Our results provide evidence for the fact that
non-egalitarian groups may emerge even when individuals do not differ in immediate condition.
In the second section, we study several scenarios in which genetically related individu-
als with unequal control over resources cooperate despite being in conflict. Two chapters are
dedicated to research on the evolution of offspring signals and parent-offspring conflict over
provisioning. First, we create an evolutionary game to show that environmental conditions can
influence whether signals convey offspring need or quality. Next, we propose and substanti-
ate using a simple theoretical model that sex differences in begging observed in several bird
species could be the consequence of sex differences in parental care provided by these species.
In the third chapter of this section, we create a full life-cycle model to clearly demonstrate that,
in agreement with recent empirical data but in contrast to previous theory, the emergence of
cooperative breeding may either increase or decrease a species average clutch size, depending
on several ecological and social conditions.
In the last section, we investigate cooperative behaviours between unrelated individuals in
conflict by modelling the evolution of coalitionary behaviour. We create an evolutionary model
to explain how certain social and ecological conditions, particularly a species coalition solic-
itation pattern and the specific resources being contested by the coalition, can influence the
i
relative frequencies of various forms of coalitionary behaviour observed in the animal king-
dom. Results also suggests concessions granted by dominant individuals rarely evolve and are
only used to make the recipient a more attractive target of coalitionary behaviour.
Keywords: Evolutionary biology, behavioural ecology, conflict, cooperation, social behaviour,
life-history
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Behaviour is considered social if it influences both the actor and other conspecifics — the re-
cipients [1]. The effect of social behaviour on the actor and recipient is often measured in
terms of how the behaviour influences an individual’s inclusive fitness, a metric describing the
success of an individual in contributing their genes to the gene pool of the population (see
Mathematical tools and concepts) [2, 3, 4]. Social behaviour is described as cooperative if it
increases the recipient’s fitness [5]. Cooperative behaviour can occur when certain interests of
individuals overlap in an evolutionary sense, such as when individuals are genetically related.
Many animals frequently live in social groups, allowing for increased frequencies of coop-
erative behaviour. However, whenever the genetic material between individuals differs, their
evolutionary interests do not completely overlap, and this can result in conflict [3]. Conflict
between individuals arises due to competition over mating opportunities and limited resources,
and ultimately results in a decrease in fitness for one or more individuals. Despite sometimes
frequent conflict between individuals, many animal species voluntarily form social groups.
Some animals such as various primates even form extensive and permanent social groups with
non-relatives, despite the apparent scope for conflict [3].
The outcome of conflict in social groups varies from an even distribution of resources
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among all individuals (i.e. low skew, egalitarian groups) to complete monopolization of re-
sources by a few dominant individuals (i.e. high skew, despotic groups) [6, 7]. Non-egalitarian
groups may form when certain individuals are physically or socially dominant and use their
dominance to secure a disproportionate amount of resources. In some animals, dominance and
resource skew is determined by the outcome of frequent fights, such as lethal engagements
common among female meerkats (Suricata suricatta) [8], or expensive displays of physical
dominance, such as the roaring of red stags (Cervus elaphus) [9]. In other species, dominance
hierarchies are established without fighting, forming static social roles that change only occa-
sionally when subordinates challenge dominant individuals [10, 11]. The dominance hierar-
chies of white-crowned sparrows (Zonotrichia leucophrys gambelii) are determined strictly by
the colour of their plumage: individuals with greater proportions of white feathers consistently
enjoy higher social statuses [12]. While conflict often increases resource skew, cooperation
frequently leads to more egalitarian outcomes. In altricial species, for example, newly born or
hatched offspring are unable to secure sufficient amounts resources by themselves and rely on
the cooperation of adults to share resources with them [13]. Cooperation among members of
non-egalitarian social groups, particularly between those in different social roles, can be diffi-
cult to explain from an evolutionary perspective since it is not always clear how both parties
benefit. For example, parental care — the simplest example of cooperation in non-egalitarian
social groups whereby parents sacrifice their own resources for their offspring — was observed
in various animal species for many centuries but was not rigorously explained until Fisher’s for-
mal mathematical treatment of kin selection in 1930 [14], and was not thoroughly understood
until Hamilton’s mathematical framework in 1964 [2]. Such cooperative behaviours commonly
emerge between members with unequal control over resources even when individuals are in di-
rect conflict over resources; these cooperative behaviours often influence the outcome of the
conflict to favour one party more significantly than the other.
Why should subordinates voluntarily engage in cooperative behaviour when only the dom-
3inant party appears to benefit? Why are voluntary leader-follower relationships so common
even though it often seems only one party benefits from the association? Why in coopera-
tively breeding species do subordinates aid dominant breeders, often lengthening the breeder’s
tenure as monopolisers of breeding opportunities, even though a primary incentive for helping
is thought to be territory inheritance?
Why do dominant individuals so frequently cooperate with their subordinates even when
they are able to monopolize resources? Why do parents allow the begging of their offspring
to manipulate their resource allocation strategy? In species where offspring begging dictates
parental provisioning rates, why do females often resign to begging at lower rates than males
even though they can gain more resources if they chose to beg louder? Why would domi-
nant individuals in social hierarchies of unrelated individuals concede resources to low-ranking
members?
In this thesis, we address some of these questions by examining how the evolution of co-
operative behaviours exhibited between members with different social roles in non-egalitarian
groups can influence the outcome of conflict in these social groups. The thesis is divided into
three sections. In section 1, we analyze the very formation of egalitarian and non-egalitarian
groups. Chapter 2 demonstrates that cooperation itself can motivate the emergence of different
social roles and that the formation of social hierarchies of various skew can be established even
in the absence of any physical differences between individuals. In section 2, we dedicate three
chapters to exploring cooperative behaviours in non-egalitarian groups of kin. In Chapters 3
and 4, we study how parent-offspring conflict over resource allocation may be influenced by
offspring signalling their condition to help guide parents’ provisioning and allocation strate-
gies. In Chapter 5, we analyze how subordinate offspring may resolve conflict over territories
by helping dominant breeders survive and raise offspring. In the final section, we explore coop-
eration arising from conflict existing in non-egalitarian social groups of non-relatives. Chapter
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6 is dedicated to understanding how cooperation in the form of coalitions can influence and
resolve conflicts in triads.
The remainder of the introduction initiates the reader into the basic theory behind the four
widespread cooperative behaviours exhibited in non-egalitarian groups explored in the thesis:
leader-follower relationships (Chapter 2), offspring signalling (Chapters 3 and 4), coopera-
tive breeding (Chapter 5), and coalitionary behaviour (Chapter 6). Explanations of the core
mathematical tools used in the thesis will be provided in this exposition, often supplemented
with summaries of previous models constructed to explain the aforementioned cooperative be-
haviours.
1.1 Mathematical tools and concepts
Here, I briefly outline the primary mathematical tools and concepts used in this thesis.
1.1.1 Inclusive fitness
Evolutionary success is frequently measured in terms of inclusive fitness. An individual’s in-
clusive fitness is the sum of an individual’s fitness gained through personal reproduction (direct
fitness) and the fitness produced by helping non-descendant kin (indirect fitness). Inclusive fit-
ness is sometimes defined as a measure of an individual’s total contribution to the gene pool
of the next generation [3], while other sources state it measures an individual’s genetic con-
tribution to the population in the very distant future [4]. Many empirical studies frequently
equate fitness with offspring quantity, though this metric may not correlate completely with
genetic contributions to the population in the distant future when there is nonrandom variation
in offspring quality [15]. Regardless, the concept of inclusive fitness is most often used as a
tool which helps us compare the evolutionary consequences of traits and, for many models, the
relative fitness consequences of any two traits does not depend on whether it is measured in the
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next generation or in the distant future.
An common example of the application of inclusive fitness is its role in explaining altruistic
behaviour, whereby an individual endures a cost to itself in terms of direct fitness in order
to aid relatives, thereby increasing the individual’s indirect fitness. For an altruistic trait to
evolve, the inclusive fitness of an altruistic individual needs to be greater than the fitness of
an individual that does not engage in the altruistic behaviour. Hamilton derived a now famous
mathematical condition describing when altruism should be expected to spread: c < rb, where
c can be described by the cost to the altruist in terms of direct fitness, b denotes the reproductive
benefit experienced by the recipient of the altruistic behaviour, and r measures the degree of
relatedness between actor and recipient.
1.1.2 Nash equilibria
Game theory was first introduced to study strategic interactions among rational individuals.
Games are essentially situations involving two or more players, in which each player has a
number of strategies, the set of actions from which the player chooses in any given situation.
Each strategy is associated with some expected payoff, which may be influenced by the strate-
gies used by other players in the game. The basic tenant of game theory is that all players are
rational and will therefore seek to maximize their own payoffs. The structure of the game and
the payoffs of each player for any given outcome is knowledge common to all players, and, as
such, players can predict the actions of their opponents [16].
The solution concept of evolutionary game theory is that of the Nash equilibrium, defined
as an equilibrium where no player can fare better by unilaterally changing strategies. Suppose
each individual in a population uses strategy X. If one player in this population decides to
adopt strategy Y instead, then strategy X is considered a Nash equilibrium whenever E(X, X) ≥
E(J, I), for any strategy Y , where E(i, j) is the expected payoff for using strategy i against
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strategy j. If a Nash equilibrium is strict, any player that unilaterally changes strategies receives
a lower payoff; that is, E(X, X) > E(Y, X). In this sense, in a strict Nash equilibrium, every
player is choosing the ’optimal’ given that the strategy of every other players is constant [16].
1.1.3 Evolutionarily stable strategies
In the models presented here, we will generally seek to identify possible endpoints of evolu-
tion. The primary distinction between early game theory and evolutionary game theory is that
players are no longer assumed to be aware of the structure of their game, nor can consciously
predict the actions of their opponents via rational foresight. In evolutionary game theory, strate-
gies are genetically determined and heritable and payoffs are measured in terms of inclusive
fitness. Essential for this is the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), defined as
any strategy which, once adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any initially rare alter-
native strategy. An ESS is a Nash equilibrium, but not all Nash equilibria are ESSes [16]. For
a strategy to be an ESS, it must be a strict Nash equilibrium or, if the Nash equilibrium is not
strict, the Nash equilibrium strategy must fare better in a population that uses any alternative
strategy that is neutral with respect to the Nash equilibrium strategy than the neutral strategy
itself, thereby ensuring some advantage for continuing to play the Nash equilibrium strategy.
That is, for X to be an ESS, we require that either E(X, X) > E(Y, X) or, if E(X, X) = E(Y, X),
then E(X,Y) > E(Y,Y) [16].
For example, consider a very simple game involving two players — the parent and the
offspring. The parent can decide between feeding at a normal rate and feeding at an elevated
rate. The offspring will decide between signalling and not signalling. If both players choose
between their options simultaneously (i.e. without knowledge what the other player has cho-
sen but with the knowledge of the payoffs of both players for any given outcome), we can
represent the game in the payoff matrix given in Table 1.1. The values in the matrix represent
the inclusive fitness of each player in each of the game’s possible outcomes. Identifying the
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Table 1.1: Example payoff matrix
Offspring
Signals Does not signal
Parent
Normal parental care 5, 2 6, 4
Elevated parental care 2, 3 4, 5
ESS in this scenario is simple: the offspring always fares better by not signalling, regardless of
which option the parent chooses, while the parent always receives a higher payoff by choosing
to provide normal levels of parental care to the offspring, regardless of whether the offspring
signals. Thus, the ESS — a strict Nash equilibrium — will always be the outcome in which
the offspring does not signal and the parent provides normal levels of care.
1.1.4 Evolutionarily stable states
Following the proof outlined in Taylor & Jonker, we next study dynamic games wherein the
frequencies of strategies may change over time [17]. Consider now a population of individ-
uals, each able to choose one of n pure strategies. Let si and s = (s1, s2, ..., sn) denote the
proportion of individuals using strategy i and the population’s state vector, respectively. The
payoff, equivalent to the fitness, of any individual using strategy i at any given time is denoted
by F(i|s). Strategies yielding a higher payoff are more likely to be used in the future, whether
this is due to the fact that those employing more fit strategies have more offspring or others
observe the success of the strategy and replicate it. Let p =
∑
pi = 1, pi ≥ 0 denote a state
of the population. For any state q, we define F(q|p) = ∑ qiF(i|p).State p is an ESS if for any
alternative state q , p, setting p¯ = (1 − )p + q, then F(q|p¯) < F(p| p¯) for any sufficiently
small  > 0. That is, p is considered stable if the system, once disturbed, returns to p [17].
We will now discuss the notion of stability in these dynamic games. Suppose there are ni
i-strategists in a total population of N =
∑
ni individuals. Let n˙i = rini represent the growth
rate of strategy i. Suppose the fitness F(i|s) is an estimate of the growth rate of an individual
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using strategy i, ri. In the time δt, each individual produces F(i|s)δt additional individuals. Our
replicator equation is thus
s˙i = si(F(i|s) − F(s|s)). (1.1)
Suppose we are dealing with discrete generations. If an individual using strategy i produces
no offspring and simply dies, then ri = −1. The number of i in the next generation is given by
nˆi = ni(ri + 1). Ensuring the population size remains constant, the proportion of the population
employing strategy i in the next generation is sˆi =
si(ri+1)
r¯+1 , where r¯ represents the average growth
rate of the population. Equivalently,
sˆi = si
F(i|s) + 1
F(s|s) + 1 . (1.2)
State p is stable if every trajectory near p converges to p. We can examine the local stability of
a model with continuous dynamics by linearizing (6). Given state s, let x = s − p. It follows
that x˙i = s˙i, thus from (2) we have x˙i = (xi + pi)(F(i|x + p) − F(x + p|x + p)). Collecting
terms on the right side that are first-order with respect to x gives the system x˙ = Bx. p is
strictly stable with respect to perturbations in
∑
si = 1 if the eigenvalues of the matrix B have
strictly negative real parts. Similar treatment can be applied to (7), giving linearization xˆ = Cx.
Here, p is strictly stable with respect to perturbations in
∑
si = 1 if the eigenvalues of C have
modulus less than one. Taylor & Jonker [17] demonstrate that if p is an ESS, then it is locally
asymptotically stable with respect to the dynamics in (6).
1.1.5 Evolutionary invasion analysis
We now consider analysis involving continuous state variables. The goal of invasion analysis
is to model the long-term evolution of phenotypes in a population. To analyze social evolution
using a mathematical framework, traits are represented by continuous variables [18]. To begin,
we make two assumptions: first, that the wildtype population is in dynamical equilibrium, and
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second, that the long-term success of the mutant is equivalent to its initial growth rate upon
invasion [19]. Suppose we seek to model the evolution of a continuous trait, x. This resident
population is monomorphic exhibiting trait value x when a mutant — the focal individual —
invades and exhibits trait value y. Since we are modelling the evolution of social behaviour, the
fitness of the focal individual, f (y, x), depends both on the strategy set it employs, y, and the
strategy set of those with whom the individual interactions, x. This measure of fitness, some-
times referred to as invasion fitness, represents the expected number of offspring produced by
or growth rate of a rare mutant y in a resident population that is monomorphic for trait x [20].
With small mutations, the local selection gradient is defined as D(x) = fy(y, x)|y=x. If the
gradient is positive (resp. negative) mutants with slightly higher (resp. lower) phenotypic val-
ues may successfully invade the resident population [18]. Evolutionary singular strategies are
phenotypic values x∗ at which D(x∗) = 0, which is where the selection gradient vanishes. In
the absence of evolutionary singular strategies, the trait x uniformly increases (resp. decreases)
if D(x∗) > 0. (resp. D(x∗) < 0), unless boundary conditions are present [18]. If an evolutionary
singular strategy is also a local maximum, then it is also an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS);
that is, if Dy|y=x∗ < 0, then the strategy, once established, cannot be invaded by nearby mutants
because no phenotypic value sufficiently close to the singular point has a higher growth rate
than the singular trait value itself. Evolutionary singular points are thus referred to as candi-
dates ESSes.
A singular strategy is locally convergence stable if the system returns to the singular point
after any sufficiently small perturbation [18]. If x∗ is convergence stable, then If both x and
y are close to x∗, but y is close to x∗, y will yield a higher fitness than x; that is, the lo-
cal fitness gradient leads toward x∗. More precisely, if a singular point, x∗, is convergence
stable, then D(x) decreases locally around x∗, and thus dD(x)dx =
∂ f (y,x)
∂x∂y +
∂2 f (y,x)
∂y2 < 0. Since
whenever y = x, f (x, y) = f (y, x), we note that the directional derivative along the line is
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thus 2∂ f (y,x)
∂x∂y +
∂2 f (y,x)
∂x2 +
∂2 f (y,x)
∂y2 = 0, and so the condition for convergence stability simplifies to
∂2 f (y,x)
∂x2 >
∂2 f (y,x)
∂y2 [18].
As described, the conditions for convergence stability and evolutionary stability are, in
general, different. Thus, an ESS is a possible endpoint to evolution, but only if an ESS is also
convergence stable is it likely to be the end point of evolution. Points that are both evolu-
tionary and convergence stable are continuously stable strategies (CSSes), and they represent
terminal points of evolutionary dynamics. If a singular point x∗ is convergent but evolutionary
stable, evolution will favour selection toward x∗, but as nearby mutants can invade, evolution
may subsequently diverge away from the singular point in two coexisting clusters, forming an
evolutionary stable dimorphism. If a singular point x∗ is an evolutionary but not convergence
stable, no mutant population can invade the resident population, but if the resident population
begins at a different point, it will never reach x∗ [20, 18, 19].
1.1.6 Numerical approximations of ESSs
In this thesis, there were cases where explicit evolutionary stable solutions could not be de-
rived analytically from the invasion analysis, and so numerical approximations were used. The
approximations emulate replicator dynamics by first assigning a random strategy xi to the resi-
dent population. The strategy used by the next generation, xi+1, was determined by calculating
the selection gradient at this point, Di and evolution occurred at some rate k, along this gradient
such that xi+1 = xi + kDi. Evolutionary endpoints were said to have been reached when xi+1− xi
was sufficiently small. Note that this condition is not equivalent to Di → 0, as boundaries
were imposed on the traits (e.g. dispersal rates could never exceed 1 or fall below 0) such
that a strategy was evolutionary stable if the trait was at a maximum (resp. minimum) value
and selection favoured yet further increases (resp. decreases) in the trait value. To ensure the
existence of a single CSS, multiple initial strategy values employed by the resident population,
x0, were used through use of a mesh. Individual-based simulations were used to illustrate and
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verify predictions derived from numerical analyses.
1.2 Leader-follower relationships and the formation of social
groups
We begin our exploration of behaviours between members of non-egalitarian social groups by
first investigating the emergence of non-egalitarian social groups. One of the most basic forms
of non-egalitarian social groups are leader-follower groups. Leader-follower groups are a com-
mon subset of social relationships in which certain individuals initiate or coordinate group ac-
tivity (leaders) and others follow (subordinates) [21]. Some leader-follower groups are formed
and are stabilized through coercion; that is, certain individuals are so physically or socially
dominant that they can aggressively punish subordinate individuals attempting to leave the
leader-follower group [22]. Explaining the emergence of these leader-follower groups is often
trivial from an evolutionary perspective: even if the relationship is ultimately costly to subor-
dinates, punishment incurred from dominants may be costlier. However, many leader-follower
groups are seemingly formed from the voluntary participation of both leader and follower, and
the incentives for these relationships are often less apparent [23]. Understanding of how se-
lection may favour sociality and cooperation among competitors in conflict, particularly when
subordination is voluntary, yet subordinates seem to gain little from sociality, is lacking.
Theoretically, leader-follower relationships can evolve if the reproductive success of both
leaders and followers is, on average, greater than that of individuals who are not in leader-
follower groups[3]; equivalently, the benefits of being in leader-follower relationships rather
than being solitary must be, on average, less than the costs. Empirical studies have shown that
the benefits of social living can be considerable. Compared to solitary individuals, groups have
greater defense against predators and outside competitors via the dilution effect and mutual
defense [24]. Further, groups have improved foraging via information flow and collaboration
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[25], and assistance from others when dealing with pathogens [3]. Within groups, there is also
greater opportunity to sabotage competitors’ reproduction. However, the costs of sociality can
also be substantial: relative to solitary individuals, groups have higher rates of disease due to
greater transmission rates [26], greater competition for limited resources, and more reproduc-
tive interference [27, 3].
Where high skew exists, the cost-to-benefit ratio of participating in leader-follower rela-
tionships varies greatly between subordinate and dominant individuals [28]. For example, it is
common for social species to expend energy in pursuit of not only resources but social status.
Those that fail to occupy dominant or leadership positions frequently obtain a lower share of
reproductively relevant resources [3]. Further, in some cases, subordinates must expend energy
merely to demonstrate their submissive nature to remain in the group. The emergence of these
voluntary and often high skew leader-follower groups is an evolutionary puzzle because it re-
quires both dominant and subordinate individuals, to accrue, on average, a higher fitness than
those attempting to become solitary individuals [22].
Despite extensive empirical studies on the emergence and maintenance of leader-follower
relationships, some theoretical work on the evolution of leadership and followership relies on
unrealistic or unjustified assumptions. First, previous literature tends to focus only on under-
standing the conditions in which leadership emerges, and therefore neglects the evolution of
followership, despite it being central to evolutionary analysis [29, 30, 22]. Theoretical work
instead needs to identify conditions under which the formation of leader-follower relationships
is favourable to both leader and follower.
Secondly, studies on the emergence of leader-follower relations often suggest or assume
that leaders will emerge only if they receive direct fitness benefits, and thus presupposes
a certain degree of skew [31]. Yet, in nature, animal groups vary from despotic to com-
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pletely egalitarian. Further, many, if not most, leader-follower groups are formed among kin
[22, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. Thus, leaders can still benefit from an increase in
inclusive fitness by forming leader-follower relationships even when subordinates experience
the majority of reproductive success. Proper accounting of the inclusive fitness of leaders and
followers is crucial to understanding this type of dominant-subordinate relationship. This in-
cludes the creation of models that explicitly account for population dynamics, which is often
required for accurate and realistic results [41].
Lastly, leaders are commonly thought to be socially or physically dominant, in possession
of specialized knowledge, or in exceptional need of particular resources [23, 42, 43, 44]. Many
previous models have used the assumption of pre-existing differences in state to explain the
emergence of leader-follower behaviour [45, 42], including the idea that leaders have direct
control over the behaviour of their followers. These models assume some degree of repro-
ductive skew. This assumption can hinder understanding of the emergence of leader-follower
relationships and the evolution of reproductive skew in animal groups. While it is common for
leaders to be physically or social dominant [22, 45], and leaders often demonstrate the ability
to manipulate the behaviour of followers, both of these may, at least in some cases, be the prod-
ucts rather than the causes of leader-follower relationships. The assumption is valid for models
exploring the consequences of leader-follower relationships, but more theoretical work needs
to be dedicated to examining the emergence of leadership and followership in homogeneous
populations.
In Chapter 2, I construct a model for the evolution of natal dispersal — the movement of
individuals from their birth site to their breeding sites — when certain individuals (leaders) ini-
tiate dispersal and others (followers) disperse with these leaders. This inclusive fitness model
uses explicit population dynamics to generate an accurate mathematical description of the evo-
lutionary incentives for leading and following in dispersal groups. In addition to describing
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how certain social and ecological factors can promote the emergence of group dispersal, the
model is used to identify how leader-follower relationships affect population dynamics, in-
cluding the evolutionarily stable levels of natal dispersal. I also describe how leader-follower
relationships in the context of dispersal affect altruistic behaviour.
1.3 Parent-offspring conflict and offspring signals
Next, we investigate the evolution of cooperative behaviours emerging from conflict among
kin in non-egalitarian groups.
Parent-offspring conflict and conflict among offspring for parental investment is influenced
by offspring signals. Parental investment describes any allocation of resources expended by the
parent to increase the fitness of their offspring [3]. The investment behaviours of the parent,
which constitute its parental care strategy, are made at the expense of other components of
the parent’s fitness, such as their survival and future reproductive success. Higher degrees of
parental care mean greater resource investment into a relatively smaller number of offspring.
Parental care increases the direct fitness of the offspring, thereby increasing the indirect fitness
of the parent, and thus, since both parties benefit, parental care can be defined as cooperative
[3]. However, parent and offspring are not genetically identical in most species of animal,
meaning that the evolutionary interests of the two parties do not completely align. This has led
to significant parent-offspring conflict over parental investment. Consequently, parental care
can be considered both a cooperative behaviour and a key source of conflict between parent
and offspring.
Offspring signalling or soliciting for parental care is thought to significantly influence the
outcome of parent-offspring conflict. Solicitation for parental care, exhibited in birds, mam-
mals, insects, and even plants, is both taxonomically widespread and common [46]. This be-
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haviour, often referred to as offspring begging, occurs in a variety of forms, including auditory,
visual, and chemical signals [47]. Parental responses to begging behaviour via adjustments
in resource provisioning and allocation are also complex and diverse in nature. The ubiquity
and diversity of begging behaviour and parental responses has motivated decades of extensive
theoretical and empirical research, with literature often focusing on the ultimate function of
begging. Although it is often argued that begging behaviour is used to guide the feeding be-
haviour of parents by indicating levels of need — and is thus cooperative — debate over the
function of begging is on-going, and recent empirical data has demonstrated that current theory
is unable to explain and predict observed begging and provisioning behaviours.
1.3.1 Begging as blackmail
Offspring signals have been demonstrated to be metabolically taxing [48, 49, 50, 51] and to
increase predation rates [52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57], even though less expensive forms of commu-
nication between offspring and parent could seemingly evolve. For these reasons, early theory
on offspring signalling focussed on the notion that offspring may evolve to effectively handicap
themselves by signalling to shift the outcome of parent-offspring conflict over provisioning
closer to the offspring’s optimal provisioning rates [58, 59, 60]. Offspring begging reduces
offspring fitness, but parents can reduce or prevent these expensive soliciting behaviours by
providing greater care for the offspring than would be optimal for the parent in the absence of
begging behaviours. This central idea will henceforth be referred to as the blackmail hypothe-
sis. A series of models have determined that this blackmailing behaviour can be evolutionarily
stable in a wide variety of situations [61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 60, 66].
The blackmail hypothesis was initially criticized because models supporting the hypothesis
assumed the behaviour of parents and offspring were fixed rather than dynamic [67]. Johnstone
later proved that the blackmail hypothesis is robust even when parent and offspring responses
could evolve [66], but by then, several hypotheses, discussed below, had become more widely
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accepted. The blackmail hypothesis has also been criticized because there have been several
empirical studies that did not find any fitness costs associated with signalling [68]. Further,
signalling can be shown to be stable even in the absence of signalling costs, and thus the
blackmail hypothesis may be less parsimonious than other hypotheses.
1.3.2 Signal of quality
Grafen was the first to formalize that signalling behaviour can be stable only when they are
generally honest so that the receiver may benefit on average by responding to the signal; oth-
erwise, the receiver would ignore the signal and the signal would not evolve [69]. He extended
the idea of honest signals to propose that offspring may be honestly signalling to their parents
their quality by begging when their quality would otherwise be unknown to the parent. The
parents may benefit by distributing resources in accordance to these signals by provisioning for
the best growing chicks to avoid wasting resources on the sick or weak. The principal assump-
tion for this hypothesis is that higher-quality offspring can ’afford’ to beg more aggressively —
and thus the signal is honest — whereas begging results in relatively greater harm for smaller
offspring. A second important assumption is that parents are to some degree limited in the
resources they can provide their offspring, otherwise they could provide all offspring with an
abundance of resources [69]. This reasoning formed the signal of quality (SoQ) hypothesis.
Although Godfray broadly defined quality as being equal to the current condition or repro-
ductive value of the offspring, the definition of ’quality’ was neither very precise nor consistent
among authors [69] — a primary reason the theory generally fell out of favour among the-
orists. The SoQ hypothesis has been suggested to be limited due to the assumption that the
costs of signalling are less for higher-quality individuals [67]. Verification of this theory has
remained elusive because measuring an offspring’s current or potential reproductive value is
required, yet there is no agreed upon metric for this value. Body size has been proposed to be a
proxy closely related to potential fitness, but such cues are easily assessed by parents, meaning
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signals should not be required for parents to evaluate offspring quality.
1.3.3 Signal of need
The theory that offspring with the greatest need — as defined by the marginal fitness benefits of
increased provisioning — beg loudest and receive the most resources from parents is by far the
most widely studied and recognized hypothesis that seeks to explain begging and provision-
ing behaviours. The signal of need (SoN) hypothesis was first formally proposed by Godfray
(1991), and hinges on the idea that offspring condition cannot be perceived by the parent in
the absence of these honest signals [67]. A SoN system benefits both parent and offspring as it
guides the parent to distribute resources more optimally. Unfortunately, for mathematical con-
venience, the model constructed by Godfray tacitly assumed for mathematical convenience that
quality and need were antonyms, where offspring with higher levels of fitness necessarily had
lower levels of need. This assumption, embedded in functions that represent how offspring fit-
ness changes with parental provisioning levels, was repeated in several models extended from
Godfray’s original [70, 71, 72, 73].
Like SoQ, SoN has not received strong empirical support due to the difficult in assessing
the current and potential reproductive of offspring. Several hunger experiments that have os-
tensibly provided support for the SoN hypothesis — and criticism for the SoQ hypothesis —
have now been criticized, as hunger does not necessarily correlate to potential marginal fitness
gains [46], conflating proximate and ultimate explanations for begging behaviour. Further,
models [70] often assume that the intention of the parent is to always raise all offspring and
ignore the importance and prevalence of brood-reduction behaviour that is widespread in the
animal kingdom [46]. It has been argued that when resources are scarce, parents should instead
allocate resources only to the few offspring which they can successful raise, an argument that is
in line with SoQ [46]. More recent experiments on species that regularly use brood reduction
tactics have shown parents skew resources toward larger offspring, and that there is a corre-
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lation between total resources allocated to offspring and the size of fledging. Indeed, while
several studies have been viewed as champions for the SoN hypothesis, there are a consider-
able number of studies, particularly those focusing populations with very limited food, that are
in opposition of SoN and in support of SoQ [74, 75, 76, 77]. Although these two hypothe-
ses have frequently been compared, they need not be mutual exclusive, with SoN being used
whenever there is enough resources to reliably raise all offspring, and SoQ employed whenever
there are a shortage of resources [46].
1.3.4 Signal of hunger
Both SoN and SoQ hypotheses assume that the offspring is more aware than the parents of its
own potential reproductive value, an assumption that has not yet been carefully examined for
plausibility. The SoN and SoQ hypotheses also somewhat fail to account for the information
conveyed by body cues (e.g. size, weight) which, regardless of begging levels, are very often
readily available to parents and could influence provisioning and allocation tactics. Mock [46]
argues that these weaknesses are addressed by his signal of hunger (SoH) hypothesis, which
stipulates that signals are merely proximate indications of fullness. This is precisely what
hunger experiments are, in fact, assessing (as opposed to need), with the general finding that,
as predicted by SoH, offspring beg less intensely after a large meal. Parents can either choose
to respond to signal intensity (complying with SoN) or body cues (inline with SoQ), depending
on resource availability.
This theory, like the SoN and SoQ hypotheses but unlike the blackmail hypothesis, suffers
in part because it is unable to explain why conspicuous signals, such as exuberant vocal beg-
ging, are used instead of more subtle cues that are less metabolically taxing and are less likely
to attract predators. While Mock champions SoH for its parsimony, it does have an additional
assumption compared to SoN and SoQ: parents must be able to reliably and efficiently assess
body cues. In species that build nests in tree cavities, the assessment of visual cues may not
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be very efficient. Body cue assessment may also be unreliable: inherent sex differences in the
size of offspring, for example, could make ineffective parental provisioning and offspring beg-
ging behaviours that are based solely on offspring size; the consequences of this oversight are
addressed in Chapter 4. Most importantly, however, this theory applies more to the proximate
rather than the ultimate causes for begging behaviour.
1.3.5 Begging for efficiency
A final hypothesis that has yet to be concretely formalized posits that offspring begging may
comprise a system that is not entirely necessary but is simply a more efficient method for off-
spring to convey information to parents. Referring again to the many species that lay eggs in
tree hollows, it may cost parents less time or energy to assess offspring signals instead of body
cues, and these resources could instead be redirected toward greater overall provisioning levels.
If offspring signals are more easily assessed, they could benefit both parent and offspring, in-
creasing either or both direct or indirect fitness. The wide prevalence of exuberant vocal cries
may also be explained with this through by recognizing that parents often need to leave the
nests to gather resources. Auditory cues provide parents with a means of leaving nests while
also being able to monitor the status of their offspring.
Note that none of the above hypotheses are mutually exclusive. However, the offspring
blackmail and begging for efficiency hypotheses are more closely related to the provisioning
levels — the total amount of resources given to all offspring — whereas signals of need, quality
and hunger may significantly influence both parental provisioning and allocation behaviour –
the way parents distribute resources among offspring.
1.3.6 The mathematics of signalling theory
Signalling theory has been investigated using a diverse set of mathematical models and tools.
Generally, these models involve a single parent and one or two offspring, with the goal of find-
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ing the begging intensity of the offspring and either the provisioning or the allocation behaviour
of the parent at equilibrium. This section will review the basic mathematical framework used
in previous signalling models while also addressing the limitations of these models.
Godfray model
Box #1: Mathematical framework of Godfray’s (1991) one-offspring model [67]
Godfray was the first to concretely and mathematically formulate the SoN hypothesis [67]. His
models had two players: the parent and the offspring. The fitness function of an offspring,
f (c, x, y), depends on its initial or baseline condition, level of solicitation, and the amount of
resources the offspring receives, denoted by c, x, and y, respectively. Signalling is assumed to
be costly, and thus offspring fitness decreases with increasing x. The parent’s residual fitness,
g(y), decreases as it provides more resources to its current offspring. The amount of resources
provided to the offspring is some unknown function of the offspring’s begging intensity, y =
S (x), which will be identified by finding the evolutionarily stable level of solicitation, x∗, and
the level of parental provisioning, y∗, as functions of offspring condition, c. At equilibrium,
small increases in begging intensity will not produce a change in the offspring’s net inclusive
fitness. Mathematically, this condition corresponds to
S ′(x∗) fy(y∗, x∗, c) + S ′(x∗)rgy(y∗) + fx(y∗, x∗, c) = 0, (1.3)
where the first term represents the increase in the offspring’s direct fitness as provisioning in-
creases, the second term represents the decrease in the parent’s residual fitness due to increased
provisioning, weighted by the relatedness between parent and offspring, r, and the third term
represents the decrease in the offspring’s direct fitness due to the cost of increasing begging
behaviour. Similarly, at evolutionary equilibrium, small increases in provisioning should yield
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no change in the parent’s net inclusive fitness; that is,
fy(y∗, x∗, c) + gy(y∗) = 0, (1.4)
where the first term represents the increase in the reproductive value of the offspring as it re-
ceives more resources while the second term denotes the decrease in residual fitness the parent
experiences due to increased provisioning rates. To identify x∗ and y∗, an initial condition is
required. It is assumed that offspring of maximal fitness, cmax, do not solicit as they do not need
provisioning, so we have the initial condition (y, x, c) = (y∗, 0, cmax).
We begin by revisiting the construction and implications of Godfray’s model [67]. First,
while the general construction of Godfray’s model (see Box #1) assumes neither SoN nor SoQ
(no explicit relation between begging intensity, provisioning, and condition is required), it
should be made clear that Godfray’s model does not provide evidence for SoN. Instead, after
building the general model, Godfray analyzes it under the assumption that SoN is true: he
defines an offspring’s need as the marginal fitness gain it experiences by obtaining more re-
sources, and assumes that parents will provide more resources to young in “poor condition”
(low reproductive value) [67, 46] (mathematically, he assumes fy is greater for offspring with
lower c). Note that nothing in the framework given in Box #1 prohibits the converse assump-
tion that parents will provide more resources to young in good condition, such that parents feed
according to which offspring has better intrinsic fitness. He then explicitly states that offspring
fitness increases monotonically with respect to greater resources (mathematically fx > 0), and
adds a further restriction — that this increase occurs at a uniformly decelerating rate. While
the former assumption is altogether reasonable, no justification is provided for the latter as-
sumption, even though there is good evidence that fitness as a function of resources obtained is
typically of a very different form compared to what he proposes, and is often instead modelled
as being sigmoidal [78, 79].
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Godfray chooses to illustrate his model by selecting example offspring and parent fit-
ness functions based primarily on mathematical convenience, f = (1 − e−cy) − 0.1x, and
g = 1 − 0.08 ∗ y, respectively, and solves for y∗ and x∗. While there is no issue with the
foundation of Godfray’s model, other than perhaps its simplicity compared to the known in-
tricacies of begging behaviour observed in nature [72, 80, 81, 82], which has been addressed
elsewhere, there are several issues with the example Godfray selects. First, as Rodriguez-
Girones points out in several of his papers [71, 83, 72], Godfray fails to recognize that the
equilibrium he found for his example is, in fact, unstable, and that there exists a non-signalling
equilibrium that is stable. Rodriguez-Girones demonstrates that sibling competition is a mech-
anism that could be used to stabilize the signalling equilibrium [72]. However, he did so by
focusing only the specific example (and hence the specific fitness functions) that Godfray uses;
even slightly modifying the fitness functions (e.g. using f = (1 − e−cy) − c1x, where c1 is a
sufficiently low positive constant) is sufficient to ensure at least the local stability of the sig-
nalling equilibrium. Second, the example Godfray selects is misleading because he states that
“as condition of the young deteriorates, both the level of display and the amount of parental
investment increases”. This is only true for a certain range of conditions; for 0 < c < 0.5, both
resources obtained and level of solicitation as a function of condition are non-monotonic, and
indeed reach a peak before declining in the fashion suggested by Godfray. This is to say, these
results do not indicate that this is not wholly a signal of need model, since needier offspring
(lower c) do not necessarily exhibit lower levels of solicitation nor obtain more resources from
parents. Another issue with the example Godfray uses is that he finds the equilibrium level of
parental investment, y∗ = 1c ln
c
γ
, is completely independent of the offspring’s solicitation level.
Mathematically, this result is due to the offspring’s fitness function having linear dependency
on x. Because of this, parents are not explicitly modifying their allocation strategy based on
the need of their offspring, despite the fact that Godfray designs the model with the intention
of offspring begging intensity influencing parental provisioning (Box #1).
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Despite these limitations of Godfray’s model, his work suggests that SoN can be evolu-
tionarily stable under a variety of conditions without the assumption that the cost of signalling
is dependent upon the signaller’s condition — an assumption that is incompatible with SoQ.
SoN was thus viewed as being more parsimonious and many signalling models published since
Godfray’s seminal paper have SoN as a built-in assumption [70, 71, 72, 73]. However, the
assumption that offspring fitness monotonically increases at a decelerating rate ensures ’need’
and ’quality’ are antonyms, and thus that SoQ and SoN are mutually exclusive. We take is-
sue with how SoQ has been defined, since quality can hold many different meanings. Most
theoretical work regards quality as being the opposite of need and the same as condition and
reproductive value; however, in these works, offspring all had the same fitness functions (al-
though may have differed in condition — effectively the offspring’s current placement along
the fitness function curve). When fitness functions differ (Figure 1.1), need as defined by the
marginal change in the offspring’s fitness with increased investment may no longer be the op-
posite of quality. Alternatively, quality could refer to the potential reproductive value that an
offspring possesses, meaning that offspring with the greatest reproductive value, if resources
were effectively unlimited, could be considered of highest quality. For example, certain off-
spring may be “late bloomers”: perhaps initial investments into this offspring yield only small
increases in reproductive value, but there may exist some threshold of provisioning/nutrition
passed which the higher quality sibling actually possesses uniformly higher reproductive value
than its siblings per degree of investment (Figure 1.1).
Box #2: Mathematical framework of Godfray’s (1995) two-offspring model [70]
Suppose instead that a parent has two offspring, i and j, and xi, ci, yi, and fi(xi, yi, ci) (resp.
x j, c j, y j, and f j(x j, y j, c j)) represents the level of solicitation, condition, resources received
by, and the fitness function of offspring i (resp. offspring j). Again, there is assumed to be
some relationship between the begging intensity of offspring and the amount of resources it
receives. Suppose the parent has a set amount of resource, Y , and distributes this amount
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Figure 1.1: When the fitness functions of offspring differ significantly, it becomes difficult
to define which offspring has greater quality. To the left of the dashed line, the fitness of
offspring i (red line) is uniformly higher than the fitness of offspring j (blue line), and could be
considered as being of higher quality. Conversely, to the right of the dashed line, offspring j
may be considered of higher quality. Given perfect information, a parent that has only 2 units
of resources would allocate all resources to offspring i. However, if the parent had 6 units of
resources, it would invest all resources into offspring j.
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between its offspring such that yi + y j = Y). At equilibrium, parents will allocate resources such
that slight changes in resource distribution will not change the parent’s net inclusive fitness;
mathematically,
∂ fi
∂yi
=
∂ f j
∂y j
. (1.5)
At the ESS, the net change in the inclusive fitness of each offspring should zero; that is,
∂ fi
∂xi
+
∂yi
∂xi
∂ fi
∂yi
+ r
(
∂x j
∂xi
∂ f j
∂x j
+
∂y j
∂xi
∂ f j
∂y j
)
= 0, (1.6)
where r is the relatedness between the two offspring. The ESS begging and allocation strategies
can be found using (3) and (4) only for specified offspring fitness functions. An alteration of
this model created by Rodriguez-Girones [72] allows flexibility in the total amount of resources
the parent allocates to the offspring, Y , by making allocation decisions explicitly a function
of begging behaviour, yi = Y xixi+x j and y j =
Y x j
xi+x j
; this extension, inspired by empirical data,
makes the model more realistic. Due to this, the residual fitness of the parent, g(Y), needs to
be tracked, producing the following fitness functions, Fi, F j, and Fp, for offspring i, j, and the
parent, respectively,
Fi = fi(xi, yi, ci) + rs f j(x j, y j, c j) + rpg(Y)
Fi = rs fi(xi, yi, ci) + f j(x j, y j, c j) + rpg(Y)
Fp = fi(xi, yi, ci) + f j(x j, y j, c j) + g(Y)

(1.7)
where rp and rs represents the relatedness between parent and offspring and the offsprings,
respectively. Again, by specifying fitness functions, the evolutionary stable levels of begging,
x∗i and x
∗
j, and resource allocation strategy, y
∗
i and y
∗
j, can be solved by numerically analyzing
system (5).
To examine Godfray’s model, then, it is crucial to identify the ESS levels of begging and
provisioning using more realistic offspring fitness functions. This is made especially apparent
by examining Godfray’s two-offspring extension (see Box #2) of his 1991 model [70]. Un-
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fortunately, Godfray once again chose to discuss the implications of his model by selecting
specific functions (of the same general structure as the functions chosen to illustrate his one-
offspring model), which does not properly represent the diversity nor complexity of begging
behaviours observed in nature.
The parent’s residual fitness function may also be modified to investigate phenomena ob-
served in empirical studies. For instance, to better understand how environmental conditions
influence whether parents feed offspring with the greatest need or quality [80, 84], one simply
needs to modify the nature of the parent’s residual fitness function, g(Y): harsher environments
cause the parent’s residual fitness to decrease at a faster rate per unit of investment into their
current brood (mathematically, harsher environments increase δg(Y)
δY ). In this way, both SoN and
SoQ may be rules that dictate behaviour, but which theory better explains behaviour may be
dependent on fitness functions, which in turn are influenced by environmental factors. As such,
we find it prudent to divorce ourselves of the notion that a higher-quality offspring necessarily
has greater reproductive value, but rather simply has the potential to be of greater reproductive
value. In doing so, one nullifies one of the most common criticisms of the SoQ theory, that
parental intervention of food allocation in favour of higher quality offspring pointless since
offspring of higher quality should be able to out-compete their siblings anyway [85]. There are
two issues with this criticism: first, it is plausible that, even if one equates quality with current
reproductive value, that parental control over food allocation may better optimize food distri-
bution — at least from the parent’s prospective — than the outcome of competition among
offspring for resources would. Second, there are many dimensions to quality (a chick that is
better able to fight its siblings may in fact have lower reproductive value because it may fare
poorly in other arenas, like sex competition). Further, an offspring that is currently of higher
quality (i.e. is better able to compete against its siblings) may not necessarily be so for every
given level of provisioning received (that is, the relation fi > f j for all yi = y j should not be
required to conclude that offspring i is of higher quality than offspring j).
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Wild et al. model
Wild et al. [86] use a three-player evolutionary game to explore the idea that offspring may
signal to convey information to parents more efficiently than can otherwise be transmitted.
Note that this is in contrast to many previous models that assume signals communicate infor-
mation that parents cannot otherwise obtain. The three players are the parent, one high-quality
offspring, and one low-quality offspring. The parents can distinguish between the quality of
their offspring by investigating cues, but this is assumed to be less efficient than using offspring
signals to distinguish between the low- and high-quality offspring.
It is assumed that the family resides in a poor-quality environment such that the parent
is only able to successfully rear one offspring. Before the parent decides which of the two
offspring to feed, the offspring each simultaneously and independently decide whether to sig-
nal. An offspring that uses signals reduces its own fitness by some fraction. If neither or both
offspring signal, the parent is unable to use the signal to distinguish between the offspring
and must instead either feed randomly or investigate offspring quality using cues. If only one
offspring signals, the parent must decide between feeding the signaller and feeding the non-
signaller. By responding to the signal, the parent avoids wasting time and energy investigating
cues and so it can improve the fitness of the offspring that it does rear by some factor. After
identifying the inclusive fitness payoff for each individual for each outcome, the conditions for
the stability of Nash equilibria in which only one offspring signalled were derived.
Wild et al. assume that resources are so scarce that parents may raise only one offspring.
This assumption can be removed by instead allowing the amount of resources available to
the parent to vary. By investigating how this changes the conditions for the stability of Nash
equilibria in which only one offspring signals, one can explore the relationship between envi-
ronmental quality and the evolution of signalling behaviour.
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Alternatively, the base model built by Wild et al. [86] could be modified to understand how
begging behaviour influences parental conflict over provisioning. Instead of modelling two off-
spring with one parent, the players in the game could instead be two parents and one offspring.
In this way, one could explore how paternal uncertainty can differentially manipulate maternal
and paternal provisioning patterns. For example, the blackmail hypothesis has been previously
investigating in very simple models involving only one parent and one offspring.
A simplifying assumption common to nearly all previous signalling theory is the pres-
ence of only one parent. These models are unable to expound why numerous species exhibit
sex differences in the provisioning patterns of adults and the begging behaviour of offspring
[87, 88, 89, 90, 91]. While uncertain paternity is an obvious motivator for differences between
male and female provisioning behaviour, it remains less clear why males are frequently found
to beg more than their female nestmates [87, 88, 90]. Indeed, theoretical explanations for this
phenomenon may be lacking because parent-offspring conflict over provisioning has frequently
been modelled without regard to sex-specific offspring behaviours. In contrast, species-specific
theories for sex differences in begging behaviour have been the subject of several empirical
studies. Price et al. proposed that, since males tend to be larger than females, they are in
greater need and consequently beg more intensely [87]. However, this explanation cannot ex-
plain the sex-specific begging that has been observed in species that have little sex differences
in size, such as the zebra finch [90], Taeniopygia guttata, and the barn swallow [92], Hirundo
rustica.
In Chapter 3, we modify Wild et al.’s work to investigate how environmental variability and
quality influences the signalling and provisioning strategies of parents. Guided by recent em-
pirical data [80, 84], we use our model to elucidate the types of information (need vs. quality)
offspring evolve to convey when signalling. We also examine how the limiting assumptions
of Godfray’s model [67], such as simplified relationship between offspring fitness and parental
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provisioning, have influenced previous models and discussion regarding the type of informa-
tion signals convey. In Chapter 4, we expand beyond the one-parent models of signalling
behaviour by investigating conflict between parents over provisioning can explain differences
in the begging behaviours of male and female offspring observed in several species of bird.
1.4 Cooperative breeding
In cooperatively breeding species, certain individuals (auxiliaries) delay or even refrain from
reproduction to help rear offspring produced by other individuals (breeders) [93]. Two promi-
nent, complementary theories have been proposed to explain why some individuals chose to
help raise offspring that are not their own. The habitat saturation hypothesis suggests that
individuals will not disperse if it is unlikely to result in independent reproduction [94, 93].
The benefits of philopatry hypothesis is a related explanation which focuses on the benefits of
staying rather than the costs of dispersing [93, 95]. These benefits can be divided into two
categories: i) the passive advantages of remaining on the territory which include group aug-
mentation, territory inheritance, access to mating opportunities, increased survival and access
to resources from group living, and enhanced ability to form alliances and court future mates,
and ii) benefits associated with actively helping breeders raise their offspring such as increased
production of kin via helping behaviour, reciprocal altruism, and the acquisition of parenting
skills associated with helping [96, 24].
Breeders rarely coerce auxiliaries to stay and help [97, 98]; instead, prospects for indepen-
dent breeding are so poor that helpers have greater reproductive success than those attempting
to disperse [24]. Thus, cooperative breeding is another type of voluntary non-egalitarian so-
cial relationship. Like the relationship between leader and follower, there is conflict between
breeder and auxiliary, resulting in distribution of resources between breeder and auxiliary to
vary vastly between and within species, ranging from the complete monopolization of repro-
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ductive opportunities by a single breeder or breeding couple, to an even distribution of repro-
ductive success (i.e. communally breeding species) [99, 100].
High adult survival has been proposed to be an precursor to cooperative breeding because
it increases habitat saturation [101]. In highly saturated environments, the reproductive value
of each offspring is thought to diminish rapidly as more offspring are produced since offspring
may compete amongst each other for limited breeding opportunities. Since there is an inherent
trade-off between survival and fecundity, it has been suggested that cooperative breeders resid-
ing in these saturated environments should reduce their reproductive output, and thus should
tend to have smaller clutch sizes than non-cooperative breeders [94]. Although comparative
analysis has provided support for the association between longevity and cooperative breeding,
results from these studies found no connection between clutch size and cooperative breeders
[101].
An obvious explanation for the discrepancy between theoretical and empirical results is
that, while small brood sizes may predispose species to breed cooperatively, cooperative breed-
ing itself may drive an increase in clutch size. This idea has been tacitly proposed by Hardling
& Kokko, who developed a simple model to conclude that cooperative breeders should have
smaller clutch sizes compared to that of non-cooperative breeders [102]. However, this model
does not use population dynamics, and therefore may not properly account for the inclusive
fitness effects resulting from changes in clutch sizes. In this sense, the theoretical work on the
association between clutch size and cooperative breeding suffers from the same assumptions
as those used to model leader-follower relationships. Further, the model considers only the
breeder’s optimal resource distribution between fecundity and survival. It therefore neglects
the potential conflict between breeder and auxiliary, which may cause selection on brood size
to deviate from the breeder’s optimum [103, 104].
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In Chapter 5, I revisit this theory on the association between clutch size and cooperative
breeding. In contrast to previous theory [102], I describe how the emergence of cooperative
breeding influences clutch size by constructing a thorough inclusive fitness model using pop-
ulation dynamics. I also explore how the conflict between breeder and auxiliary over helping
behaviour may influence clutch sizes.
1.5 Coalitionary behaviour
Coalitionary behaviour refers to the formation of temporary alliances between two or more
individuals that target other individuals or alliances [11]. Coalitions have been commonly ob-
served in a wide variety of species, including humans and primates [105]. Fundamentally, a
coalition forms so that its members can obtain or retain more resources than would be possible
if instead its members operated individually.
Coalitionary behaviour can be classified into three basic categories based on the members
of the coalition and its target: i) ‘all-up’ or ‘revolutionary’ coalitions in which individuals direct
aggression toward those of higher rank, ii) ‘all-down’ coalitions formed by higher-ranking indi-
viduals targeting low-ranking individuals, and iii) ’bridging’ coalitions formed among at least
one member ranking above and one ranking below the coalition’s target. It has been observed
that all-up coalitions are relatively rare compared to all-down coalitions [11]. A theory for the
relatively low frequency of all-up coalitions has been proposed [11]: the threat of revolutionary
coalitions may lead high-ranked individuals to concede a greater amount of resources toward
lower ranked individuals, thereby deterring the formation of all-up coalitions. Whether such
an intriguing verbal argument is a valid outcome of genetic and social evolution remains to be
tested. The idea is highly related to other important biological theories, including the ‘concede
versus control’ debate regarding dominant breeders of cooperatively breeding species. In many
cooperatively breeding species, such as meerkats (Suricata suricatta), subordinate individuals
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breed [28, 106]. This is often suboptimal for the dominant breeders, as their offspring have
greater competition for the group’s resources. It has been proposed that this occurs because
breeders are not always able to prevent subordinate reproduction (control), while others posit
that dominant individuals permit subordinates to occasionally breed to retain them as helpers
(concede) [106]. Other theories for the rarity of revolutionary coalitions include the high cost
of targeting dominant individuals, and the fact that revolutionary alliances can be countered by
all-down coalitions, which often consist of more dominant individuals [11].
The type of resources which are contested by coalitions vary vastly both within and be-
tween species. Resources can be divisible (e.g. food, eating order) or indivisible (e.g. mating
opportunities), which may affect the type of coalitions that form [107, 11]. For example, be-
cause it is particularly rare for mixed-sex groups to have all-up coalitions, and coalitions in
such groups often compete against others for mating opportunities, indivisible resources may
deter the evolution of all-up groups [11]. This verbal argument should be readily tested, espe-
cially if social factors such as reciprocity are considered.
Revolutionary coalitions essentially function as a levelling mechanism — a means to min-
imize the unequal division of resources in dominance hierarchies [108]. Yet, many animal
species that form dominance hierarchies do not regularly form coalitions [109]. The study of
coalition formation then provides a way to understand the nature of dominance hierarchies.
For example, Stamatopoulos et al. propose that resource scarcity will favour the emergence of
dominance hierarchies [110] — a verbal argument that requires closer examination — but why
such conditions would not also favour the emergence of coalitions to counter the unequal dis-
tribution of resources is unclear. Identifying the social, ecological, and life-history conditions
that select against coalition but for hierarchical groups is a clear avenue for future theoretical
work.
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The costs of forming coalitions are difficult to demonstrate in empirical studies. Available
data suggests that the time and energy invested in coalition formation is negligible, and that
injuries and deaths because of failed coalitions are very rare [111]. Regular observations of
punishment and costly retaliation in response to unsuccessful coalitions have been observed
only in a few species. Instead, data suggests that there may be opportunity costs (e.g. failure to
achieve higher ranks, reduced mating access) associated with coalition formation, particularly
if the coalition fails, and that this form of cost may depend on age, group composition, and
demography [111]. It would be of use to empiricists to create a model capable of quantifying
the costs of coalition formation as a function of age, sex, and other pertinent traits.
Coalitionary behaviour has been thoroughly studied using theoretical models, which has
unveiled numerous key features about coalitions, particularly regarding their formation. How-
ever, a recent comprehensive comparison between these mathematical models and the vast
amount of data collected by field biologists indicates an important lack of communication be-
tween theorists and empiricists [11]. In addition to suffering from unrealistic assumptions,
models of coalition formation focus extensively on the effects of rank and ‘resource holding
potential’ (RHP) on coalition formation [112]. Yet, empirical studies have routinely demon-
strated that coalition partners are selected often based on features like kinship [113, 114], sex
[115, 116], and age [111, 11]. Such features are ultimately functions of life-history character-
istics, including dispersal patterns, interbirth intervals, and birth cohort size [11], which can be
easily integrated into models of coalition formation.
A second issue with the current state of theoretical literature on coalitionary behaviour is
the focus on identifying Nash equilibria in isolated scenarios using simple economic games
rather than using evolutionary game theory. The standard design for most theoretical models
is to initialize a population of three individuals — often alpha, beta, and gamma males — each
with its own RHP, and each rank with its own payoff or reproductive value. Next, the payoffs
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of each potential coalition are calculated, and from this the evolutionary stable strategies are
identified. While these simple models can and have provided some information about coalition
formation, there are two potential issues with this approach. First, these models do not track
the consequences of coalitions through an individual’s entire life cycle, instead focusing only
on the immediate, direct costs of coalition formation. Second, these models assume that coali-
tion behaviour is not a function of genetic evolution; instead, actions are based solely on the
current social dynamics. It is unclear how much coalition behaviour is influenced by genetics,
although the fact that coalitions are often formed even when there are no (apparent) resources
to contest [108] suggests it may play an important role.
For example, the relative rarity of all-up coalitions may be because as all-up coalitions be-
come more common (or more successful), they may reduce the value associated with being in
higher rank, causing a negative feedback loop. In contrast, a positive feedback loop is likely
to develop for all-down coalitions, since they effectively secure the positions of highly ranked
individuals, which provides greater reason to secure such positions. In these simple triadic
interactions, the probability with which each coalition forms and succeeds should ultimately
affect the reproductive value associated with each rank. The coevolution between coalition
formation strategies and other essential factors, such as the reproductive value associated with
each rank, has thus far been neglected by previous theoretical studies.
Chapter 6 is dedicated to amending these weaknesses in the theoretical literature on coali-
tionary behaviour. We create a set of life-history models to determine how the nature of coali-
tionary behavior that emerges at evolutionary equilibrium is influenced by the types of costs,
in terms of survival, fecundity, and social rank, aﬄicted upon members of failed coalitions. We
test the theory that the relative rarity of all-up coalitions can be explained by dominant individ-
uals preventing their formation by granting concessions to subordinates; this is accomplished
by modelling the coevolution between coalitionary behavior and concessions. We then con-
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trast our results to empirical data to provide an evolutionary context for commonly observed
coalitionary behaviors.
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Abstract
In many species, individuals disperse in groups. While there are empirical studies that
explore the proximate incentives for group dispersal, theoretical research has primarily
examined the consequences rather than the evolution of this phenomenon. We design a
simple model to study the origin and evolution of group dispersal. We assume that like
many other group activities associated with collective movement, group dispersal in our
model is initiated by leaders. We use the theory of inclusive fitness to examine the in-
centives for leading and following in this context. High relatedness, significant reductions
in the cost of dispersal due to dispersing in groups, and reproductive skew in favour of
followers facilitates the emergence of group dispersal. In contrast to some previous theo-
retical work, which has either concluded that that leadership uniformly altruistic or that it
is uniformly selfish, we find that at evolutionary equilibrium the incentives for leading can
be either selfish or altruistic, depending on ecological and social conditions such as the cost
of dispersal and the relatedness between leaders and followers. Our model demonstrates
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that kin selection is sufficient and that individual differences in condition and ability are
not necessary to promote the emergence and maintenance of leader-follower relationships.
2.1 Introduction
Leadership is not a uniquely human trait. Dominant male baboons initiate foraging activities
[1], alpha-male chimpanzees resolve conflicts by eliminating aggressive behaviour [2], certain
species of ants use tandem running to direct movement toward resources [3], dominant females
of the dwarf mongoose determine the location of resting sites [4], and in the free-ranging dogs,
Canis lupus familiaris, pack leaders organize group defense [4]. While there are many forms
of leadership, leader-follower social structures are frequently used to coordinate group move-
ment such as foraging and migration [5]. Despite this, little is known theoretically about the
evolution of natal dispersal — dispersal from birth place to breeding sites — involving leader-
follower relationships. It is standard in mathematical models to assume that dispersal occurs
independently, but in many species dispersal occurs in groups of individuals that are often
but not always related, and group dispersal is frequently initiated by a subset of individuals
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. The few models that incorporate the concept of group dispersal do
not examine the emergence or maintenance of this biological phenomenon, nor do they assume
the presence of leader-follower relationships [14, 15, 16].
While the impact of group dispersal on the evolution of social behaviour has been previ-
ously explored [14, 15], theoretical knowledge of the origin and maintenance of group dis-
persal is lacking. Additionally, the current body of literature on leadership and followership
often suggests or assumes that leaders will emerge only if they receive direct fitness benefits
[17], but this is seemingly in conflict with the widely-accepted theory that dispersal is an act of
altruism [18]. Thus, careful analysis is required to understand the evolutionary incentives for
group dispersal.
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In this paper, we build a simple model for the evolution of natal dispersal with the goal
of understanding how group dispersal can emerge and be maintained when certain individuals
(leaders) initiate dispersal and others (followers) disperse with these leaders. Our aim is to
generate a mathematical description of the evolutionary incentives for leading and following
in dispersal groups. We show how certain social and ecological factors can promote the emer-
gence of group dispersal. We identify how leader-follower relationships can affect population
dynamics, including the evolutionarily stable levels of natal dispersal. We also describe how
leader-follower relationships in the context of dispersal affect altruistic behaviour.
2.2 The Model
We develop an infinite-island model of an infinitely large population with non-overlapping
generations based on Taylor’s model for the dispersal of offspring [18]. Every island contains
N breeding territories, each of which is inhabited by exactly one haploid asexual breeder that
produces a very large number of offspring. The only potential difference between individuals
is their dispersal strategy, which is controlled by three independent loci. The first locus dictates
the probability with which a given individual will become a leader. Leaders are individuals
who always disperse from their natal island. Dispersers leave their natal island and disperse
toward an island chosen uniformly at random from the set of all islands. The second locus de-
scribes at what probability an individual will follow given that they are not a leader. Followers
also always disperse, but will only do so only in the presence of a leader; this allows for the
creation of both lone dispersers and dispersal groups of variable size. Every individual in a
given dispersal group is born on the same island and will disperse together toward the same
island chosen at random. The presence of followers therefore ensures that the dispersal of in-
dividuals no longer occurs independently. The third locus influences the competitive ability of
leaders relative to that of followers, and is discussed in greater detail below.
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Fix attention on a given island - the focal island - then fix attention on an individual on that
island - the focal individual - immediately following its birth. The leadership phenotype of the
focal individual is denoted by d• ∈ (0, 1) and it expresses the probability that the focal individ-
ual will lead. Similarly, d′• ∈ (0, 1) represents the followership phenotype, which corresponds
to the probability that the focal individual will be willing to follow. Since individuals can fol-
low only if they do not lead, (1 − d•)d′• represents the probability that the focal individual is a
follower. It is also possible, with probability (1 − d•)(1 − d′•), that the focal individual neither
leads nor follows, in which case it stays on its natal island.
Dispersal is a costly endeavour, but may be less costly when it is attempted in larger groups
[19]. Let ck = c0αk represent the cost of dispersal, where c0 represents the cost experienced
by individuals who disperse alone, α ∈ [0, 1] controls the rate at which the cost of dispersal
decreases as group sizes increases and k represent the number of followers other than the focal
individual that are in the dispersal group. Every individual in a particular dispersal group ex-
periences the same cost of dispersal. If dispersers successfully arrive at their destination, they
will then compete against other dispersers as well as non-dispersing natives for each of the N
available breeding positions. We assume that in addition to lower dispersal costs, larger groups
are better able to compete for breeding territories. Thus we define uk may be an increasing
function that describes the relative competitive advantage that groups with k followers have
over lone individuals (we assume u0 = 1); uk can be viewed as a function denoting the benefits
of group augmentation. We further assume that non-dispersers do not form groups and com-
pete for each breeding site as individuals; this is done to contrast the benefits of leadership with
the decision to not join groups.
For each of the N breeding territories on a particular island, a winning group or individ-
ual is selected with probability proportional to their relative competitive ability (equal to 1
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for non-dispersers) multiplied by the probability that they survived dispersal (equal to 1 for
non-dispersers). Should a group win the rights to a particular territory, group members then
compete with each other for the sole breeding position. Followers are guaranteed to have
both themselves and a leader in their dispersal group, but leaders run the risk of dispersing by
themselves. Therefore we give leaders a competition advantage over followers to compensate
for this risk. Let s•k represent the probability that the focal individual, should he be a leader,
successfully competes against his k followers for the right to breed on the territory that the
dispersal group has won; a given follower wins with probability 1−s•kk . All results in this paper
were generated under the assumption that s•k =
β
β+k , where β ≥ 1 can be viewed as the rel-
ative competitive ability or competitiveness of leaders compared to that of its followers. All
sampling is done with replacement so that any group may win the rights to multiple breeding
territories and any individual may become the breeder on multiple territories. In order to have
non-overlapping generations, any individual who fails to become a breeder will die, leaving
each of the N breeding territories occupied by exactly one breeder.
To calculate the expected fitness [20] of a focal individual on a focal island, some additional
notation is required. Let d¯, d¯′, and s¯k denote the focal island’s average leadership, follower-
ship and competitive ability phenotypic values, respectively; similarly, d, d′, and sk represent
the global-average leadership, followership, and competitive ability phenotypic values, respec-
tively. We assume that the number of offspring produced on each breeding territory, K, is very
large. In doing so, we are able to use the Poisson distribution with mean equal to the expected
number of followers in a given dispersal group, NK(1−d¯)d¯
′
NKd¯ =
(1−d¯)d¯′
d¯ , to calculate the probability
that a given dispersal group on the focal island contains k followers (see Supplementary Data).
To justify all assumptions and to confirm the accuracy of our model, a stochastic simulation
was created, the results of which agree with our analytic model (see Supplementary Data).
We use the direct fitness formulation from Taylor & Frank to calculate the neighbour-
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modulated fitness [21] of a focal individual on a focal island (Appendix A)
W =
Not dispersing︷                                          ︸︸                                          ︷
(1 − d•)(1 − d′•)
(1 − d¯)(1 − d¯′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
+
Leading︷                                             ︸︸                                             ︷
d•
∑∞
k=0 Qk(1 − ck)uks•k
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j) (2.1)
+
Following︷                                                        ︸︸                                                        ︷
(1 − d•)d′•
∑∞
k=0 Qk(1 − ck+1)uk+1 1−s¯k+1k+1
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
where P and Q represent Poisson distributions about the global mean dispersal group size,
λ = (1−d)d
′
d , and the mean dispersal group size of the focal island, λ¯ =
(1−d¯)d¯′
d¯ , respectively. At
equilibrium, d = d¯, d′ = d¯′, and so Q j = P j. This fitness expression (2.1) can be divided into
three main components: the neighbour-modulated fitness gained from leading, following, and
doing neither.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Emergence of Leader-Follower Behaviour
To investigate the emergence of leader-follower behaviour in our model, suppose no individual
in the population exhibits any willingness to follow (i.e d′ = 0). In this case, our model be-
comes exactly equivalent to Taylor’s, with the cost of dispersal uniformly equal to c0. Assume
we have a population of only leaders dispersing at Taylor’s predicted evolutionarily stable strat-
egy (i.e. d = H+1−2NcH+1−2Nc2 , where H =
√
1 + 4N(N − 1)c2, but see Appendix D for greater detail).
Now fix attention on a mutant individual. This mutant has not dispersed; it instead exhibits
deviant behaviour by following another disperser. This leader-follower pair will disperse to-
gether toward an island selected uniformly at random from the set of all islands. The change in
the inclusive fitness of the focal individual as a result of its deviant behaviour can be described
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by
∆WF = − 1 + u1(1 − c1)(1 − s1) I
+ c0 II (2.2)
+ R((u1(1 − c1)s1 − (1 − c0))) III
where R is the expected coefficient of relatedness between the mutant and a random individual
on its natal island (Appendix C), c0 and c1 are the cost of dispersing singly (i.e. with zero fol-
lowers) and in pairs (i.e. a leader and its follower), respectively, u1 represents the competitive
advantage that dispersing pairs have over lone individuals when competing for breeding terri-
tories, and s1 describes the probability that the leader will outcompete its follower for breeding
opportunities. Equation (2.2) shows that the inclusive fitness effects of following are given by
three components:
(I) The direct fitness effect of following. This term represents the difference between the
focal individual’s expected fitness should it have not dispersed and the expected direct
fitness of the focal individual given that it is a follower. Since the population is at equi-
librium, it can be assumed without loss of generality that by following and sacrificing the
opportunity to breed on its natal island, the mutant forgoes a reproductive value of one
[22]. The pair survives dispersal with probability 1− c1 and is u1 ≥ 1 times as likely as a
given lone individual to win a breeding territory. The mutant outcompetes its leader for
breeding opportunities with probability (1-s1). Thus the mutant has an expected direct
fitness of u1(1 − c1)(1 − s1).
(II) The decrease in local competition due to the focal individual’s increased tendency to
disperse. By dispersing, any breeding opportunities that the focal individual would have
won by remaining on the natal island is instead granted to another individual who, after
dispersal, is present on the island. Thus this term is equal to the probability, h, that a
randomly selected individual on an island after dispersal is native to that island multi-
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plied by the average relatedness, R, between individuals born on the same island [18].
In a polymorphic population at equilibrium, the inclusive fitness of each strategy must
be equal [23], and so the loss in direct fitness experienced by dispersers must be com-
pensated by an increase in indirect fitness. Therefore, by dispersing and decreasing kin
competition, the mutant gains Rh = c0 units of indirect fitness.
(III) The change in inclusive fitness produced by the change in the direct fitness of the leader
that the focal individual follows. If the leader dispersed alone, it would have an expected
direct fitness of 1 − c0. By dispersing with a follower, the leader now has an expected
direct fitness of u1(1 − c1)s1. Then by following, the mutant changes the expected direct
fitness of the leader by u1(1−c1)s1− (1−c0), and given that the coefficient of relatedness
between the mutant and a random individual on its natal island is R (Appendix C), this
means the mutant’s indirect fitness changes by R(u1(1 − c1)s1 − (1 − c0)).
Followership will now emerge in the population whenever following increases one’s inclu-
sive fitness [20, 21]; equivalently, leader-follower behaviour emerges if and only if ∆WF > 0.
A wide range of biologically relevant parameter conditions satisfy ∆WF > 0 (Figure 2.1),
demonstrating that leader-follower patterns can emerge in a population that is homogeneous
apart from differences in individual propensities to lead and to follow. Followership and hence
group dispersal is more likely to emerge when: (i) the cost of dispersing alone is high relative
to the expected costs associated with dispersing in groups, (ii) relatedness between individuals
born on the same island is high (equivalently, when N is low and c0 is high, but see Appendix
C and Figure 2.1), and (iii) followers are given a greater share of reproductive opportunities.
2.3.2 Altruism in Leader-Follower Relationships
Analytic Solutions
We now describe how leader-follower relationships affect altruistic behaviour in the popula-
tion. We will continue to use Taylor & Frank’s [20] direct fitness formulation to determine
56 Chapter 2. The evolution of group dispersal with leaders and followers
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
s
N = 2 c0 = 0.05
c 1
0.0269
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
s
N = 5 c0 = 0.05
c 1
0.0260
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
s
N = 100 c0 = 0.05
c 1
0.0257
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
s
N = 2 c0 = 0.25
c 1
0.1850
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
s
N = 5 c0=0.25
c 1
0.1601
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
s
N = 100 c0 = 0.25
c 1
0.1538
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
s
N = 2 c0 = 0.55
c 1
0.5287
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
s
N = 5 c0 = 0.55
c 1
0.5163
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
s
N = 100 c0 = 0.55
c 1
0.5095
Relatedness
Re
lat
ed
ne
ss
Figure 2.1: Leader-follower relationships in our model emerges under a wide variety of bio-
logically reasonable conditions. Any point that lies below the blue lines represents parameter
conditions under which followership emerges. Points below the horizontal black lines repre-
sent parameter conditions under which the assumption c0 > c1 is satisfied. Thus any values of s
and c1 that lie in the grey region (the area of which is given in the top left corner of each graph)
constitute a set of reasonable social and ecological conditions that can support the emergence
of leader-follower behaviour. Values of s lying to the right of the vertical black line represent
situations in which leaders take a disproportionate large amount of resources. Note that as
relatedness increases, so too does the parameter space under which followership emerges. All
else being equal, individuals are less likely to disperse when dispersal costs are higher, and thus
relatedness between individuals on the same island increases as c0 increases. Similarly, as the
number of breeding territories per island decreases, it becomes more likely that any given two
individuals were produced by the same breeder, and thus relatedness increases as N decreases
(Appendix C). Results were generated using uk = k + 1.
2.3. Results 57
evolutionarily stable levels of leadership and followership in the population. This requires the
assumption of weak selection, which our stochastic simulation will demonstrate is valid. Dis-
persal strategies evolves until each parameter arrives at a biologically imposed boundary or a
local maximum, defined below as
(
∂W
∂d•
+ R
∂W
∂d¯
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d,d′•=d¯′=d′,s•=s¯=s
= 0,(
∂W
∂d′•
+ R
∂W
∂d¯′
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d,d′•=d¯′=d′,s•=s¯=s
= 0, (2.3)(
∂W
∂s•
+ R
∂W
∂s¯
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d,d′•=d¯′=d′,s•=s¯=s.
= 0
Each expression in (2.3) has a clear biological interpretation. To illustrate this, consider a
mutant individual who has some increased propensity to lead. The change in inclusive fitness
due to this deviant behaviour,
(
∂W
∂d• + R
∂W
∂d¯
)∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d
, is proportional to
∆WL = − (1 − d′) I
+
∞∑
k=0
Qkuk(1 − ck)sk II
− d′
∞∑
k=0
Qkuk+1(1 − ck+1)1 − sk+1k + 1 III (2.4)
+ R(1 − d′)h IV
+ d
∞∑
k=0
δQkuk(1 − ck)sk V
+ (1 − d)d′
∞∑
k=0
δQkuk+1(1 − ck+1)1 − sk+1k + 1 VI
where δQk is the change in the distribution of the dispersal group sizes that form on the focal
individual’s natal patch as a result of its increasing propensity to lead.
The sign of ∆WL corresponds to the direction of selection: if ∆WL > 0, selection will favour
a greater disposition to lead, whereas if ∆WL < 0, selection will favour lower propensities to
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lead. We will explain the biological interpretation of each term in ∆WL:
(I) The loss of direct fitness due to the decreased propensity to not disperse. Conditioned on
the event that the focal individual would not have been a follower (probability (1 − d′)),
he gives up the opportunity to breed on his natal patch. Since we assume without loss
of generality that that non-dispersers have a reproductive value of 1, by increasing the
probability that the focal individual leads, he loses a reproductive value of −(1 − d′).
(II) The gain in direct fitness due to the increased propensity to lead. The focal individual is
now more likely to become a leader. As with the wild-type leaders, he attracts followers
and forms a dispersal group the size of which is modelled by the Poisson distribution
Pk, where k represents the number of followers. The group survives dispersal with prob-
ability 1 − ck, and is uk times as likely as a lone individual to win a breeding position.
With probability sk, the focal individual successfully competes against his followers for
breeding opportunities. Overall then, the direct fitness of the focal individual increases
by
∑∞
k=0 Pkuk(1 − ck)sk.
(III) The loss of direct fitness due to the decreased propensity to not follow. By becoming
a leader, the mutant relinquishes his opportunity to become a follower. He would have
become a follower with probability d′, and in doing so would have with probability Qk
joined a group with k other followers. This group would have had k + 2 individuals,
would have survived dispersal with probability 1 − ck+1, and would have been uk+1 as
likely as lone individuals to have won the rights to each available breeding territory. The
focal individual would have won within-group competition for breeding opportunities
with probability 1−sk+1k+1 . This explains the loss in direct fitness represented by the third
term, d′
∑∞
k=0 Qkuk+1(1 − ck+1) 1−sk+1k+1 .
(IV) The decrease in local competition resulting from the focal individual’s increased propen-
sity to disperse. Had he not been a leader, the focal individual would have stayed to
compete on its natal patch with probability (1 − d′), and so the reduction in competi-
2.3. Results 59
tion is valued at 1 × (1 − d′). This benefit is awarded to another random individual who
competes on the natal island; this individual is native to the island with probability h, in
which case it is related to the focal individual by R. Thus the focal individual’s inclusive
fitness increases by (1 − d′)hR through the reduction of kin competition.
(V) By modifying his tendency to become a leader, the focal individual changes the dis-
tribution of dispersal group sizes that form on its natal patch. This will change the
direct fitness of a random individual born on the same island as the focal individual. In
the event that this random individual becomes a leader, it has a reproductive value of
d
∑∞
k=0(Qk + δQk)uk(1 − ck)sk. The relatedness between this random individual and the
focal individual is R, and so it contributes Rd
∑∞
k=0(Qk + δQk)uk(1 − ck)sk to the focal
individual’s inclusive fitness. It follows that the change in inclusive fitness of the focal
individual is d
∑∞
k=0 δQkuk(1 − ck)sk.
(VI) An argument similar to the one used in (V) can be used to show that if instead the
random individual becomes a follower (probability (1 − d)d′ ), the change in the dis-
tribution of group sizes, δQk, would change the focal individual’s inclusive fitness by
R(1 − d)d′∑∞k=0 δQkuk+1(1 − ck+1) 1−sk+1k+1 .
A similar inclusive fitness argument can be applied to interpret the biological meaning of
the remaining expressions in (2.3). The system (2.3) is, in general, difficult to solve analyt-
ically, but the convergence stable strategies [23] and many other properties can be explored
numerically. Numerical analysis was carried out using Matlab, and copies of the scripts used
can be found in the Supplementary Data. For convenience, unless stated otherwise we set
the relative competitive ability of every leader to be equal and disallowed this trait to undergo
evolution, such that s•k = s¯k = sk. Each behavioural strategy is then influenced by only two
phenotypes, and numerical results were produced by finding solutions to the set
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(
∂W
∂d•
+ R
∂W
∂d¯
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d,d′•=d¯′=d
= 0,(
∂W
∂d′•
+ R
∂W
∂d¯′
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d,d′•=d¯′=d′
= 0 .
Numerical Results
Altruistic behaviour is defined as any action that increases the fitness of others while decreasing
the actor’s own direct fitness [21]. In this model, an individual is described as being altruistic if
it has a lower-than-average expected direct fitness as a consequence of its dispersal strategy. In
Taylor’s model, dispersal is always costly and is therefore always altruistic: dispersers lower
their direct fitness while reducing kin competition on their natal island. We investigate how
leader-follow relationships affect dispersal rates and the degree to which dispersal can be de-
scribed as altruistic. Numerical analysis reveals that the effects of leader-follower relationships
on dispersal rates and altruistic behaviour is primarily characterized by the function uk. We use
two simple and biologically reasonable functions to illustrate this fact: uk = k + 1, which im-
plies that if a dispersal group doubles in size, the group becomes twice as effective at competing
against others for breeding territories, and uk =
√
k + 1, which suggests that it is more difficult
to coordinate a larger group, and additional group members provide diminishing returns on the
group’s ability to compete. Note that if uk = k + 1, groups technically no longer provide a
competitive advantage over lone individuals: the expected number of breeding opportunities
k individuals will successfully compete for is equal to the number of breeding opportunities a
group of k individuals will win; the advantage of group dispersal is strictly in reducing the cost
of dispersal. We could additionally allow uk = (k + 1)2, but this would place non-dispersers at
a severe disadvantage because we have assumed they cannot form groups.
Results from our model show that the emergence of leader-follower behaviour increases
(resp. decreases) dispersal rates if uk = k + 1 (resp. uk =
√
k + 1 ). That dispersal rates differ
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Figure 2.2: The effects of leader-follower relationship on the degree to which dispersal is
altruistic. The black lines are results generated by Taylor’s model (i.e. in the absence of
followership relationships). The scatterplots represent results obtained after the emergence of
leader-follower behaviour. If uk = k + 1, the introduction of leader-follower behaviour either
increases or does not affect both dispersal rates and the expected direct fitness of dispersers,
WDD , compared to non-dispersers, WDND (a). If uk =
√
k + 1, the emergence of leader-follower
relationships either decreases or does not affect both dispersal rates and the expected direct
fitness of dispersers compared to non-dispersers (b). Recall that the cost of dispersal for a
group with k followers is c0αk. The expected cost of dispersal is the weighted average cost for
all dispersal groups, which in Taylor’s model is simply the cost of lone dispersal, c0. Results
were generated by numerical simulation using N = 10 and various values for c0, α, and s.
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once leader-follower behaviour emerges is not simply a consequence of the fact that dispersing
in groups is less costly than dispersing individually: convergent stable levels of dispersal in the
model with leader-follower behaviour do not necessarily equal the convergent stable dispersal
rates in a model without leader-follower behaviour, even when the expected dispersal costs are
equal (Figure 2.2). To explain this finding, note that although the costs of dispersal in Taylor’s
model are the same regardless of the proportion of individuals who disperse, there are dimin-
ishing returns on the reduction of local kin competition as a greater proportion of individuals
disperse [18]. Consequently, for each cost of dispersal there is a distinct dispersal rate that
maximizes the difference between the indirect fitness gained by reducing kin competition and
the costs of dispersal. In our model, the cost of dispersal can be significantly influenced by
dispersal strategies: whenever the cost of dispersing singly is high, followers provide a way
for leaders to significantly reduce dispersal costs. Thus the expected inclusive fitness of in-
dividuals on an island is no longer simply maximal at a particular dispersal rate; instead, the
proportion of leaders and followers (and hence the expected size of dispersal groups), in addi-
tion to the values of α and c0, influences the expected cost of dispersal, and therefore influences
the convergence stable dispersal rates.
Whenever uk = k + 1 (resp. uk =
√
k + 1 ), the emergence of leader-follower behaviour
increases (resp. decreases) the expected direct fitness of dispersers compared to that of non-
dispersers, thus we conclude that the emergence of leader-follower relationships make dispersal
as a whole a less (resp. more) altruistic act (Figure 2.2). We therefore demonstrate that leader-
follower relationships influence both the prevalence of altruistic acts and the degree to which
these acts can be described as altruistic.
We can further investigate how altruism is affected by the emergence of leader-follower
relationships by delineating the direct and indirect fitness incentives for leaders and follow-
ers. We show in Appendix E that the direct fitness of followers is less than or equal to that of
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non-followers. Numerical analysis reveals that the direct fitness of leaders is always greater
than or equal to that of followers (Figures 2.3a, 2.3b), but can be greater or less than that of
non-leaders (i.e. followers and non-dispersers), depending on social and ecological factors,
namely sk, ck, uk, and N (Figures 2.3c, 2.3d). Thus, while the act of following in our model
is always more altruistic than leading, under some circumstances leaders, too, can be viewed
as altruistic whenever leaders have lower direct fitness than non-dispersers. Even in conditions
in which leading is the dispersal strategy that yields the highest direct fitness, followers may
be sufficiently altruistic such that the presence of leader-follower relationships increases the
direct fitness of those who neither lead nor follow. This implies that under certain conditions
(namely when dispersal is extremely costly for all but very large groups) where leaders are not
altruistic, leader-follower groups are altogether altruistic.
Finally, when the competitiveness of leaders, sk, is allowed to evolve, we find that selection
favours leaders that are neither completely selfish nor completely egalitarian. Individuals in
this model have the ability to not participate in leader-follower relationships by choosing not
to disperse. By allowing non-participation as a strategy in which there are no pre-existing
differences in states, followership is voluntary and cannot be imposed by leaders via coercion.
Leaders must instead strike a balance: if their competitiveness is too low they gain little direct
fitness from dispersing because their followers out-compete them for breeding opportunities,
but if their competitiveness is too, high fewer individuals will be willing to follow, thereby
increasing the cost of dispersal and lowering the leader’s direct fitness. Leaders evolve as if to
optimize their inclusive fitness, an action which in this and all other inclusive-fitness models is
not necessarily equivalent to optimizing their direct fitness.
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Figure 2.3: The degree to which leadership is altruistic depends on social and ecological fac-
tors. For any values the social and ecological parameters - s ≥ 1, N, and ck - the direct fitness
of leaders is greater than that of followers for both u = k + 1 (a) and u =
√
k + 1 (b). These
factors also determine whether or not leaders have a greater direct fitness than non-leaders for
both u = k + 1 (c) and u =
√
k + 1 (d).
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2.4.1 A Comparison to Previous Models
Both empirical and theoretical research has led to conflicting conclusions regarding whether
leaders coordinate group activities for selfish or selfless reasons. On one hand, animal leaders
are known to manipulate group activities in order to gain a disproportionately large personal
advantage [24]. On the other hand, leaders can bear a disproportionately large share of costs
associated with enforcing group cohesion and cooperation [24, 25, 26]. To make matters more
complicated, recent theoretical work shows that even the seemingly altruistic acts of leaders
may simply be done to increase direct fitness gains [27]. The lack of clear definitions for al-
truistic and selfish leadership is a common issue in previous models, and it has compounded
the difficulty in identifying the incentives for the emergence of leader-follower relationships.
We use the theory of inclusive fitness to define and measure the incentives for leadership and
followership. Leader-follower behaviour in our model emerges under a wider range of social
and ecological conditions when followers act selfishly by taking a greater share of resources
than leaders (Figure 2.1). In contrast to some previous models [17], and in agreement with
Hooper et al., we demonstrate that leaders need no advantage - and thus need not be selfish
- for leader-follower relationships to emerge in homogeneous populations. It is only after the
emergence of followership that leaders necessarily evolve to acquire a disproportionately large
share of breeding opportunities compared to followers. Unlike Hooper et al., we further show
that leaders do not need greater direct benefits than that of non-leaders (followers and non-
dispersers) for the maintenance of leader-follower behaviour.
Leaders are often thought to be socially or physically dominant, in possession of special-
ized knowledge, or in exceptional need of particular resources [24, 28, 29, 30]. Many previous
models have used the assumption of pre-existing differences in state to explain the emergence
of leader-follower behaviour. For example, Rands et al. create a game-theoretical model to
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demonstrate that leadership can emerge in foraging pairs when individuals have differing en-
ergetic reserves. Johnstone and Manica [31] developed a repeated coordination game to chal-
lenge the importance of pre-existing differences in state has, but even this model relied on
differences among individuals with regard to an unspecied state variable (e.g. preferences that
reflect physiological condition) to produce the emergence of leaders and followers.
Only recently have models shown that leader-follower relationships can emerge and be
maintained in completely homogeneous populations. Both Hooper et al. and Powers &
Lehmann created models of homogeneous populations to show that leader-follower behaviour
can be voluntarily created by followers rather than through coercion by leaders if leadership
generates a sufficiently large increase in group productivity. However, these models apply only
to very specific biological systems; they were designed to investigate leadership in ancestral
human populations, and as such involve several very specific assumptions, including the pre-
existence of egalitarian social groups. We have created a model in which emergence of leaders
and followers is motivated by kin selection, and is influenced solely by social and ecological
factors, such as the cost of dispersal and the relative competitive advantage that groups have
over individuals. The coordination of group movement - the form of leadership we have stud-
ied - is particularly widespread because it does not involve sophisticated cognitive processes:
it only requires one individual to initiate the movement and others individuals to follow [5].
That state-dependent conditions are not required to explain the emergence of leader-follower
behaviour is an idea that can thus be applied to a wide variety of animal species.
Leader-follower behaviour cannot emerge in homogeneous populations unless both leaders
and followers gain from the relationship; that is, unless the relationship increases the inclusive
fitness of both the leader and the follower. Ultimately then, what is required for the emergence
of leader-follower behaviour in the absence of coercion is that it increases group productivity
in some manner. In Hooper’s model, group productivity was increased due to leadership be-
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cause it allowed defectors to be more efficiently punished, and so it lowered the costs required
to maintain cooperation [32]. In Powers & Lehmann’s model, hierarchies evolved from egal-
itarian groups whenever leader-follower behaviour provided sufficient increases to resource
production, such that even when leaders took a greater share of resources, followers were still
better off than those who neither lead nor follow [17]. In our model, individuals are able to
more efficiently decrease kin competition in the presence of leaders.
2.4.2 Limitations and Future Directions
It is important to note that our model relies on the assumption that leader-follower relationships
form predominantly among kin. Indeed, kin selection is the main incentive for the emergence
and maintenance of leadership and followership in our model. We do not view the assumption
that individuals in leader-follower relationships are related as restrictive because genetic relat-
edness has been shown to help facilitate the emergence of many types of social interactions
and social organizations [33, 34]. Consequently, while leader-follower relationships can occur
among non-relatives, many [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 35] (if not most) observed leader-
follower behaviour has occurred between relatives. Therefore the general conclusions drawn
from our model should still be applicable to a wide variety of animal species. In fact, depending
on what type of leadership is being modelled, it may be important to include the assumption
that leader-follower relationships are formed among kin. This is particularly true of models
that study how leadership can emerge from pre-existing social groups, as genetic relatedness is
thought to very frequently facilitate group living [34].
Group formation occurs randomly in our model, and so the number of individuals that will
follow a given leader is random. As a result, leadership as it is modelled here is risky: if a
leader attracts too few followers, the cost of dispersal is high and the expected fitness of the
leader will be well below the global average, but if the leader attracts many followers, dispersal
is less costly and the leader (and possibly his followers, depending on the reproductive skew)
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can expect an above-average fitness. Of course, group formation in real populations is unlikely
to be completely random. Instead, individuals may decide which leader they will follow based
on the leader’s attributes, namely the leader’s selfishness. Following Hooper, our model could
be extended to include this idea of a biological market [36], wherein leaders who are willing
to concede a lower reproductive skew (low β) attract more followers than despotic leaders [37]
(high β). The evolutionarily stable level of leader selfishness in such a biological market would
depend on a number of additional social factors, such as information flow. For example, if
dispersal groups are formed randomly, it would be reasonable to assume that followers may
pay some cost or bear some risk in the pursuit of finding more selfless leaders to follow. If
these costs are sufficiently high, even relatively selfish leaders are likely to retain followers.
However, in contrast to Hooper, kin competition is present in our population, and should lower
the evolutionarily stable levels of leader selfishness. It is unclear how precisely the conflict
between leader and follower over resources is resolved when both the biological market and
kin selection are factors.
2.4.3 Conclusions
We have established that leader-follower behaviour can emerge even when leaders and fol-
lowers have no pre-existing differences in state. This provides further support for the theory
that individuals may differ in their intrinsic propensity to become leaders and followers, irre-
spective of their immediate condition [31]. Further, our model demonstrates that, despite the
assumptions commonly made in previous theoretical work, leaders need not be selfish in or-
der for leader-follower relationships to emerge; in fact, these relationships can emerge even if
followers are selfish and take a greater share of resources produced by the group than lead-
ers. Therefore, while it is frequently assumed that certain differences in condition or ability
motivate leader-follower relationships, our model shows that no such differences are neces-
sary. It is thus possible that leaders and followers evolved to possess different traits only after
leader-follower relationships had emerged in order to take advantage of their respective social
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positons. For example, leaders may have evolved to become socially or physically dominant
so they could more easily use their leadership position to monopolize resources for their own
personal gain.
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2.5.1 Appendix A. Fitness Calculation
To show that the Poisson distribution accurately models the probability of dispersal group
sizes when the number of offspring becomes large, a stochastic simulation was created (Sup-
plementary Data). To justify all other simplifications, a stochastic simulation was designed
without implementing the aforementioned assumptions; the results of the stochastic simula-
tion are equivalent to that of our analytic model (see Supplementary Data). We calculate the
neighbour-modulated fitness of a focal individual on a focal island:
W =
Neither leading nor following︷                                          ︸︸                                          ︷
(1 − d•)(1 − d′•)
(1 − d¯)(1 − d¯′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
+
Leading︷                                             ︸︸                                             ︷
d•
∑∞
k=0 Qk(1 − ck)uks•k
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j) (A1)
+
Following︷                                                        ︸︸                                                        ︷
(1 − d•)d′•
∑∞
k=0 Qk(1 − ck+1)uk+1 1−s¯k+1k+1
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
where P and Q represent Poisson distributions about λ = (1−d)d
′
d and λ¯ =
(1−d¯)d¯′
d¯ , respectively.
At equilibrium, d = d¯, d′ = d¯′, and so Q j = P j. This fitness expression (A1) can be divided
into three main components: the neighbour-modulated fitness gained from leading, following,
and doing neither. We will illustrate the derivation of the first term in the fitness expression.
The probability that a non-disperser wins a breeding site is equal to one divided by the sum
of the relative competitive abilities of every competitors. There are two types of competitors:
other non-dispersers, of which there are NK(1 − d¯)(1 − d¯′), and dispersers. We expect from
any given island there to be NKd dispersing groups; the expected relative competitive ability
of these groups is equal to the probability of each group size, multiplied by one minus the cost
of dispersal of groups that size, multiplied again by the relative competitive advantage of that
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group size, summed over all possible groups sizes:
∑∞
j=0 P ju j+1c j. But there are N breeding
sites to be won, and should an individual win a breeding site, its fitness will be K; we thus find
the neighbour-modulated fitness of a non-disperser to be NKNK(1−d¯)(1−d¯′)+NKd ∑ j=0 P ju jc j . Cancelling
the NK terms and multiplying by the probability with which the focal individual neither leads
nor disperses, (1 − d′•)(1 − d•), we obtain the first term in our fitness expression. Similar
calculations can be made to derive the remaining two terms in (A1).
2.5.2 Appendix B. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
We can use the direct fitness formulation from Taylor & Frank to describe the evolution of
dispersal strategies; this requires the assumption of weak selection, which our stochastic simu-
lation will demonstrate is valid. Dispersal strategies evolve until a local maximum is reached,
defined as
(
∂W
∂d•
+ R
∂W
∂d¯
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d,d′•=d¯′=d′,s•=s¯=s
= 0(
∂W
∂d′•
+ R
∂W
∂d¯′
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d,d′•=d¯′=d′,s•=s¯=s
= 0 (B1)(
∂W
∂s•
+ R
∂W
∂s¯
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d,d′•=d¯′=d′,s•=s¯=s
= 0
where R is the expected relatedness between the focal individual and a random individual on
its natal island. Taking the partial derivatives, we find
∂W
∂d•
∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d
=
−(1 − d′)
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
+
∑∞
k=0 Qkuk(1 − ck)s•k
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
− d
′∑∞
k=0 Qkuk+1(1 − ck+1)1−s¯k+1k+1
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
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∂W
∂d¯
∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d
=
(1 − d)(1 − d′)2
((1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j))2
+
d
∑∞
k=0 δQkuk(1 − ck)s•k
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
+
(1 − d)d′∑∞k=0 δQkuk+1(1 − ck+1)1−s¯k+1k+1
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
∂W
∂d′•
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d′•=d¯′=d′
=
−(1 − d)
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
+
(1 − d) ∑∞k=0 Qkuk+1(1 − ck+1) 1−s¯k+1k+1
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
∂W
∂d¯′
∣∣∣∣∣
d′•=d¯′=d′
=
(1 − d)2(1 − d′)
((1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j))2
+
d
∑∞
k=0 δQkuk(1 − ck)s•k
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
+
(1 − d)d′∑∞k=0 δQkuk+1(1 − ck+1) 1−s¯k+1k+1
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
∂W
∂s•
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s¯=s
= d
∑∞
k=0 Qkuk(1 − ck)δsk
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j)
∂W
∂s¯
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s¯=s
= −(1 − d)d′
∑∞
k=0 Qk(1 − ck+1)uk+1 δsk+1k+1
(1 − d)(1 − d′) + d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1 − c j) .
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2.5.3 Appendix C. Relatedness Calculation
To calculate relatedness [18], we use two key assumptions. First, we assume weak selection.
Second, given that there are an infinite number of islands in our model, we make the standard
assumption that the relatedness between two individuals born on different islands is zero. We
find that relatedness, R, is equal to
R =
fyx
fx
where fyx represents the coefficient of consanguinity, which is the probability that two random
alleles, one taken from focal individual, x, and the other from a random individual born on the
same patch, y, at the locus of control (i.e. the leadership and followership genes), are identical
by descent. fx is the inbreeding coefficient of x, which, for our haploid population, is equal to
1. The value of the coefficient of consanguinity for the next generation, f ′yx, is dependent upon
that of this generation; more precisely,
f ′yx =
1
N
+
N − 1
N
h2 fyx
where h = (1−d)(1−d
′)
(1−d)(1−d′)+d ∑∞j=0 P ju jc j represents the probability that a random breeder on an island is
native to that island. Setting f ′yx = fyx in order to find the coefficient of consanguinity when the
population is at equilibrium, we find R = fyx = 1N−Nh2+h2 .
2.5.4 Appendix D. Emergence of Followership
By eliminating the option to follow (i.e. by setting d′ = 0), every dispersal group is of size
one, and we should recover the results of Taylor’s inclusive fitness model for the dispersal of
offspring. The fitness equation now becomes
W =
1 − d•
1 − d¯ + d(1 − c0)
+
d•(1 − c0)
1 − d + d(1 − c0) . (D1)
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We now take the partial derivatives of (D1) in order to solve system (B1)
∂W
∂d•
∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d
=
−c0
1 − dc0 (D2)
∂W
∂d¯
∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d
=
1 − d
(1 − dc0)2 . (D3)
The probability that a random breeder on an island is native to that island now becomes
h = 1−d1−d+dc0 and the expression for relatedness R = fyx =
1
N−Nh2+h2 , remains the same except for
the adjusted value of h. By substituting the above partial derivatives (D2) and (D3) into (B1),
we find evolution will favour higher dispersal rates whenever Rh > c0, which is equivalent to
Taylor’s result.
We are also interested in the conditions under which followership can emerge; equivalently, we
seek solutions to
(
∂W
∂d′•
+ R
∂W
∂d¯′
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d′•=d¯′=d′=0
> 0 (D4)
−(1 − d) + (1 − d)u1(1 − c1)(1 − s1) + Rh(1 − d)
+R(1 − d)(u1(1 − c1)s1 − (1 − c0)) > 0.
As proved by Taylor, at equilibrium Rh = c0. We find that (D4) is satisfied by a wide range of
biologically relevant parameter conditions. For example, it is simple to show that even in the
extreme case where followers are expected to have no direct fitness (s = 1), uk = k + 1, and
c0 = 1, c1 = 0, (D4) is satisfied and so followership emerges.
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2.5.5 Appendix E. Fitness Consequences of Leader-Follower Behaviour
The change in fitness of a mutant individual who has some increased propensity to lead is
(
∂W
∂d•
+ R
∂W
∂d¯
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d
∝ ∆WL
∆WL = −(1 − d′) +
∞∑
k=0
Qkuk(1 − ck)sk − d′
∞∑
k=0
Qkuk+1(1 − ck+1)1 − sk+1k + 1
+R((1 − d′)h + d
∞∑
k=0
δQkuk(1 − ck)sk + (1 − d)d′
∞∑
k=0
δQkuk+1(1 − ck+1)1 − sk+1k + 1
where δQk represents the change in the distribution of the dispersal group sizes that form on the
focal individual’s natal patch as a result of its increasing propensity to lead. For our analysis of
the system, we are concerned only with the direction — not the magnitude — of steepest de-
scent. By removing common factor 1(1−d)(1−d′)+d ∑∞j=0 P ju j(1−c j) from
(
∂W
∂d• + R
∂W
∂d¯
)∣∣∣∣
d•=d¯=d
, we derive
the expression ∆WL, the sign of which is corresponds to the direction of selection. If ∆WL > 0,
selection will favour increased propensities to lead, whereas if ∆WL < 0, selection will favour
lower levels of leadership.
We can use this direct fitness argument to show that it is unclear if the direct fitness of lead-
ers will be greater than that of non-leaders. The direct fitness consequences for the increased
probability to lead is given by the first three terms in ∆WL. Consider the second term. We can-
not conclude that uksk is uniformly less than or equal to 1. Thus whether or not the increased
propensity to lead results in increased fitness depends on various parameter conditions, includ-
ing s, ck, uk, and N.
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The change in fitness of a mutant individual who has some increased propensity to follow is
(
∂W
∂d′•
+ R
∂W
∂d¯′
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
d′•=d¯′=d′
∝ ∆WF
∆WF = −(1 − d) + (1 − d)
∞∑
k=0
Qkuk+1(1 − ck+1)1 − sk+1k + 1
+R((1 − d)h + d
∞∑
k=0
δ1Qkuk(1 − ck)sk + (1 − d)d′
∞∑
k=0
δ1Qkuk+1(1 − ck+1)1 − sk+1k + 1
where δ1Qk represents the change in the distribution of the dispersal group sizes that form on
the focal individual’s natal patch as a result of its increasing propensity to follow. The direct
fitness consequences for the increased probability to follow is given by the first two terms in
∆WF . Note that (1 − ck) ≤ 1, and recall that we assume sk = ββ+k . Then in the cases where
uk = k + 1 or uk =
√
k + 1, uk+1
β+k+1 ≤ 1, and so
∑∞
k=0 Qkuk+1(1 − ck+1) 1−sk+1k+1 ≤ 1. Thus under these
circumstances, increasing one’s propensity to follow always decreases or does not affect one’s
direct fitness.
We can define an action as altruistic if decreases the direct fitness of the actor but increases
the direct fitness of other individuals. With this, we can conclude that followership is always
altruistic but whether or not leadership is altruistic depends on social and ecological conditions.
Evolutionarily stable strategies [38] can be found by solving B1. However, this system could
not be solved analytically, so it was instead assessed numerically (see Supplementary Data).
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Chapter 3
Environmental variance and the evolution
of signalling behaviour
Koykka, C. & Wild, G. (2018) The influence of environmental variance on the evolution of
signalling behaviour. Behav. Ecol. 29(4): 814-820.
Abstract
A recent meta-analysis has indicated that environmental quality and variability can in-
fluence whether offspring begging and parental responses to these signals are motivated
by offspring need or offspring quality. We create a model to verify and apply evolutionary
logic to this hypothesis. We determine the ecological and social conditions under which
species signal and respond to need in favorable environments, and to quality in poor en-
vironments. The environmental conditions that favor this shift are widest when signalling
costs and differences in quality between offspring are moderate. Low relatedness between
siblings coupled with high signalling costs, as well as moderate relatedness between sib-
lings coupled with low signalling costs, allow for the shift between signals of need and
signals of quality to occur in more volatile environments. Further, only species whose off-
spring are highly dependent on parents for survival are not expected to use both signals of
need and of quality. Ultimately, this shift between signalling need and signalling quality is
the result of high-quality offspring benefiting more from meagre amounts of parental pro-
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visioning, while low-quality offspring have most to gain when parents can contribute more
substantially. We show that this differential benefit of resources depends substantially upon
offspring fitness as functions of parental investments, a variable which has lacked both di-
versity and biological realism in previous theoretical approaches. We then use this work
to reassess previous theory on signals of need and of quality.
3.1 Introduction
It is common throughout the animal kingdom for offspring to solicit resources from parents via
auditory or visual signals called begging [1, 2]. Although begging behaviour has been exten-
sively investigated, both theoretical and empirical studies have led to no consensus regarding
the evolutionary purposes of signalling and the explanations for parental response strategies to
begging behaviour. The two most commonly proposed theories to explain signalling behaviour
are (i) the signal of need (SoN) hypothesis [3], which posits that offspring with lower repro-
ductive value will beg more and will be preferentially fed by their parents, and (ii) the signal of
quality (SoQ) hypothesis [4, 5], which proposes that offspring with higher reproductive value
can better afford the costs of begging and parents will allocate more resources to these young
because the survival of offspring in better condition may translate to greater reproductive value.
Both SoN and SoQ rely on the assumption that offspring are more aware of their reproduc-
tive value than their parents are in the absence of signals. It is plausible that begging instead
conveys only proximate information, as outlined by the signal of hunger hypothesis proposed
by Mock et al. [6]. While SoN and SoQ are neither mutually exclusive nor the only theories
proposed to explain signalling behaviour, they are the most prominent and are frequently com-
pared with little consensus reached [7, 8, 6, 9].
Most previous theoretical work either assumes or claims to validate SoN over SoQ [6], in
part due to the assumption that parents are always trying to raise all their offspring to inde-
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pendence [6, 2]. Yet many empirical studies seem support SoQ [10, 11, 12, 2], particularly in
populations that experience frequent brood reduction. This discrepancy is exacerbated by the
fact that empirical literature suggests that strategies involving begging and reactions to begging
are largely species-dependent: in certain species, parents provision disproportionately large
amounts of resources toward the smallest and seemingly the most needy offspring, whereas
in other species the largest offspring are preferentially fed by parents, sometimes without any
regard to offspring begging behaviour [2, 13]. It has been suggested [6] that neither the SoN
hypothesis nor the SoQ hypothesis is alone capable of explaining and predicting the begging
behaviour found in nature, and that certain species appear to beg to signal need while others
beg to signal quality.
More recently, it has been demonstrated that begging behaviour and parental responses
differs significantly between species [2, 13]. A thorough meta-analysis of avian species has
demonstrated that, at least in some birds, the way in which parents respond to begging may ac-
tually depend on environmental conditions. In more stable environments, resources are abun-
dant and so retention of entire broods is likely, and consequently parents feed in accordance to
offspring need. Conversely, in unpredictable and poor environments, limited resources means
it is frequently impossible to ensure the survival of an entire brood, and so parents fare better
by feeding offspring that are in the best condition to secure the survival of the greatest number
of offspring [2, 13]. However, the attractive argument that environmental variation is sufficient
in explaining the between- and within-species variation of SoN and SoQ systems has not yet
been rigorously tested by theory. It is further unclear how the shift between SoN and SoQ can
be influenced by ecological factors, such as the cost of begging, and social factors, including
relatedness between offspring.
Here, we create a simple model to confirm that certain species may employ either SoN and
SoQ depending on environmental conditions. We then identify the environmental conditions
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which favor the shift between SoN and SoQ, and examine how certain social and ecological
factors can influence this shift. We then discuss the implications of our findings on the debate
between the SoN and SoQ hypotheses.
3.2 Methods
Our primary goal is to create the simplest model capable of analyzing possible shifts between
SoN and SoQ caused by environmental variation. To do so, we construct a modified version
of the three-player evolutionary game found in Wild et al. [14]. Consider a parent that has
one high-quality offspring and one low-quality offspring in each generation. Any differences
in quality could be the result of asynchronous hatching, which can heavily influence egg size,
among other factors proven to influence growth [15]. Offspring quality is cryptic, meaning
parents are unable to differentiate the need and quality of their offspring in the absence of any
signals (see Appendix 3.5.2 for an extension of this model that relaxes this assumption). .
Suppose that at the end of each generation the parent has collected a divisible resource (see
Appendix 3.5.3 for a version of the model with indivisible resources) which it must distribute
between the two offspring. Since parents are unable to distinguish between the quality of off-
spring, they do not know how much of the resource they should allocate to each offspring.
However, offspring may use signals that indicate their quality, and this can be used to guide
the parent’s provisioning strategy. It is assumed that parents distribute resources in a manner
that is optimal for their own inclusive fitness; the parent is better able to do this if they can
identify the quality difference between offspring. It is assumed that signals may be costly to
produce, as is standard in theoretical models [5, 16] and evidenced by several empirical studies
[17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24] .
The family resides in a volatile environment, meaning resource availability depends signifi-
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cantly on environmental conditions. The parent can collect amount gh of this divisible resource
in good environmental conditions, but obtains only gl < gh in poor environmental conditions.
Here, the terms ‘good’ and ‘poor’ are strictly relative: good environments are favorable rela-
tive to poor environments, but our results will view scenarios in which even good environments
have scarce resources, and others in which even poor environments have an abundance of re-
sources. Parents can recognize the quality of environmental conditions, but not until after they
lay their eggs. Consequently, the parent always lays two eggs at the beginning of each genera-
tion – many species of bird do not lay or hatch eggs in the same clutch at the same time, often
hypothesized as a method of efficiently eliminating clutch sizes that are too large to maintain
during poor ecological conditions [25, 26].
The two offspring can differ in terms of how their fitness changes as a function of resources
provisioned to them: high-quality and low-quality offspring have fitness functions fh(g) and
fl(g), respectively, where g is the amount resources provided. Since signalling may be costly
for the signaller, the fitness of the signaller is subtracted by some fixed cost, c.
We assume that offspring can distinguish the quality of their environment, either by di-
rect observation or indirectly based on the parent’s behaviour. They can use this information
when deciding whether to signal, a decision which is assumed to be made by offspring simul-
taneously. If both or neither offspring signal, it is assumed the parent is unable to distinguish
between the need and quality of the offspring, and so must divide resources in a manner that
maximizes the parent’s own inclusive fitness without any information about offspring quality;
as it turns out, the optimal strategy in these cases is for the parent to divide resources evenly
between the two offspring (see Appendix 3.5.1). If only one offspring signals, the parent is
assumed to be able to differentiate between the two offspring, and uses the information about
offspring quality to distribute resources optimally with respect to the parent’s own inclusive
fitness. Note that the begging strategies of each offspring can change depending on current
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environmental conditions – choices in good-quality environments may differ from choices in
poor-quality environments.
For each environmental condition – good and poor – there are 4 possible outcomes for the
scenario described (see Figure 3.1). There is a certain payoff for each offspring in each of the
different possible outcomes. In this model, the payoff is measured in terms of the total inclusive
fitness each offspring has in each outcome. The inclusive fitness payoff corresponding to each
outcome and for each individual is calculated by setting the relatedness between parent and
offspring and the relatedness between offspring to 1/2 < R < 1 and 1/4 < r < R, respectively.
We are, in particular, interested in finding conditions that favor the Nash equilibrium profile
under which signal of need is adopted in one environmental condition but signal of quality is
employed in another. We identify the conditions in which only the low-quality offspring signals
and is given a greater share of the divisible resource in good environments (SoN), and only the
high-quality offspring signals and is given a greater share of resources in poor environments
(SoQ). This equilibrium, which captures the outcome in which the information conveyed by
signals shifts from need to quality based on environmental conditions, is henceforth referred to
as the facultative outcome.
The payoffs for each individual in each outcome j, as well as the conditions in which the
facultative outcome is a Nash equilibrium, are listed in Appendix 3.5.1. To examine the sta-
bility of the facultative outcome, we must first select biologically realistic fitness functions for
the two offspring. Since fitness as a function of resources for many species is best modeled as
sigmoidal [27, 28], we set f = 1/(1 + e−t), where t represents the state of the offspring.
We assume that the high-quality offspring has hatched early and has thus received care from
the parent for a longer period than the low-quality offspring but is otherwise identical to the
low-quality offspring. That is, we will assume that the fitness functions of the two offspring
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High-Quality Offspring
Signal No Signal
Low-Quality Offspring Low-quality Offspring
Signal SignalNo Signal No Signal
1, 5 2, 6 3, 7 4, 8
Figure 3.1: Decision tree representation of the game outlined in the main text. A separate
and independent game is played in good- and poor-quality environments, although the general
structure of the decision tree is the same for each environment. Note that the high-quality and
low-quality offspring act simultaneously and independently. Each pair of numbers refers to
the outcome name assigned to the good-quality environments and poor-quality environments,
respectively.
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are identical, fh = fl, but that the state of the offspring differ. Suppose in the absence of any
additional resources that the low-quality offspring is in initial state t = d (Figure 3.1). The
high-quality offspring, having been cared for by the parent for a longer duration, is assumed to
be in a better state, t = d + a, a > 0; higher values of a correspond to greater fitness advan-
tages over the low-quality offspring. Lastly, the fitness of each offspring is influenced by the
amount of resources it receives. If the high-quality offspring receives g1 resources, it has fitness
fh = 11+e−(d+a+g1) (i.e. t = d + a + g1), while any low-quality offspring receiving g2 resources has
fitness fl = 11+e−(d+g2) (i.e. t = d + g2).
Since we are primarily interested in investigating how environmental variability influences
whether signals indicate need or quality, we set all other variables (r, c, a, and d) equal to
constants, then numerically calculate the amount of resources available in good and poor envi-
ronmental conditions, gh and gl respectively, for which the stability conditions of the facultative
outcome are met; these values will constitute the ’region of stability’. We analyze the influence
of each parameter on the region of stability; below we briefly discuss the results of this analysis
for each parameter in turn.
3.3 Results
Whenever an offspring chooses to signal, there are two inclusive fitness penalties. The first is
the direct cost associated with signalling and the second is the indirect cost resulting from the
other offspring receiving fewer resources. This second cost is influenced by the relatedness be-
tween offspring, baseline fitness of the signaler’s sibling, and the amount of resources that the
two offspring are competing over. The sole benefit of signalling is that the offspring will receive
a larger share of resources, which is influenced by the baseline fitness of the signaller and the
amount of resources available to the parent. Note that in this model an offspring who does not
stand to receive a larger share of resources by signalling simply will not beg, as begging will
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only serve to alert the parent that the signaller should receive fewer resources. For the stability
of the facultative outcome, the sole benefit of signalling must outweigh the two penalties for
high-quality offspring (but not for low-quality offspring) in poor environments, and similarly
the benefit must outweigh the cost for low-quality offspring (but not for high-quality offspring)
in more favorable environments. Consequently, resource availability, relatedness, signalling
costs, baseline fitness, and differences in offspring quality each affect whether SoQ in poor
environments shifts to SoN in good environments.
Results for the stability of the facultative outcome are presented in terms of how relatedness,
signalling costs, baseline fitness, and differences in offspring quality influence the range of
environmental conditions that would lead to a shift between SoN and SoQ.
Relatedness between offspring
Generally, if signalling costs, c, are high, increasing relatedness, r, decreases the range of pa-
rameters of which the facultative outcome is stable (Figure 3.2). High signalling costs can
completely offset the fitness gain produced by guiding the parental investment via signals, and
so offspring are less inclined to beg. As relatedness increases, the greater share of resources
that an offspring may acquire by signalling becomes less of a benefit, as the signaller is depriv-
ing its closer relative of resources. This is often particularly true when the difference between
offspring quality, a, is small. The result is that, in both good and poor environments, both
offspring are less likely to beg as relatedness increases. When signalling costs are large, higher
relatedness between offspring translates to greater environmental volatility required for the sta-
bility of the facultative outcome (where volatility is measured by the minimum difference in
resources in good versus poor environments).
If the signalling costs are low, the range of environmental conditions over which the fac-
ultative outcome is stable is instead expected to be widest at moderate relatedness levels (i.e.
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Figure 3.2: Relatedness between offspring and its effect on the amount of resources required
for the facultative outcome to be stable in good environments (light grey region) and in poor en-
vironments (dark grey region). The region between the maximum amount of resources (dashed
lines) and the minimum amount of resources (solid lines) constitute the amount of resources
necessary for the stability of the facultative outcome. Results were generated using c = 0.05 in
left panel and c = 0.01 in the right panel, d = −2, and a = 1.
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with offspring that are full-siblings) compared to lower relatedness levels (i.e. with offspring
of species where extra-pair copulation is more common). With lower relatedness, offspring ex-
perience a relatively greater gain in inclusive fitness by receiving a greater share of resources.
As such, with low signalling costs, both offspring are more inclined to beg and the parent will
distribute resources evenly (see Appendix 3.5.1). With higher-than-moderate relatedness, off-
spring lose more by taking a greater share of resource away from their closer sibling, and will
generally opt not to signal at all, especially when the difference in offspring quality is low.
When signalling costs are low, higher relatedness between offspring means lower environmen-
tal volatility (defined above) is required for the stability of the facultative outcome.
Cost of signalling
All else being equal, increasing the costs of signalling decrease the range of environmental
conditions under which the facultative outcome is stable (Figure 3.3). Simply put, this occurs
because the benefit of receiving increased provisioning due to signalling is more likely to be
outweighed by the higher direct costs of signalling. The shift between SoN and SoQ is possi-
ble even when signalling costs are minute provided relatedness between offspring is sufficiently
high, and the low-quality (resp. high-quality) offspring benefits substantially more from pro-
visioning in good (resp. poor) environments than its sibling. If there are absolutely no direct
signalling costs, c = 0, no strict Nash equilibrium exists because, while it may be optimal
for everyone if only one offspring begs so that the parent is able to differentiate between the
two offspring, offspring decide whether to signal simultaneously and as such cannot coordinate
which of them should signal.
Baseline fitness
Given low to moderate baseline fitness levels, conditions for the stability of the facultative out-
come can be met (Figure 3.4). All else being equal, if the baseline fitness of offspring is high,
it is less likely that one offspring will gain substantially more than the other. The offspring are
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Figure 3.3: Cost of signalling and its effect on the amount of resources required for the facul-
tative outcome to be stable in good environments (light grey region) and in poor environments
(dark grey region). The region between the maximum amount of resources (dashed lines) and
the minimum amount of resources (solid lines) constitute the amount of resources necessary
for the stability of the facultative outcome. Results were generated using d = −2, a = 1, and
r = 0.5.
consequently less inclined to beg since the costs of begging are less likely to outweigh the ben-
efit of directing the parent to distribute resources more optimally, particularly when relatedness
between offspring is high.
The facultative outcome is also unlikely to be stable when the baseline fitness of offspring
is very low. Due to the sigmoidal nature of the fitness function, very low baseline fitness
levels mean that it is unlikely for one offspring to benefit significantly more than the other by
receiving a greater share of resources, particularly when the resources are very limited; the
difference in quality between offspring would have to be very large. The cost of begging will
then deter both offspring from begging.
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Figure 3.4: Offspring baseline fitness and its effect on the amount of resources required for
the facultative outcome to be stable in good environments (light grey region) and in poor envi-
ronments (dark grey region). The region between the maximum amount of resources (dashed
lines) and the minimum amount of resources (solid lines) constitute the amount of resources
necessary for the stability of the facultative outcome. Results were generated using c = 0.05,
a = 1, and r = 0.5.
High-quality offspring advantage
Mathematically, both baseline fitness and high-quality offspring advantage, a, influence the
offspring’s conditions relative to the inflection point – where the marginal fitness benefits of
increased provisioning are greatest – of the sigmoidal curve. Consequently, similar to the re-
lationship between the stability of the facultative outcome and offspring baseline fitness, the
facultative outcome is stable only when the high-quality offspring has a moderate advantage
over its sibling. If the advantage is very small, it is unlikely for one offspring to gain signifi-
cantly more than another from having a greater share of resources, and so bearing the cost of
signalling to direct the parent’s provisioning strategy is an unfavorable strategy. If the high-
quality offspring advantage is sufficiently high, then the low-quality offspring will benefit more
from even a small amount of resources, and so the facultative outcome will not be stable.
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3.4 Discussion
We have demonstrated using evolutionary game t heory that environmental variation can in-
fluence signalling behaviour and, in particular, is sufficient to promote signals to demonstrate
need in good environmental conditions and quality in poor conditions, a conclusion recently
suggested by empirical data [2, 13]. Ultimately, this shift may occur only if two basic condi-
tions are met. First, low-quality offspring must stand to benefit much more substantially from
high degrees of parental investment, while high-quality offspring can benefit more when poten-
tial parental investment is limited by poor environmental conditions. Whether this condition
is satisfied depends on the quality and the quality differences between offspring, and the way
quality changes as a function of parental investment. The second basic condition that must
be satisfied is that only one offspring begs and is preferentially fed. Whether this condition
is satisfied may be influenced by the relatedness between offspring and the inherent costs of
signalling.
Our work outlines some of the specific social and ecological factors that can influence how
variable environments need to be for the shift between SoN and SoQ to occur. Many of these
results provide testable predictions. Our results suggest there is a greater range of environ-
mental conditions that favor the stability of the facultative outcome for species with moderate
relatedness between siblings (e.g. full siblings) when the cost of signalling is low compared
to low relatedness (e.g. half-siblings or less) when the cost of signalling is relatively high. If
both relatedness between offspring and costs of signalling are high, it is expected that the shift
between SoN and SoQ would occur only in very volatile environments, whereas when sig-
nalling costs are low and relatedness is high, this shift should be readily found in more stable
environments. Given that only moderate differences between offspring quality, a, allowed for
the stability of the facultative outcome, we expect to see a connection between the synchronic-
ity of offspring hatching and whether a species shifts between SoN and SoQ depending on
environmental conditions. Our results also suggest that the shift between SoN in high-quality
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environments to SoQ in low-quality environments will occur only in species that depend heav-
ily upon parents at birth (i.e. baseline fitness d small). Future empirical work should examine
the degree to which young are self-sufficient soon after hatching and the probability with which
environmental instability facilitates the shift between SoN and SoQ.
Many species may be able to use physical proxies (cues), such as body size, to evaluate
offspring quality. Compared to simply responding to signals, investigating cues may require
more energy and time, thereby making it a less efficient option. We created an extension of
our model (see Appendix 3.5.2) in which the parent has the option of investigating cues. The
extension demonstrates that environmental variation can still encourage SoN to be used in poor
environments and SoQ to be used in favorable environments. Qualitatively, the results of the
extended model are very similar to the base model, though greater efficiency associated with
using cues results in increases in the minimum baseline fitness, difference in offspring quality,
and relatedness between siblings, as well as a decrease in the maximum cost of signalling,
necessary for the stability of the facultative outcome. For the facultative outcome to be stable,
investigating cues must be more costly than feeding according to signals or at random, oth-
erwise the parent will always use cues as they are more reliable than signals (see Appendix
3.5.4).
SoN vs. SoQ
Paramount to influencing whether a species uses signals to display need versus quality is the
relationship between resources and the offspring’s fitness levels. As shown by the relationship
between the region of stability of the facultative outcome and the high-quality offspring advan-
tage and baseline fitness, even translations of the same fitness function can dictate the nature
of signalling systems. This importance of the nature of fitness functions has been largely ne-
glected by previous research. Indeed, the very fact that both SoN and SoQ may be required
to explain the begging behaviours of certain species, yet theoretical work almost exclusively
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validates or assumes SoN [6], encourages a review of previous signalling theory.
Much of the recent theoretical literature, which frequently uses Godfray’s seminal paper
[3] as a basis for more elaborate models [29, 30, 31, 32], is constructed around the notion that
offspring use begging to signal their need to their parents. It is therefore prudent to revisit the
construction and implications of Godfray’s (1991) model [3]. First, it should be made clear
that Godfray’s model does not provide evidence for SoN. Instead, Godfray builds the model
under the assumption that SoN is true: he defines an offspring’s need as the marginal fitness
gain it experiences by obtaining more resources, and assumes that parents will provide more
resources to young in “poor condition” – condition, here, being synonymous with reproduc-
tive value [3, 6]. He then explicitly states that offspring fitness increases monotonically with
respect to greater resources, and, crucially, assumes that this increase occurs at a decelerat-
ing rate. While the former assumption is altogether reasonable, no justification is provided
for the latter assumption, even though fitness functions are often modeled as being sigmoidal
[27, 28]. The fitness function used by Godfray is then repeated in several extensions of his
model [30, 33, 31]. The selection of specific functions which properly represent neither the
diversity nor complexity of begging behaviours observed in nature has resulted in SoQ largely
being neglected by previous theoretical models.
Previous research on SoN and SoQ have also been impeded by the definitions of need and
quality. SoQ, as defined tacitly by Godfray [3] and explicitly elsewhere [6], effectively claims
the opposite of SoN – offspring in “poor condition” will beg less and be allocated fewer re-
sources. The largest problem with this definition is rooted in semantics, since “quality” can
hold many different meanings. Most signalling theory regards quality as being the opposite of
need and the same as condition and reproductive value: the greater the need of the offspring,
the lower its quality, reproductive value, and condition. However, with biologically reasonable
fitness functions (like the sigmoidal relationship between offspring resources and fitness used
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in this study), need as defined by the marginal change in the offspring’s fitness with increased
investment may no longer be the opposite of quality. An offspring can reasonably have higher
fitness than its siblings while also standing to gain more from additional parental investment.
One may even argue that quality and need are equivalent because, from the perspective of the
parent, a quality investment into an offspring should naturally mean an investment into off-
spring that have most to benefit most from further investment. Definitions of need and quality
become even less intuitive if offspring have entirely different fitness functions, as quality could
refer to the potential reproductive value that an offspring possesses given unlimited provision-
ing. A limitation of our work is that we use a single offspring fitness function. While this
setup is sufficient to investigate the role of environmental variation in the shift between SoN
and SoQ, our model lacks the predictive power that fitness functions that are modeled closely
after empirical data could generate.
Our work supports Mock’s [6, 13] theory that parents are not restricted to using signals to
convey only need or only quality. However, rather than parents simply being able to switch be-
tween SoN and SoQ, it may be that signals (or lack thereof) evolved to roughly indicate where
along the fitness curve an offspring’s condition currently resides, whereas cues (such as weight)
indicate to the parent the general shape of the offspring’s fitness curve. That is, as suggested
by Mock [6], the distinction between SoN and SoQ may be more artificial and certainly less
useful than previously suggested.
In our model, the cost of signalling is set to a constant which is then subtracted from the
offspring’s fitness. In this way, we assume that if there are any costs associated with signalling
(i.e. c > 0), they are metabolic in nature and are not shared. However, signals can also draw
predators to the nest [34, 35], and the cost of signalling is shared among its inhabitants. In
this situation, the parent may be more encouraged to provide greater care for signallers to stop
their signals. This situation is outlined by the blackmail hypothesis, for which there is some
3.4. Discussion 99
empirical support [24], though it has been discussed mostly via verbal arguments [36, 37] and
has not been explored particularly rigorously. One crucial exception is Johnstone [38], though
his model does not consider increased predation as a cost of signalling, includes only one
offspring (therefore disallowing offspring to compete via signals), and does not consider the
influence of environmental variation. An alternative response to blackmail that lacks discussion
since previous theory has often operated under the assumption that parents attempt to raise all
offspring [6, 2] is the option for the parent to abandon the entire brood or even terminate
and encourage the termination (i.e. via siblicide) of signallers. The relationship between the
blackmail hypothesis and the signal SoN verses SoQ debate has remained unexplored. It is
possible that begging does not necessarily signify need or quality in any scenario, but instead
is simply used as a tool to skew the parent-offspring conflict over provisioning closer to the
offspring’s optimal outcome.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Stability analysis of the divisible resource model
We begin by finding the optimal parental allocation strategy in any given situation. Suppose
g > 0 is the total resource available to the parent and x is the amount given to the higher-quality
offspring. To continue, we must assume the form of the high- and low-quality offspring’s fitness
functions which, as provided in the main text, are fh(x) = 11+e−(d+a+g) and fl(g − x) = 11+e−(d+g−x) ,
respectively. When one offspring begs so that the parent is able to determine the need and
quality of each offspring, and assuming the parent is equally related to the two offspring, the
parent will distribute resources in a manner maximizes the combined total fitness of the two
offspring,
f =
1
1 + e−(d+a+x)
+
1
1 + e−(d+g−x)
.
Solving d fdx = 0, we find x
∗ = g2 − a2 , the optimal amount to be given to the lower-quality
offspring (SoN), such that the low- and high-quality offspring are equally fit. However, this
maximum is only valid when g ≥ a. Suppose instead that 0 < g < a. Since no critical points
lie on the interval [0, g], the optimal strategy is either x∗ = 0 or x∗ = g. We therefore need to
determine whether d fdx is increasing or decreasing on the interval [0, g]. The function is decreas-
ing, and therefore f is maximal at x∗ = g (SoQ), if −(a + d) > g, and since we know a > g, this
condition is equivalent to d < −2g. Similarly, if d ≥ −2g, f is maximal at x∗ = 0 (SoN).
Now suppose that neither or both offspring beg, such that the parent is unable to differentiate
the need and quality of the offspring. Then the parent must effectively guess which offspring
she should receive resource amount x, with the remainder, g − x, going to the other offspring;
it is assumed she suceeds at doing so only half the time. That is, the parent will distribute the
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resources in a manner that maximizes
f =
1
2
(
1
1 + e−(d+a+x)
+
1
1 + e−(d+g−x)
+
1
1 + e−(d+a+g−x)
+
1
1 + e−(d+g+x)
)
Solving again for x∗, it follows that the parent will distribute the resources evenly between the
two offspring whenever both or neither offspring signal.
Knowing how the parent will distribute resources in any given situation, we can next deter-
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mine the payoff of each outcome for each player
Oh,1 = fh(
g
2
) − c + r( fl(g2) − c)
Ol,1 = fl(
g
2
) − c + r( fg(g2) − c)
Oh,2 =

fh(g) − c + r fl(0), if 0 < g < a, d < −2g
fh(0) − c + r fl(g), if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g
fh(
g − a
2
) − c + r fl(g + a2 ), if g ≥ a
Ol,2 =

fl(0) + r( fh(g) − c), if 0 < g < a, d < −2g
fl(g) + r( fh(0) − c), if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g
fl(
g + a
2
) + r( fh(
g − a
2
) − c), if g ≥ a
Oh,3 =

fh(g) + r( fl(0) − c), if 0 < g < a, d < −2g
fh(0) + r( fl(g) − c), if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g
fh(
g − a
2
) + r( fl(
g + a
2
) − c), if g ≥ a
Ol,3 =

fl(g) − c + r fh(0), if 0 < g < a, d < −2g
fl(0) − c + r fh(g), if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g
fl(
g + a
2
) − c + r fh(g − a2 ), if g ≥ a
Oh,4 = fh(
g
2
) + r fl(
g
2
)
Ol,4 = fl(
g
2
) + r fh(
g
2
).
The above payoffs are for outcomes 1-4, with g = gh, though outcomes 5-8 follow the same
structure with g = gl. Next, we calculate the stability conditions for the facultative outcome.
Our first condition, D1, is that low-quality offspring in good environments will prefer to signal
when the high-quality offspring remains silent,
D1 : Ol,3 > Ol,4.
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Next, the high-quality offspring in good environments prefers to remain silent, given that the
low-quality offspring will beg,
D2 : Oh,2 >

Oh,3, if Ol,3 ≥ Ol,4
Oh,4, if Ol,4 > Ol,3.
Conversely, in poor environments, the low-quality offspring must prefer to remain silent given
that the high-quality offspring begs
D1 : Ol,6 > Ol,5.
Lastly, the high-quality offspring in poor environments must prefer to beg, given that the low-
quality offspring will not,
D2 : Oh,6 >

Oh,7, if Ol,7 ≥ Ol,8
Oh,8, if Ol,8 > Ol,7.
3.5.2 Stability analysis of the divisible resource model with cues
Suppose that instead of responding optimally in the absence of useful information (i.e. when
both or neither offspring signal) the parent is able to use cues to investigate the need and
quality of the two offspring. Using cues may be inefficient, as the parent may have to spend a
considerable amount of time and energy examining the offspring. To reflect this inefficiency, it
is assumed that instead of having quantity g resources to distribute between the two offspring,
the parent is only able to gather g(1 − b) if the parent uses cues, where b ≥ 0. The payoffs the
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same as without cues, except for the following
Oh,1 =

fh(g(1 − b)) − c + r( fl(0) − c), if 0 < g < a, d < −2g, fh(g(1 − b)) + fl(0) > fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
g
2
) − c + r( fl( g2 ) − c), if 0 < g < a, d < −2g, fh(g(1 − b)) + fl(0) ≤ fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(0) − c + r( fl(g(1 − b)) − c), if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g, fh(0) + fl(g(1 − b)) > fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
g
2
) − c + r( fl( g2 ) − c), if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g, fh(0) + fl(g(1 − b)) ≤ fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
(1 − b)(g − a)
2
) − c + r( fl( (1 − b)(g + a)2 ) − c), if g ≥ a, fh(
(1 − b)(g − a)
2
) + fl(
(1 − b)(g + a)
2
) > fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
g
2
) − c + r( fl( g2 ) − c), if g ≥ a, fh(
(1 − b)(g − a)
2
) + fl(
(1 − b)(g + a)
2
) ≤ fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
Ol,1 =

r( fh(g(1 − b)) − c) + fl(0) − c, if 0 < g < a, d < −2g, fh(g(1 − b)) + fl(0) > fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
r( fh(
g
2
) − c) + fl( g2 ) − c, if 0 < g < a, d < −2g, fh(g(1 − b)) + fl(0) ≤ fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
)
r( fh(0) − c) + fl(g(1 − b)) − c, if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g, fh(0) + fl(g(1 − b)) > fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
r( fh(
g
2
) − c) + fl( g2 ) − c, if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g, fh(0) + fl(g(1 − b)) ≤ fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
)
r( fh(
(1 − b)(g − a)
2
) − c) + fl( (1 − b)(g + a)2 ) − c, if g ≥ a, fh(
(1 − b)(g − a)
2
) + fl(
(1 − b)(g + a)
2
) > fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
)
r( fh(
g
2
) − c) + fl( g2 ) − c, if g ≥ a, fh(
(1 − b)(g − a)
2
) + fl(
(1 − b)(g + a)
2
) ≤ fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
Oh,4 =

fh(g(1 − b)) + r fl(0), if 0 < g < a, d < −2g, fh(g(1 − b)) + fl(0) > fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
g
2
) + r fl(
g
2
), if 0 < g < a, d < −2g, fh(g(1 − b)) + fl(0) ≤ fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(0) + r fl(g(1 − b)), if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g, fh(0) + fl(g(1 − b)) > fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
g
2
) + r fl(
g
2
), if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g, fh(0) + fl(g(1 − b)) ≤ fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
(1 − b)(g − a)
2
) + r fl(
(1 − b)(g + a)
2
), if g ≥ a, fh( (1 − b)(g − a)2 ) + fl(
(1 − b)(g + a)
2
) > fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
g
2
) + r fl(
g
2
), if g ≥ a, fh( (1 − b)(g − a)2 ) + fl(
(1 − b)(g + a)
2
) ≤ fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
Ol,4 =

r fh(g(1 − b)) + fl(0), if 0 < g < a, d < −2g, fh(g(1 − b)) + fl(0) > fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
r fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
), if 0 < g < a, d < −2g, fh(g(1 − b)) + fl(0) ≤ fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
r fh(0) + fl(g(1 − b)), if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g, fh(0) + fl(g(1 − b)) > fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
), if 0 < g < a, d ≥ −2g, fh(0) + fl(g(1 − b)) ≤ fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
(1 − b)(g − a)
2
) + fl(
(1 − b)(g + a)
2
), if g ≥ a, fh( (1 − b)(g − a)2 ) + fl(
(1 − b)(g + a)
2
) > fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
)
fh(
g
2
) + fl(
g
2
), if g ≥ a, fh( (1 − b)(g − a)2 ) + fl(
(1 − b)(g + a)
2
) ≤ fh( g2 ) + fl(
g
2
)
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3.5.3 Stability analysis of the indivisible resource model
To examine when the facultative outcome above is a Nash equilibrium, we first need to deter-
mine the payoffs of each strategy for each player. The payoffs for the parent in good environ-
ments are given by
Op,1 =
1
2
R( fh(gh) + fh(0) + fl(gh) + fl(0) − 4c)
Op,2 = R( fh(gh) + fl(0) − c)
Op,3 = R( fh(0) + fl(gh) − c)
Op,4 = R( fl(gh) + fh(0) − c)
Op,5 = R( fh(gh) + fl(0) − c)
Op,6 =
1
2
R( fh(gh) + fh(0) + fl(gh) + fl(0)).
The payoffs for the parent in poor environmental conditions, Op,7−12, can be found by substi-
tuting gh for gl in the equations above. The payoffs for the low-quality offspring are given
by
Ol,1 =
1
2
(r( fh(gh) + fh(0) − 2c) + fl(gh) + fl(0) − 2c)
Ol,2 = r( fh(gh) − c) + fl(0)
Ol,3 = r( fh(0) − c) + fl(gh)
Ol,4 = fl(gh) − c + r fh(0)
Ol,5 = r fh(gh)) + fl(0) − c
Ol,6 =
1
2
((r( fh(gh) + fh(0)) + fl(gh) + fl(0))).
The payoffs for the low-quality offspring in poor environmental conditions, Ol,7−12, can be
found by substituting gh for gl in the equations above. Lastly, the payoffs for the high-quality
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offspring are given by
Oh,1 =
1
2
( fh(gh) + fh(0) − 2c + r( fl(gh) + fl(0) − 2c))
Oh,2 = fh(gh) − c + r fl(0)
Oh,3 = fh(0) − c + r( fl(gh))
Oh,4 = r( fl(gh) − c) + fh(0)
Oh,5 = fh(gh) + r( fl(0) − c)
Oh,6 =
1
2
fh(gh) + fh(0) + r( fl(gh) + fl(0)).
The payoffs for the high-quality offspring in poor environmental conditions, Ol,7−12, can be
found by substituting gh for gl in the equations above.
Next, we calculate the stability conditions for the facultative outcome. Our first condition,
D1, is that the parent prefers to feed the low-quality offspring when environmental conditions
are favourable and the high-quality offspring when environmental conditions are poor; that is,
D1 : Op,4 ≥ Op5 ,Op,8 ≥ Op,9.
The low-quality offspring in favourable environmental conditions prefers to signal given that
the high-quality offspring does not; this condition can be separated into three cases
D2 : Ol,4 ≥ Ol,6.
Similarly, the high-quality offspring in favourable environmental conditions prefers not to sig-
nal
D3 : Oh,4 ≥ Oh,1.
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Conversely, in low-quality environments the low-quality offspring does not signal
D4 : Ol,8 ≥ Ol,7.
Lastly, the high-quality offspring signals in poor environments
D5 : Oh,8 > Oh,12.
3.5.4 Results
Results are presented in terms of how relatedness, signalling costs, baseline fitness, and differ-
ences in offspring quality influence the range of environmental conditions that would lead to a
transition between SoN and SoQ.
Relatedness between offspring
Moderate levels of relatedness between offspring facilitate the stability of the transition out-
come. When resources are scarce even in good environments (low gh), one offspring will not
benefit from the modest increase in resources significantly more than the other; consequently, in
these environments, high relatedness between offspring encourages neither offspring to signal
so that neither bears the cost of signalling (assuming there is a cost), thus leading the parent to
feed randomly. If relatedness between offspring is low, there is less incentive for the offspring
to work together using signals to direct the parent to feed the offspring that would receive the
greatest fitness benefits. Instead, both offspring will signal and the parent is more likely to feed
randomly, especially if the direct fitness benefit of one offspring is not significantly greater than
the other.
As relatedness between offspring increases, so too does the degree of environmental vari-
ability which can sustain the stability of the transition outcome (that is, higher r allows for a
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larger ratio between maximum gh and maximum gl).
Cost of signalling
Moderate signal costs facilitate the stability of the transition outcome. If the cost of signalling
is too low, both offspring will signal. The exception is when relatedness is sufficiently high
and one offspring will benefit significantly more from additional resources than the other. The
transition between SoN and SoQ is possible even when there is no signalling cost (i.e. c = 0),
provided relatedness between offspring is sufficiently high, and the low-quality (resp. high-
quality) offspring benefits substantially more from provisioning in good (resp. poor) environ-
ments than its sibling. Very high signalling costs can outweigh the direct benefits of receiving
the additional resources, and so neither offspring beg unless relatedness is high and one off-
spring benefits significantly more than the other; in this case, begging will ensure the parent
feeds the offspring that benefits most.
Baseline fitness
Given moderate baseline fitness levels, conditions for the stability of the transition outcome
can be met.
When offspring baseline fitness is low, as is the case for altricial species, the high-quality
offspring will prefer to signal and have the parent feed randomly in good environments if gh is
too high. This is because, while the low-quality offspring would benefit more from the addi-
tional resources, the additional resources available would significantly benefit the high-quality
offspring as well, and so it too signals. If gh is too low, the parent will prefer to feed the non-
signalling high-quality offspring rather than the low-quality offspring. This occurs because the
high-quality offspring would benefit more than the low-quality offspring, so the parent ignores
the beggar and feeds the high-quality offspring.
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As the baseline fitness, d, increases, the maximum gl in the region of stability decreases.
If gl is sufficiently large, the parent will not prefer to feed the higher-quality offspring should
it be the only offspring to signal, and will instead feed the lower-quality offspring. Given
sufficiently high d, which would be characteristic of precocial species, the low-quality offspring
will always signal since it prefers that the parent feeds randomly rather than feed the higher-
quality offspring, or the cost of signalling becomes so large relative to the potential benefits of
additional resources that it is not worth it for either offspring to signal.
High-quality offspring advantage
Mathematically, both baseline fitness and high-quality offspring advantage, a, influence the
offspring’s’ conditions relative to the inflection point – where the marginal fitness benefits of
increased provisioning are greatest – of the sigmoidal curve. Consequently, similar to the re-
lationship between the stability of the transition outcome and offspring baseline fitness, the
transition outcome is stable only when the high-quality offspring has a moderate advantage
over its sibling.
If the advantage is sufficiently small, the inclusive fitness benefit from the high-quality
offspring’s perspective of allowing its sibling to be fed in favourable environments does not
outweigh the direct fitness advantage of being fed, even if the parent feeds randomly. Con-
sequently, the facultative outcome is never stable since the high-quality offspring will always
signal (D3 not satisfied). As the relative advantage of the high-quality offspring increases, the
minimum gh in the region of stability decreases. If the amount of resources in good environ-
ments, gh, is sufficiently low, the parent may prefer to feed the high-quality offspring rather
than the low-quality offspring (D1 not satisfied), since the fitness function of both offspring
will be sufficiently far away from the domain of diminishing returns (Figure 3.5.1), and so the
high-quality offspring will experience greater fitness gains for smaller levels of investment.
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High-Quality Offspring
Signal No Signal
Low-Quality Offspring Low-quality Offspring
Parent ParentParent Parent
Signal SignalNo Signal No Signal
Random Cues Random CuesSignaller SignallerNon-
Signaller
Non-
Signaller
1, 9O: 2, 10 3, 11 4, 12 5, 13 6, 14 7, 15 8, 16
Figure 3.5.1: Offspring fitness represented by a sigmoidal (solid black line). The dashed blue
lines that intersect the fitness function at t=-5, t=0, and t=5 represent the instantaneous rate
of change, or marginal fitness benefits, for offspring in those three states. Note that when the
offspring state is very poor, small amounts of investments do little to increase offspring fitness.
Also, if the state of the offspring is t > 0 – the inflection point – there are diminishing returns
on investment: the per-unit benefit of resource investment decreases as the offspring’s state
gets better.
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As the advantage becomes greater, lower amounts of resources are required to push the
fitness function of the high-quality offspring into the domain of diminishing returns, thereby
decreasing the minimum gh. When a increases, maximum gh in the region of stability in-
creases. If gh is sufficiently large, the high-quality offspring begins to prefer that the parent
feeds randomly rather than allow the low-quality offspring to signal, and thus signals (D3 not
satisfied). This is because, with large gh, the direct benefit of receiving resources, even if ran-
domly, outweighs the inclusive fitness benefit of its low-quality sibling getting the resource,
even though the resource will increase its sibling’s direct fitness more than it would its own.
As the advantage of high-quality offspring increases, the offspring’s fitness reaches the point of
diminishing returns for lower levels of investment, and as such higher levels of gh are required
for the direct fitness benefit of being fed randomly to outweigh the indirect fitness benefit of
letting the low-quality offspring be fed more.
As a increases, the maximum gl in the region of stability decreases. If gl is sufficiently
large, the low-quality offspring will signal, as it will prefer the parent to feed randomly rather
than feed the high-quality offspring (D4 not satisfied). Since gl is so large, the direct fitness
benefit of being fed randomly outweighs the inclusive fitness benefit of allowing its sibling to
be fed, even if the sibling would benefit more from being fed. As the fitness advantage of the
high-quality offspring increases (a increases), the high-quality offspring’s fitness function will
be closer to the domain of diminishing returns for smaller gl; as such, the higher-quality off-
spring benefits less per unit of resource, and so the low-quality offspring will signal for smaller
gl levels.
When the fitness advantage of the high-quality offspring is small, there is little difference
between the marginal benefits of feeding the high-quality offspring versus the low-quality off-
spring for most values of gl; the cost of signalling can easily outweigh these marginal benefits.
As a increases, the fitness function of the high-quality offspring is in the domain of diminishing
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returns even for very small amounts of resource investment, and so the fitness benefit of feed-
ing one offspring over the other begins to shrink once again, and the parent is better off feeding
randomly. This causes the maximum gl in the region of stability to decrease as a increases.
3.5.5 Model with cues
Suppose parents are able to use physical proxies (cues) to evaluate offspring quality. A sim-
ple and realistic assumption is that it is more efficient for parents to use signals to guide their
provisioning than it is to use physical cues (i) [14]: if the parent uses offspring signals rather
than investigate cues, they have more energy or time to find more resources, and so the amount
of indivisible resource obtained is increased by some factor, b > 0, for a total of (1 + b)gh
in high-quality conditions and (1 + b)gl in low-quality conditions. If the parent uses neither
signals nor cues to decide resource allocation, it is assumed to feed an offspring at random.
As this is another scenario in which the parent does not expend energy investigating cues, all
resources obtained are multiplied by a factor of 1 + b if the parent feeds randomly. If the parent
uses neither signals nor cues to decide resource allocation, it is assumed to feed an offspring at
random. As this is another scenario in which the parent does not expend energy investigating
cues, all resources obtained are multiplied by a factor of 1 + b if the parent feeds randomly.
If both offspring signal, the parent can choose to either feed an offspring at random or inves-
tigate cues to decide which to feed. If only the high-quality offspring signals, the parent can
choose to either feed it or feed the non-signalling low-quality offspring. Similarly, if only the
low-quality offspring signals, the parent can choose to feed it or feed the non-signalling high-
quality offspring. Finally, if neither offspring signals, the parent once again decides between
feeding one offspring at random or investigating cues.
There are 16 possible outcomes for the scenario described (see Figure 3.5.2). To examine
when the facultative outcome above is a Nash equilibrium, we first need to determine the
payoffs of each strategy for each player. The payoffs for the parent in good environments are
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Figure 3.5.2: Decision tree representation of the game outlined in the main text. A separate
and independent game is played in good- and poor-quality environments, although the general
structure of the decision tree is the same for each environment. Note that the high-quality and
low-quality offspring act simultaneously and independently. Each pair of numbers refers to
the outcome name assigned to the good-quality environments and poor-quality environments
respectively.
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given by
Op,1 =
1
2
R( fh(gh(1 + b)) + fh(0) + fl(gh(1 + b)) + fl(0) − 4c)
Op,2 = R max( fh(gh) + fl(0) − 2c, fl(gh) + fh(0) − 2c))
Op,3 = R( fh(gh(1 + b)) + fl(0) − c)
Op,4 = R( fh(0) + fl(gh(1 + b)) − c)
Op,5 = R( fl((1 + b)gh) + fh(0) − c)
Op,6 = R( fh((1 + b)gh) + fl(0) − c)
Op,7 =
1
2
R( fh(gh(1 + b)) + fh(0) + fl(gh(1 + b)) + fl(0))
Op,8 = R max( fh(gh) + fl(0), fl(gh) + fh(0))).
The payoffs for the parent in poor environmental conditions, Op,9−16, can be found by substi-
tuting gh for gl in the equations above. The payoffs for the low-quality offspring are given
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by
Ol,1 =
1
2
(r( fh(gh(1 + b)) + fh(0) − 2c) + fl(gh(1 + b)) + fl(0) − 2c)
Ol,2 =
{ if fh(gh) + fl(0) > fh(0) + fl(gh), r( fh(gh) − c) + fl(0) − c
if fh(0) + fl(gh) > fh(0) + fl(gh), r( fh(0) − c) + fl(gh) − c
Ol,3 = r( fh(gh(1 + b)) − c) + fl(0)
Ol,4 = r( fh(0) − c) + fl(gh(1 + b))
Ol,5 = fl((1 + b)gh) − c + r fh(0)
Ol,6 = r fh((1 + b)gh)) + fl(0) − c
Ol,7 =
1
2
((r( fh(gh(1 + b)) + fh(0)) + fl(gh(1 + b)) + fl(0)))
Ol,8 =
{ if fh(gh) + fl(0) > fh(0) + fl(gh), r fh(gh) + fl(0)
if fh(0) + fl(gh) > fh(0) + fl(gh), r fh(0) + fl(gh).
The payoffs for the low-quality offspring in poor environmental conditions, Ol,9−16, can be
found by substituting gh for gl in the equations above. Lastly, the payoffs for the high-quality
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offspring are given by
Oh,1 =
1
2
( fh(gh(1 + b)) + fh(0) − 2c + r( fl(gh(1 + b)) + fl(0) − 2c))
Oh,2 =
{ if fh(gh) + fl(0) > fh(0) + fl(gh), fh(gh) − c + r( fl(0) − c)
if fh(0) + fl(gh) > fh(0) + fl(gh), fh(0) − c + r( fl(gh) − c)
Oh,3 = fh(gh(1 + b)) − c + r fl(0)
Oh,4 = fh(0) − c + r( fl(gh(1 + b)))
Oh,5 = r( fl((1 + b)gh) − c) + fh(0)
Oh,6 = fh((1 + b)gh) + r( fl(0) − c)
Oh,7 =
1
2
fh(gh(1 + b)) + fh(0) + r( fl(gh(1 + b)) + fl(0))
Oh,8 =
{ if fh(gh) + fl(0) > fh(0) + fl(gh), fh(gh) + r fl(0)
if fh(0) + fl(gh) > fh(0) + fl(gh), fh(0) + r fl(gh).
The payoffs for the high-quality offspring in poor environmental conditions, Ol,9−16, can be
found by substituting gh for gl in the equations above. The remainder of the procedure to find
the conditions under which the facultative outcome is stable is the same as the procedure used
in the base model.
Relatedness
For sufficiently low values of relatedness, the minimum amount of resources in good environ-
ments, gh, necessary for the stability of the facultative outcome is high (Figure 3.5.3). When
siblings are mostly unrelated in good environments, there is little incentive for the high-quality
offspring to remain silent it does not receive significant inclusive fitness benefits by allowing
the low-quality offspring to be fed, even if the direct fitness of the low-quality offspring will
benefit significantly more from receiving the resource (D3 not satisfied). But as relatedness in-
creases, eventually the inclusive fitness benefits of allowing its low-quality offspring to be fed
will outweigh the potential direct fitness benefits of being fed, and so the high-quality offspring
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Figure 3.5.3: Relatedness between offspring and its effect on the amount of resources required
for the facultative outcome to be stable in good environments (top panel) and in poor en-
vironments (bottom panel). The region between the maximum amount of resources (blue
lines) and the minimum amount of resources (red lines) constitute the amount of resources
necessary for the stability of the facultative outcome. Results were generated using d = 1,
c = min(0.05, 11+e−t ), a = 1.25, r = 0.5, and b = 1.
will not beg. The result is a bifurcation at some threshold, the minimum gh in the region of
stability instantaneously and significantly lowers. As relatedness between siblings continues
to increase, the minimum gh of the region of stability increases: the low-quality offspring no
longer prefers to signal since it benefits more from the parent feeding randomly – the marginal
direct fitness benefits it obtains from being fed consistently rather than randomly does not out-
weigh the cost of signalling if the resource quantity is low, and this is especially true when the
siblings are more closely related (D2 not satisfied).
The minimum gl in the region of stability is very low regardless of relatedness assuming
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the high-quality offspring will benefit significantly more from small amounts of additional pro-
visioning, which occurs as long as its advantage over its sibling is not very large; the cost of
signalling together with the fact that the parent can use cues to conclude that the high-quality
offspring should be fed prohibits the low-quality offspring from signalling this is true regard-
less of the relatedness between siblings. As relatedness increases, the maximum gl defining
the region of stability increases as well, since this increases the inclusive fitness benefit of the
low-quality offspring remaining silent so that the high-quality offspring will remain fed. How-
ever, this increase eventually stalls as at sufficiently high gl values it is in the best interest of
the parent to feed the lower-quality offspring, assuming they are related, because high levels of
resources cause the fitness of high-quality offspring to enter the domain of diminishing returns,
and thus high levels of resources benefit low-quality offspring more (D1 not satisfied).
Efficiency benefit of the signalling system
If the efficiency benefit of signalling, b, is too small, the facultative outcome will not be stable
under any condition (Figure 3.5.4). In good quality environments, the high-quality offspring
must remain silent, but if there is no efficiency benefit, it makes better sense for both offspring
to remain silent so as to not suffer the cost of signalling (D2 not satisfied). The parent then uses
cues to determine that it is better for the low-quality offspring to be fed. As the efficiency benefit
increases, the minimum gh decreases and maximum gh increases in the region of stability, since
there is a greater inclusive fitness benefit for the good-quality offspring to allow only the poor-
quality offspring to beg and be fed. In contrast, as b increases, the maximum gl defining
the region of stability decreases: even small amounts of resources can benefit the low-quality
offspring. This is because large efficiency benefits ensure that even small amounts of resources,
gl, make the high-quality offspring reach the domain of diminishing returns. Consequently, it
is much better for the parent to allocate toward the low-quality offspring, thus incentivizing
the parent to feed the low-quality offspring even though the high-quality offspring is the one
signalling (D1 not satisfied). It is not advantageous for the high-quality offspring to cease
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Figure 3.5.4: The efficiency benefit of not using cues and its effect on the amount of resources
required for the facultative outcome to be stable in good environments (top panel) and in poor
environments (bottom panel). The region between the maximum amount of resources (blue
lines) and the minimum amount of resources (red lines) constitute the amount of resources
necessary for the stability of the facultative outcome. Results were generated using d = 1,
c = min(0.05, 11+e−t ), a = 1.25, and R = r = 0.5.
signalling since the system benefits everyone so significantly.
Cost of signalling
The higher the cost of signalling, the higher the minimum gh and the lower the maximum gh
in the region of stability (Figure 3.5.5). Higher costs mean the low-quality offspring is less
likely to signal, since the efficiency benefit of the signalling system no longer compensates
for the cost of signalling, and as such the low-quality offspring prefers that the parent instead
investigates cues to determine that it is better to feed the low-quality offspring (D2 not satis-
fied). Also as the cost of signalling increases, the minimum gh required for stability increases
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Figure 3.5.5: The cost of signalling and its effect on the amount of resources required for the
facultative outcome to be stable in good environments (top panel) and in poor environments
(bottom panel). The region between the maximum amount of resources (blue lines) and the
minimum amount of resources (red lines) constitute the amount of resources necessary for the
stability of the facultative outcome. Results were generated using d = 1, a = 1.25, R = r = 0.5,
and b = 0.1.
as the low-quality offspring will begin preferring that the parent feed randomly rather than use
signals since the difference in the increase of fitness does not differ much depending on which
offspring gets the resource if the amount of resource is sufficiently small (D2 not satisfied).
As the cost of signalling increases in poor environments, both the minimum and maximum
gl in the region of stability increase. If gl is too low, the high-quality offspring will prefer
that the parent use cues rather than signals to confirm that it is better to feed the high-quality
offspring, since the efficiency benefit of signalling means little if gl is small anyway (D5 not
satisfied). As the cost of signalling increases, this preference strengthens. On the other hand,
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if gl is too high, the low-quality offspring will signal as it prefers the parent to feed randomly
rather than feed the higher-quality offspring, and since gl is high the high-quality offspring is
not better off by deciding to not signal (D4 not satisfied). As the costs of signalling increases,
the preference for the low-quality offspring to signal wanes as the benefit of being fed half the
time is no longer greater than the cost of signalling.
Baseline fitness
Given moderate baseline fitness levels, conditions for the stability of the facultative outcome
can be met. If the baseline fitness of the offspring is too high (d sufficiently high), the par-
ent may never prefer to feed the high-quality offspring rather than the low-quality offspring
regardless of the amount of resources the poor environment offers (D1 not satisfied). Instead,
any quantity of resource will always provide a greater benefit to the low-quality offspring since
the sigmoidal fitness function of the high-quality offspring will always be in the domain of
diminishing returns.
As the baseline fitness of offspring increases (d increases), both the minimum and maxi-
mum gh in the domain of stability increase. If gh is sufficiently low, low-quality offspring will
not signal as they will prefer that the parent feeds randomly rather than signal and be fed (D2
not satisfied). Assuming the fitness levels of the two offspring are not already in the domain of
diminishing returns (i.e. t > 0), additional provisioning has less of an impact on the recipient’s
direct fitness. Consequently, as the baseline fitness lowers, the direct fitness benefit of always
being fed is less likely to outweigh both the cost of signalling and the indirect benefit of having
its sibling be randomly fed if gh is too low. If gh is too high, the efficiency benefit has little
direct consequence on offspring fitness since the fitness function is already in the domain of di-
minishing returns. Therefore, the low-quality offspring prefers that the parent uses cues rather
than bear the cost of signalling, and so both offspring do not signal (D2 not satisfied). The
maximum gh increases with increasing d because lower baseline fitness means greater amounts
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of resources are necessary to push the offspring’s sigmoidal fitness function into the domain of
diminishing returns and thus make the cost of signalling outweigh the efficiency benefit of the
signalling system.
As d increases (i.e. baseline fitness increases), both the maximum and minimum gl in the
region of stability decrease. When gl is sufficiently low, the parent will prefer to feed randomly
rather than use cues. This is because when gl is sufficiently small, the relative advantage of
feeding one offspring over another is correspondingly small, and can be outweighed by the
benefit of not wasting energy investigating cues. The result is that the high-quality offspring
will not signal. The high-quality offspring prefers for the parent to use cues rather than having
to bear the cost of signalling, and so it does not signal (D5 not satisfied).
As the baseline fitness decreases (d decreases), the relative advantage of feeding one off-
spring over the other becomes even smaller, as the rate of fitness increase per unit of resource
decreases. Consequently, the minimum gl in the region of stability increases. If gl is suffi-
ciently large, the parent will not prefer to feed the higher-quality offspring should it be the
only offspring to signal, and will instead feed the lower-quality offspring (D1 not satisfied).
This occurs because the fitness function of the higher-quality offspring more quickly enters
the domain of diminishing returns, and so the parent will have greater inclusive fitness by in-
vesting in the lower-quality offspring instead. As d decreases, greater resource investment (i.e.
higher gl) is necessary for the fitness function of higher-quality offspring to reach the domain
of diminishing returns, and so the maximum gl in the region of stability increases. Eventually,
given sufficiently high d, the low-quality offspring will always signal since it prefers that the
parent feeds randomly rather than feed the higher-quality offspring (D4 not satisfied), or the
cost of signalling becomes so large that it is not worth it for either offspring to signal (D5 not
satisfied).
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Figure 3.5.6: High-quality offspring advantage and its effect on the amount of resources re-
quired for the facultative outcome to be stable in good environments (top panel) and in poor
environments (bottom panel). The region between the maximum amount of resources (blue
lines) and the minimum amount of resources (red lines) constitute the amount of resources
necessary for the stability of the facultative outcome. Results were generated using d = 1,
c = min(0.05, 11+e−t ), R = r = 0.5, and b = 0.1.
High-quality offspring advantage
The relationship between the high-quality offspring advantage and the region of stability for
the facultative outcome is quite complex (Figure 3.5.6), though summarily the facultative out-
come is stable only if the high-quality offspring’s advantage is moderate.
If the advantage is sufficiently small, the inclusive fitness benefit from the high-quality
offspring’s perspective of allowing its sibling to be fed does not outweigh the direct fitness ad-
vantage of being fed, even if the parent feeds randomly. Consequently, the facultative outcome
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is never stable since the high-quality offspring will always signal (D3 not satisfied). The parent
prefers to feed randomly because the efficiency benefit of not using cues outweighs the fact
that the low-quality offspring would benefit slightly more from the resource. As the relative
advantage of the high-quality offspring increases, the minimum gh in the region of stability
decreases. If the amount of resources in good environments, gh, is sufficiently low, the parent
may prefer to feed the high-quality offspring rather than the low-quality offspring (D1 not sat-
isfied), since the fitness function of both offspring will be sufficiently far away from the domain
of diminishing returns, and so the high-quality offspring will experience greater fitness gains
for smaller levels of investment.
As the advantage becomes greater, lower amounts of resources are required to push the
fitness function of the high-quality offspring into the domain of diminishing returns, thereby
decreasing the minimum gh. When a increases, maximum gh in the region of stability increases
initially, reaches a peak, then decreases. If gh is sufficiently large, the high-quality offspring
begins to prefer that the parent feeds randomly rather than allow the low-quality offspring to
signal, and thus signals (D3 not satisfied). This is because, with large gh, the direct benefit
of receiving resources, even if randomly, outweighs the inclusive fitness benefit of its low-
quality sibling getting the resource, even though the resource will increase its sibling’s direct
fitness more than it would its own. As the advantage of high-quality offspring increases, the
offspring’s fitness reaches the point of diminishing returns for lower levels of investment, and
as such higher levels of gh are required for the direct fitness benefit of being fed randomly to
outweigh the indirect fitness benefit of letting the low-quality offspring be fed more. However,
if the offspring advantage is sufficiently large, the low-quality offspring will no longer signal.
The parent no longer prefers to feed randomly and will instead use direct cues to determine
which offspring will be fed (D2 not satisfied). This is because, with such a high-fitness advan-
tage, it is in the best interest of the parent to feed the low-quality offspring, and the efficiency
advantage of the feeding randomly is outweighed by the greater fitness gains of feeding only
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the low-quality offspring. The cost of signalling outweighs the efficiency benefit of avoiding
the need to investigate cues, and so the low-quality offspring will choose not to signal. As the
advantage of the higher-quality offspring increases, there is greater incentive for the parent to
feed the low-quality offspring even for relatively low gl levels, so the low-quality offspring is
less likely to signal, and the minimum gl decreases as a decreases. If the relative advantage of
the high-quality offspring is sufficiently large, it never is in the best interest for the parent to
feed the high-quality offspring, and so it is in the best interest of both offspring to not signal
and for the parent to access using cues, thus the facultative outcome is never satisfied.
As a increases, the maximum gl in the region of stability decreases. If gl is sufficiently
large, the low-quality offspring will signal, as it will prefer the parent to feed randomly rather
than feed the high-quality offspring (D4 not satisfied). Since gl is so large, the direct fitness
benefit of being fed randomly outweighs the inclusive fitness benefit of allowing its sibling to
be fed, even if the sibling would benefit more from being fed. As the fitness advantage of the
high-quality offspring increases (a increases), the high-quality offspring’s fitness function will
be closer to the domain of diminishing returns for smaller gl; as such, the higher-quality off-
spring benefits less per unit of resource, and so the low-quality offspring will signal for smaller
gl levels. As a increases (high-quality offspring advantage increases), the minimum value of
resources, gl, for which the parent prefers to feed randomly as opposed to using cues when
neither offspring signals initially increases, reaches a peak, then decreases as a continues to
decrease (Figure 3.5.7). The high-quality offspring refuses to signal when its parent prefers to
feed using cues because it would rather the parent feed according to cues than to bear the costs
of signalling (D5 not satisfied).
When the fitness advantage of the high-quality offspring is small, there is little difference
between the marginal benefits of feeding the high-quality offspring versus the low-quality off-
spring for most values of gl, and so the parent gains more from using the efficiency that comes
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Figure 3.5.7: The difference between the parent’s payoff when feeding randomly compared to
using signals, plotted as a function of resources available in poor environments. The dotted,
dashed, and solid lines represent Op,15 − Op,16 as a function of gl at a = 1.2, a = 0.9, and
a = 0.5, respectively. Note that parents prefer to feed using cues for a greater range of gl when
a is moderate; if a is very large or very small, parents always prefer to feed randomly. Results
were generated using d = 1, c = min(0.05, 11+e−t ), R = r = 0.5, and b = 0.1.
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from feeding randomly as opposed to investigating cues. The result is that the minimum gl
in the region of stability is initially small. As the fitness advantage becomes larger, it is bet-
ter for the parent to use cues rather than feed randomly for small values of gl since feeding
the high-quality offspring is significantly better than feeding the low-quality offspring, as the
marginal rates of return are much higher for it than for the low-quality offspring when gl is suf-
ficiently low. The high-quality offspring would rather not bear the cost of signalling and thus
allows the parent to feed via investigating cues. However, as a increases further, eventually the
fitness function of the high-quality offspring is in the domain of diminishing returns even for
very small amounts of resource investment, and so the fitness benefit of feeding one offspring
over the other begins to shrink once again, and the parent is better off feeding randomly. The
high-quality offspring will once again prefer to signal, and this results in the minimum gl in the
region of stability to decrease for very large values of a.
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Chapter 4
Sex differences in begging behaviour
Abstract
There are significant differences between the begging behaviours of males and female
in many bird species. It has been hypothesized that these differences may be the result of
sex differences in the need of nestlings. However, this theory remains untested theoreti-
cally and is unlikely to be a universal explanation since there are species that exhibit sex
differences in begging behaviours but do not appear to have significant sex differences in
need. We devise a simple evolutionary model to confirm that, all else equal, the sex in
greater need the sex with lower baseline survival or greater per-unit benefit of additional
provisioning will generally evolve to beg more intensely. We also propose and test the
idea that sex differences in provisioning rates could promote the down-regulation of beg-
ging behaviour in females if there are genes in the female sex-chromosome that can modify
begging behaviour. We find that this inclusive fitness effect can even be more important
than sex differences in need, as females may evolve to be less intensely even when they
are technically in greater need.
4.1 Introduction
The observation that male offspring in several species beg more than their female nestmates
[1, 2, 3] has not been adequately explained. Price et al. (1996) proposed that male nestling
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yellow-headed blackbirds, Xanthocephalus xanthocephalus, tend to be larger, and therefore
have greater long-term needs [1]. While perhaps appropriate for the particular species, this
explanation cannot explain the sex-specific begging that has been observed in species that have
little sex differences in size, such as the zebra finch [3], Taeniopygia guttata, and the barn swal-
low [4], Hirundo rustica. Saino et al. (2003) argue that the sex-specific differences in begging
behaviour common in nestling barn swallows may be necessary for parents to identify the sex
of their offspring as no obvious sexual dimorphism in morphology exists [2]. However, it has
not been demonstrated that parents are unable to distinguish males from females in the absence
of begging. Further, such a system may be susceptible to cheating.
We propose that sex-specific differences in begging behaviour may be driven by sex differ-
ences in the inclusive fitness effect of louder begging. Males of many species, including barn
swallows, provide less care and are less reactive to increased levels of begging [5, 6, 7, 8]. Since
any mutation which prompts an offspring to beg more loudly may inherited by the mutant’s off-
spring, mutant mothers will be forced to provide a greater increase in care as a consequence
of having mutant offspring compared to mutant fathers. Since the inclusive fitness cost of pro-
viding for loudly begging offspring is greater for mothers than for fathers, selection can cause
females to beg less intensely than males if begging behaviour can be influenced by sex-linked
genes. Here, we evaluate the hypothesis that long-term need should result in higher levels of
begging using a full life-cycle model. We then model the inclusive fitness effect of begging be-
haviour to demonstrate that sex differences in provisioning behaviour are sufficient to explain
sex-specific begging levels.
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4.2 Methods
4.2.1 The long-term need hypothesis
We construct a caricature model of real biological systems to emphasize the core arguments
of the long-term need hypothesis. Consider a finite wildtype population that consists of four
distinct classes: female offspring, male offspring, female breeders, and male breeders, with
population sizes of U1, U2, V1, and V2, respectively (Table 4.1 lists all variables and parameters
used). In each generation, for mathematical simplicity, a male-female breeding pair creates
exactly one offspring: with probability p, this offspring is female, and with probability 1 − p,
the offspring is male. The wildtype offspring of sex i begs with intensity xi, where i = f denotes
females, and i = m denotes males. We assume, as is frequently observed in many species, that
greater levels of begging translate to greater parental care for that offspring [9, 10]. Suppose
an offspring that begs with intensity xi survives to fledge with probability 0 < si(xi) < 1, where
si is an increasing function.Two unlinked autosomal genes will influence begging behaviour in
the following manner: the gene controlling female (resp. male) begging levels influences only
female (resp. male) begging rates but can be inherited and transmitted by the opposite sex.
Table 4.1: Variables and parameters used in the main text
Symbol Explanation
Ui Number of female (i = 1) and male (i = 2) offspring
Vi Number of female (i = 1) and male (i = 2) breeders
xi Female (i = f ) and male (i = m) begging intensity
si(xi) Survival rate for female (i = f ) and male (i = m) offspring
sp(xi) Survival rate for mothers with daughters (i = f ) and sons (i = m)
r2 Relatedness between offspring and father
a Coefficient inversely proportional to carrying capacity
p Primary sex ratio
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𝑼𝟏
female offspring
𝑽𝟏
female breeder
𝑼𝟐
male offspring
𝒔𝒇
𝟏 + 𝒂𝑽𝟏
𝒑
𝟏 − 𝒑
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𝟐(𝟏 − 𝒑)
𝟏
𝟐
𝒑𝒔𝒑 𝒙𝒇 + (𝟏 − 𝒑)𝒔𝒑(𝒙𝒎)
Figure 4.2.1: Lifecycle of the wildtype population at equilibrium. Note that since it is assumed
male die after breeder once, one does not need to explicitly track the population dynamics
surrounding male breeders, V2.
bi,1 Baseline survival rate of female (i = f ) and male (i = m) offspring
bi,2 Per-unit benefit of parental care for females (i = f ) and males (i = m)
c Baseline survival of mothers
c1 Per-unit cost of parental provisioning
It is costly for parents to increase their level of care. To emphasize the role of sex-specific
provisioning behaviour on the evolution of sex-specific begging, we assume that only females
respond to offspring begging. Continuing with the assumption that increased begging levels
results in increased care, if an offspring begs with intensity xi, the mother survives with proba-
bility 0 ≤ sp(xi) < 1, where sp is some decreasing function.
Offspring remain in the offspring class for exactly one generation, then they compete to
become breeders. To ensure the population cannot grow without bound, suppose that there is a
finite number of breeding territories, and each territory is ‘owned’ by up to one female breeder.
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The probability that a female offspring that begs with intensity x f in the current generation
inherits one of these territories in the next generation is equal to s f (x f )1+aV1 , where a is some con-
stant inversely proportional to the carrying capacity. Any female breeder that survives in one
generation will retain their territory in the next generation. Because begging does not influence
the survival of fathers, we can assume for mathematical convenience the extreme case in which
male breeders die immediately after their first breeding season. Any male offspring that survive
will enter the male breeder class in the next generation, and these males will compete against
each other for breeding opportunities.
The number of female breeders at equilibrium, V¯1, can be found by equating the expected
number of females that lose territories in a given generation and the number of females that
obtain a territory, (1 − psp(x f ) − (1 − p)sp(xm))V¯1 = pV¯1 s f (x f )1+aV¯1 . Solving for the number of fe-
male breeders, we find V¯1 = 1a (
ps f (x f )
1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm) − 1). It is simple to conclude that U¯1 = pV¯1,
U¯2 = (1 − p)V¯1, V¯2 = (1 − p)sm(xm)V¯1.
Suppose a mutant that influences male begging behaviour enters the population. Mutant
males exhibit a deviant begging intensity, ym. Females can carry the mutation, but their be-
haviour does not change as a result. Assuming the mutant is rare and that the population
is both well-mixed and outbreeding, we need only track the population of mutant heterozy-
gotes. To model the dynamics of the mutant population, we census the population after
birth but before fledging. Since male breeders die after reproducing, it is sufficient to sub-
divide the population into mutant female offspring, mutant male offspring, and mutant moth-
ers with mutant female offspring. The dynamics of the mutant allele at equilibrium satisfy
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[U1,U2,V1]T = A1[U1,U2,V1]T , where
A1 =

1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm)
2
(1−p)(1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm))
2p
1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm)
p
psm(ym)
2sm(xm)(1−p)
sm(ym)
2sm(xm)
0
p(psp(x f )+(1−p)( sp(xm)+sp(ym)2 )
2
(1−p)(psp(x f )+(1−p)( sp(xm)+sp(ym)2 )
2 psp(x f ) + (1 − p)( sp(xm)+sp(ym)2 )
 .
Here, A1 is the Jacobian and the entries are the rates at which each class (U1, V1, and U2) moves
to other classes. We will illustrate the calculations used to generate the entries of A1 with an
example. The number of male mutant offspring in the next generation produced by a male
mutant offspring in the current generation is equal to the probability that he survives to become
an adult (sm(ym)) multiplied by the expected number of females he mates with ( V1V1(1−p)sm(xm) ,
equivalent to the total number of female breeders divided by the total number of male breeders),
multiplied by the probability that the offspring is male (p), weighted by the probability that the
new male offspring will be a mutant (12 ). The growth rate, or equivalently the fitness, of the
mutant population is equivalent to the largest eigenvalue, λ, of A1. The growth rate of mutations
influencing female begging are similarly solved. The two growth rates are used to model the
coevolution of male and female begging behaviour (see Appendix 4.4).
Results
Suppose s f = b f ,1 + b f ,2x f and sm = bm,1 + bm,2xm. Here, b f ,1 > 0 and bm,1 > 0 represent the
baseline survival of females and males, respectively, while b f ,2 > 0 and bm,2 > 0 are measures of
the per-unit benefit of increasing parental care for females and males, respectively. We assume
mothers survive with probability sp = c−c1xi, where xi is the begging intensity of the offspring,
0 < c < 1 is the baseline survival of the mother, and c1 > 0 is the per-unit cost of investment.
Males and females evolve to beg with equal intensity whenever there is no difference in their
survival as a function of provisioning (i.e. s f (x) = sm(x) for all x). All else equal, the sex with
the greater per-unit provisioning benefit, bi,2, will generally evolve to beg more intensely in a
wider variety of situations. All else equal, the sex with the lower baseline survival will always
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Figure 4.2.2: Sex-differences in begging behaviour at equilibrium. The areas under the solid
(resp. dashed) lines show the range of per-unit previsioning costs, c1, in which females (resp.
male) evolve to beg maximally, xi = 1, at equilibrium. All results were generated using p = 0.5,
dashed lines were generated using bm,1 = 0.75 and bm,2 = 0.1, and solid lines were generated
using the values given in the title of each panel.
beg with equal or greater intensity compared to the sex with higher baseline survival (Figure
4.2.2).
4.2.2 Potential influence of the sex-chromosome on sex-specific begging
behaviour
Suppose begging levels are instead partially influenced by genes on the sex chromosome. Since
most species noted to have sex differences in begging behaviour are birds, we assume ZW sex
determination. Autosome genes completely determine male begging levels and influence fe-
male begging levels. Suppose there is a gene on the W sex chromosome that influences female
begging levels. We can create a Jacobian to track the evolution of begging when influenced by
an autosome, and another to model evolution when begging is controlled by an allosome (see
Appendix 4.4.2 & 4.4.3).
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Figure 4.2.3: Sex-differences in begging behaviour at equilibrium when female begging is
influenced by the sex chromosome. The areas under the solid (resp. dashed) lines show the
range of per-unit previsioning costs, c1, in which females (resp. male) evolve to beg maximally,
xi = 1, at equilibrium when female begging is controlled by genes on the sex chromosome. As
with Figure 4.2.2, all results were generated using p = 0.5 and xm = x f = 0, dashed lines were
generated using bm,1 = 0.75 and bm,2 = 0.1, and solid lines were generated using the values
given in the title of each panel.
ResultsFollowing the general method described in the long-term need model, we can compare the
conditions under which begging can emerge if controlled by an allosome as opposed to an
autosome. We assume that p = 12 . The result indicates that the autosomal mutation more readily
allows for increased begging intensity compared to the sex-chromosome mutation (comparing
Figures 4.2.2 & 4.2.3 reveals females evolve to beg more intensely under a small range of
parameter conditions when the mutation is on the W sex chromosome; see Appendix 4.4.5 for
a precise analytic version of this comparison). Mutations on the sex chromosome can even
override sex differences in long-term need: if female begging behaviour is influenced by genes
on the sex chromosome, greater per-unit benefits of provisioning and lower baseline survival
rates for females compared to males does not necessarily mean that females will evolve to beg
more loudly (Figure 4.2.3).
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4.3 Discussion
All else equal, the sex with greater long-term need, as measured by baseline survival rates,
bi,1, and per-unit benefits of parental investment, bi,2, will evolve to beg more intensely. The
efficiency of parental investment, bi,2, typically influences sex-differences in begging intensity
most significantly (Figure 4.2.2). Male offspring in many species, such as the yellow-headed
blackbirds [1], are larger than their female counterparts, meaning that they would be less likely
to survive without additional parental care (b f ,1 > bm,1) but also that larger amounts of invest-
ment are required to sustain offspring of the larger sex (b f ,2 > bm,2). Our models thus provide
mixed support for Price’s hypothesis that males evolve more loudly because they are larger in
size and therefore require greater amounts of care [1]. The larger males, in fact, may be less
inclined to beg more intensely because their per-unit benefit of begging is lower. Consequently,
the benefits of increased begging are less likely to outweigh the indirect fitness cost incurred
through the parent’s increased provisioning levels.
The term c1 not only represents the per-unit cost of parental investment but is equal to the
maximum parental investment in our model since maximal begging effort, xi, was set to unity
(a limit is necessary to ensure positive population sizes and fitness levels). Results indicate
offspring either increase their begging maximally, xi = 1, or not at all xi = 0. Differences in the
maximum begging intensity, max(xm) , max(x f ) can lead to differences in begging intensity.
Sex differences in maximum begging intensity — which in our model is equal to the realized
begging intensity if both offspring decide to beg — can either represent the physical limit of
offspring begging intensity or sex-specific variance in fitness (without requiring sex differences
in parental investment costs).
When begging intensities were allowed to coevolve with the primary sex ratio, p, moth-
ers will skew the sex ratio toward the sex that is less costly to raise, all else being equal (see
Appendix 4.4.4). Noteworthy is the fact that offspring are less likely to beg if the survival of
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mothers, c, is high, since maternal fitness exponentially increases with increased annual sur-
vival. This can remain true even when there are significant sex differences in the cost of raising
offspring. As such, one would expect smaller absolute sex differences in begging intensities in
longer-lived species.
Note that the middle column of Figure 4.2.2 suggests that males and females may evolve to
beg with the same intensity even if their need differs. This occurs because the evolution of male
and female begging intensities influence one another (expounded more explicitly in Appendix
using Frank & Taylor analysis). Consider, for example, the situation in which male offspring
gain more from increased levels of provisioning (i.e. they are needier). In this case, compared
to daughters, sons are more willing to inflict survival costs onto mothers. Since the expected
fitness of a mother increases exponentially with survival, the indirect fitness costs of begging
more loudly declerate with increased begging. Therefore, once one sex begins to beg – males,
in this case – the opposite sex will be more willing to beg since the indirect fitness costs (i.e.
the expected decrease in the residual fitness of the mother) has diminished.
Why begging rates are necessary for parents to provide males with relatively greater levels
of care is less clear. Begging has been found in many species to increase predation [11, 12, 13]
and to have metabolic costs [14, 15, 16], and thus a system in which parents could differen-
tiate offspring by sex without begging would be largely beneficial. Our models suggest that
sex differences in long-term need are a sufficient but not necessary explanation for observed
sex differences in begging behaviour. As offspring, the sexes will benefit equally by increasing
begging intensity assuming no differences in long-term need or cost. However, if mothers often
provide greater levels of provisioning and are more responsive to offspring begging compared
to males, mothers suffer larger costs for bearing the ‘increased begging intensity’ mutation.
Therefore, if begging intensity is genetically influenced, as is suggested by several studies
[17, 18, 19], the inclusive fitness effects of begging behaviour can lead females to beg less in-
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tensely than males even in the absence of sex-differences in long-term need. With evidence for
the genetic inheritably of begging behaviour being mostly species-specific and indirect, stud-
ies that focus on identifying precisely which genes influence begging behaviour, with special
attention paid to sex chromosomes, may be a direction for future study.
The models here were constructed with the assumption of well-mixed, outbreeding popula-
tions, though sex-specific dispersal patterns can potentially influence sex differences in begging
behaviour. All else equal, the non-dispersing sex may be expected to beg less intensely since
that sex encounters more local resource and mate competition, and therefore one would expect
the per-unit efficiency of parental investment, bi,2, into the non-dispersing sex to be lower. Al-
though some of the sex differences in dispersal rates can be represented by the parameter bi,2,
the full complexity of sex-specific dispersal, including local resource and mate competition
and inbreeding, and its implications on sex-specific begging behaviour cannot be captured by
our model.
It is important to note that our model assumes the parent’s response to increased begging
will always translate to increases in provisioning. While this is indeed true of many species
[9, 10], exceptions have been noted, with parents of certain species and populations allocating
resources entirely independently of offspring begging behaviour. Ultimately, due to the fact
that ours is a one-offspring model, we assume that begging signals need rather than quality or
hunger [20]. Models with multiple-offspring broods together with more dynamic allocation
strategies that assume sex-differences in long-term need (i.e. quality) would be more realis-
tic representations of signalling systems used by species in environments that are particularly
resource-limited.
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4.4 Appendix
4.4.1 Numerical analysis
Given any initial wildtype male begging intensity, xm,0, we can approximate the selection gra-
dient acting on this phenotype by finding the derivative of the leading eigenvalue. We can
then iterate this process, with xm,t+1 = xm,t + k ∂λ∂ym |xm,t , where k is related to the mutation rate.
This continues until we find |xm,t+1 − xm,t| < , for some sufficiently small  such that we can
be confident that we have identified the evolutionarily stable begging levels for males. We
simulatenously track the dynamics of a mutation that exclusively influences female begging
behaviour (see below) to find the male and female begging rates at equilibrium.
4.4.2 Female allosome mutation
Female carriers of this mutation beg with intensity ym. Males can carry the mutation, but their
behaviour does not change as a result. The Jacobian relating to the invasion of this mutation is
given by
A2 =

s f (y f )(1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm))
2s f (x f )
(1−p)(s f (y f ))(1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm))
2sp(x f )p
s f (y f )(1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm))
s f (x f )p
p
2(1−p)
1
2 0
p(p(
sp(y f )+sp(x f )
2 )+(1−p)sp(xm))
2
(1−p)(p( sp(y f )+sp(x f )2 )sp(y f )+(1−p)sp(xm))
2 p(
sp(y f )+sp(x f )
2 ) + (1 − p)sp(xm)
 .
We then find the evolutionarily stable female begging levels. The same results can be derived
using a Taylor-Frank analysis [21] of the model (see below).
4.4.3 Female autosomal mutation
To model the influence of the gene on the sex chromosome, we need only track two population
classes:
• female offspring with a mutation on the sex chromosome, w1
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• mothers with a mutation on the sex chromosome, w2
Suppose that a mutant begging with intensity y f invades a wildtype population that begs with
intensity x. The dynamics of the gene on the female sex chromosome can be modelled using
the Jacobian
A4 =
 p
s f (y f )
1+aV¯1
s f (y f )
1+aV¯1
p(p( sp(y f )+sp(x f )2 ) + (1 − p)sp(xm)) p( sp(y f )+sp(x f )2 ) + (1 − p)sp(xm)

4.4.4 Variable sex-ratio
We model the sex-ratio as evolving completely under the female’s control, due to the assumed
ZW sex determination. Suppose a mutation influencing female behaviour invades, causing
mothers to produce female offspring with probability q. We are concerned with three popula-
tion classes
• mutant female offspring, u1
• male offspring, u2
• mutant mothers, u3
The Jacobian relating to the invasion of this mutation is given by
A3 =

q(1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm))
2p
(1−q)(1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm)
2p
1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm)
p
p
2(1−p)
1
2 0
q(qsp(x f )+(1−q)sp(xm))
2
(1−q)(qsp(x f )+(1−q)sp(xm))
2 qsp(x f ) + (1 − q)sp(xm)
 .
To allow the coevolution of sex-ratio and offspring begging, we simultaneously update x f , xm,
and p until an equilibrium is reached.
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Figure 4.4.4: Equilibrium sex ratio as a function of parental investment costs. The solid line
represents the sex ratio when adjusting the per-unit cost of investing in daughters, while holding
the per-unit investment cost into offspring of the opposite sex is set to a constant, c1 = 0.1. If
investment costs for one sex is sufficiently high, that sex will not beg at all. Consequently,
the equilibrium sex ratio will favour that sex. Results were generated using b f ,1 = b f ,1 = 0.5,
b f ,2 = bm,2 = 0.15, and c = 0.9.
Results
The sex ratio, p, is now assumed to coevolve with begging levels, xi. There is a threshold
for female (resp. male) baseline offspring survival, b f ,1 (resp bm,1), above which female (resp.
male) offspring do not signal. The sex ratio is then biased toward the sex that does not beg.
If the benefit of begging, as measured by bi,2, is too low for a specific sex, that sex will not
beg at all, causing the sex ratio to favour that sex. If the baseline survival of the parent, c, is
sufficiently high, neither offspring will beg. Increasing the per-unit cost of begging, c1, of one
sex causes the sex ratio to favour the opposite sex, until the per-unit cost of investing in one
sex is sufficiently high such that offspring of that sex cease to beg, and consequently that sex is
favoured (Figure 4.2.3).
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4.4.5 Taylor & Frank Analysis
The following analysis is used to derive more precise conditions under which the mutations
listed above may invade a population, and the results that follow agree with the analysis above.
Let A = [wi j], where wi j represents the number of class-i offspring of a class-j individual.
Suppose v = vi is the dominant left eigenvector of A, and represents the individual reproductive
values of each class. Additionally, u = ui is the dominant right eigenvector of A, and represents
the class frequencies at equilibrium. Then we note that the average fitness can be written as
W = vAu. To look at the effects of mutant behaviour, we can take the derivative of W with
respect to the variable x that controls individual behaviour. We seek to find evolutionarily
stable levels x∗ of this behaviour. As such, we are interested in dWdx = v
dA
dx u; the mutant invades
whenever dWdx > 0. The following analysis is done setting the baseline survival of sons equal to
that of daughters, b f ,1 = bm,1 = b, while s f = b + b f ,2x f , sm = b + bm,2xm, and sp = c − c1xi.
Female mutant invasion
The classes of interest, i = 1, 2, 3, are mutant male offspring, mutant female offspring, and
mutant mothers, respectively. Then we have
W =
(
1 1 p(psp(x f )+(1−p)sp(xm)1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm)
)
A1

V¯1
2
V¯1
2
V¯1
 ,
, we conclude the mutant will invade whenever c1 <
2b f ,2(1−c)
bp−2b f ,2 xm−b f ,2 px f +2b f ,2 pxm . When xm = x f = 0,
this reduces to the requirement that c1 <
2b f ,2(1−c)
bp . Note that these inequalities can only be used
if the sex ratio has been allowed to reach equilibrium, otherwise the reproductive value between
males and females would differ and the vector, v, used above would not be valid.
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Male-mutant invasion
Using the same population classes as before, we find with male mutation that
dW
dx
=
(
1 1 p(psp(x f )+(1−p)sp(xm)1−psp(x f )−(1−p)sp(xm)
)
A1

V¯1
2
V¯1
2
V¯1
 .
The invasion condition simplifies to c1 <
2bm,2(1−c)
b(1−p) when xm = x f = 0. Note that when p =
1
2 and
xm = x f = 0, the requirement for the male-influencing mutation is equivalent to the requirement
for the female-influencing mutation.
Sex-ratio mutation
The condition for mutant invasion simplifies to xm < x f . That is, the sex-ratio will be biased
toward the sex that begs less intensely since it is less costly to raise.
Sex-chromosome mutation
The condition for mutant invasion is c1 <
b f ,2(1−c)
bp−b f ,2 xm+b f ,2 pxm , which simplifies to c1 <
b f ,2(1−c)
bp
whenever xm = x f = 0. Note that by comparison to the autosomal case, it is clear that this
mutation on the sex-chromosome invades under fewer conditions.
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Chapter 5
Cooperative breeding and clutch size
Koykka, C. & Wild, G. (2016) The association between the emergence of cooperative breeding
and clutch size. J. Evol. Biol. 29(1): 58-76.
Abstract
Previous theoretical work has suggested that smaller brood sizes helped facilitate the
emergence of cooperative breeding in birds. However, recent empirical evidence has found
no statistically significant difference between the clutch sizes of cooperative breeders and
that of non-cooperative breeders. One explanation for this finding is that, while small
clutch sizes may predispose species to cooperative breeding, the emergence of cooperative
breeding itself may influence the evolution of clutch size. Here, we develop a set of models
using population dynamics to describe how the emergence of cooperative breeding influ-
ences clutch size. We find, in contrast to previous theoretical work, that the emergence
of cooperative breeding does not necessarily decrease and, under certain conditions, may
actually increase clutch size. In particular, clutch size may increase after the emergence of
cooperative breeding if helpers – philopatric individuals that assist their breeding relatives
– are able to substantially improve breeder fecundity at low costs to their own survival, and
if the association between breeder and helper is brief. In many cases, clutch size increases
following the emergence of cooperative breeding not because it is optimal for the breeder,
but as the result of breeder-helper conflict over resource allocation.
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5.1 Introduction
Cooperative breeding is a social system in which individuals forego reproductive opportunities
to help raise offspring that are not their own [1]. In the majority of cooperatively breeding
birds, helpers delay dispersal and assist breeding relatives on their natal patch [2]. Two widely
accepted theories delineate the proximate causes of delayed dispersal and cooperative breed-
ing. The habitat saturation hypothesis suggests that individuals will not disperse if it is is
unlikely to result in independent reproduction [3, 1]. The benefits of philopatry hypothesis is a
complimentary explanation which focuses on the benefits of staying, such as the possibility of
territory inheritance, rather than the costs of dispersing [1, 4].
It has been proposed that certain life-history characteristics can increase the costs of disper-
sal and the benefits of philopatry, and thus facilitate the emergence of delayed dispersal and co-
operative breeding [5]. That the presence of cooperative breeders is not randomly distributed in
avian species suggests it is possible that there are characteristics predisposing certain lineages
to exhibit cooperative breeding [5]. Both theoretical [6, 7, 8] and empirical [9, 10, 5, 11, 12]
evidence has indicated that low juvenile and adult mortality, which can lead to highly dense
populations with infrequent opportunities for independent breeding, is a life-history trait that
may have played a particularly important role in the evolution of cooperative breeding in birds.
Previous work has suggested that because greater reproductive output often translates to
reduced survival [13], cooperatively breeding birds may also tend to have smaller clutch sizes
than non-cooperative breeders [3]. Recent comparative analyses have consistently provided
support for the association between high longevity and cooperative breeding in birds [5, 11, 12],
but have provided mixed support for the association between clutch size and cooperative breed-
ers. The most recent analysis [12] found that cooperative breeders did not have statistically
significant smaller clutch sizes than non-cooperative breeders. In contrast to previous studies,
Beauchamp controlled for correlates such as body size, and used a larger sample size taken
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from avian species world-wide [12].
An obvious explanation for the discrepancy between theoretical work and recent empirical
results is that while small brood sizes may predispose species to breed cooperatively, coopera-
tive breeding itself may drive an increase in clutch size. This idea has been proposed previously
by Hardling & Kokko, who developed a simple model to study how the emergence of coop-
erative breeding affects clutch sizes. The model indicates that cooperative breeding uniformly
increases clutch size. However, this model suffers from several key limitations.
First, the model assumes that the offspring depreciation hypothesis - that the reproduc-
tive value of offspring born later in the season is strictly less than that of those born earlier -
holds true for every cooperatively breeding avian species. Yet certain species produce more
offspring than their natal territory can sustain should they remain philopatric, and so sev-
eral offspring from a single brood can become floaters [14]. As the reproductive value of
these floaters need not necessarily differ significantly, the assumption that older offspring have
strictly higher reproductive value than any offspring subsequently produced does not uniformly
hold. Additionally, the model asserts that offspring birth determines the rank of auxiliaries in
the queue for breeding positions, but this relies on the assumption that auxiliaries stay perma-
nently. There are, however, species in which helpers stay only temporarily before dispersing to
become floaters, helpers, or breeders on other territories [15].
Second, the model does not use population dynamics, and therefore may not properly ac-
count for the inclusive fitness effects resulting from changes in clutch sizes. Further, the model
considers only the breeder’s optimal resource distribution between fecundity and survival. It
therefore neglects the potential conflict between breeder and auxiliary, which may cause selec-
tion on resource distribution and consequently brood size to deviate from the breeder’s opti-
mum.
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Lastly, the model assumes a particular type of trade-off between fecundity and survival in
the presence of helpers - that help increases longevity with the same factor independent of
clutch size - but as Johnstone [16] demonstrates, this relationship is complex and can vary sig-
nificantly depending on ecological and life-history factors.
Here we develop a set of population dynamics models to investigate how the emergence
of cooperative breeding itself may influence clutch sizes at evolutionary equilibrium. These
models improve upon previous theoretical work by examining how clutch size changes under
a variety of ecological and life-history assumptions, including those regarding the nature of
help provided by auxiliaries and the relationship between breeder fecundity and survival. The
model also describes how conflict between breeder and auxiliary can affect clutch sizes at
evolutionary equilibrium. The results of the model are then compared to recent comparative
analyses investigating the association between cooperative breeding and clutch size.
5.2 The Model
5.2.1 Model Design
Following Wild & Koykka [17], we design an inclusive-fitness model by first considering a
population of diploid, simultaneous hermaphrodites. Each individual in the population is a
breeder, a helper, or a floater. Each breeder inhabits a territory on which they produce a num-
ber of offspring per season through female function by mating with another breeder, selected
uniformly at random from the population. These offspring either become helpers, floaters,
or breeders in the next season, depending on the circumstances and the assumptions about the
ecology of the species. Each helper lives on a territory occupied by a breeder: they assist breed-
ers by increasing their fecundity, decreasing their mortality rate, or both. Should a breeder not
survive the offspring-production stage of the life-cycle, the helper, assuming it survives, inher-
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its the breeding territory. In the absence of any suitable successor, breeding territories become
vacated. Floaters await the opportunity to inhabit vacant breeding territories. In these models,
breeders first produce offspring, and then it is determined whether they survive the breeding
season.
For simplicity, suppose that there can be at most one helper per breeder at any given time.
This assumption is used for mathematical convenience, but is biologically reasonable: per-
haps there is enough resources to support only a limited number of breeders and helpers per
territory [14], or the benefits of helping for both helpers and breeders diminish greatly per addi-
tional helper [18], or there is a limit on the number of offspring breeders can coerce to help[19].
While there are many ways in which helpers can assist breeders, ultimately helpers - as-
suming they are truly helpful - allow breeders to exert less energy, thereby increasing breeders’
fecundity, survival, or both [16]. Breeders exhibit either additive or compensatory reactions to
the presence of helpers: they can either choose to redirect their efforts away from reproductive
efforts and toward increasing survival (load-lightening) or they can exert the same amount of
effort toward reproduction, regardless of the presence of helpers so that total reproductive out-
put is greater when helpers are available. The degree to which breeders ’lighten their load’ in
the presence of helpers varies between and occasionally within cooperatively breeding species
[20].
To account for load-lightening and the different forms of helpful behaviour, suppose breed-
ers and helpers each have a certain amount of resources which they allocate toward breeder
survival and breeder fecundity. In the presence of a helper, a breeder allocates portion p of its
resources to offspring production while the helper allocates q to offspring production, such that
the expected number of offspring produced is λ(p, q) and the probability that the breeder will
survive a given season is sB(p, q) = sB. We assume that the actual number of offspring pro-
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duced follows a Poisson distribution with mean λ(p, q). The way in which helpers and breeders
allocate their resources may also affect helper survival, so that the helper survives a given sea-
son with probability sH(p, q). Assume that in the absence of a helper, a breeder allocates a
proportion p0 of resources to offspring production and 1− p0 toward survival. Then the solitary
breeder expects to produce α(p0) offspring and survives the breeding season with probability
sB(p0, 0) = sB0 .
Let V , W, and U represent the number of breeders without helpers, breeders with helpers,
and floaters in the population, respectively. We impose ecological constraints by assuming that
the probability with which a floater obtains a breeding territory in a given season is a function
of the number of currently occupied territories. In particular, a floater survives a given season
with probability t and surviving floaters obtain a breeding territory with probability 11+a(V+W)
(and thus remains a floater with probability 1 − 11+a(V+W) ), where a is a constant inversely cor-
related with the carrying capacity of the population.
Each of the models created adhere to the description above, and differ only in the assump-
tions made about the hierarchy of nest-mates. First, we must make an assumption about the
presence of direct local kin competition for breeding positions. If it is assumed that there is
no direct local kin competition, then only helpers may inherit breeding territories should a
breeder die; should both the breeder die and there are no helpers on the territory, any offspring
produced on that territory that season become floaters. As there is only one helper per terri-
tory, relatives are not in direct competition. Conversely, if there is direct local kin competition,
then in the event that breeder dies, both helpers and offspring residing on the territory (those
recently produced through maternal function) have the opportunity to inherit the territory, al-
though preference is given to helpers, such that in order for an offspring to inherit the territory
immediately after its birth, both helper and floater must be absent. After the role of breeder and
helper are filled (say, without loss of generality, by ’oldest’ two offspring), any remaining off-
5.2. The Model 157
spring become floaters. A second assumption that must be addressed is whether auxiliaries stay
only temporarily to help breeders on their natal patch, after which time they become floaters,
or if they stay indefinitely (i.e. until either it or the breeder dies).
Since the general results derived from our models are independent of these two assumptions
(see Results), to demonstrate the analysis of our models we will assume the presence of local
kin competition and that helpers stay for only one breeding season before dispersing. See
Appendix for the complementary analysis of the remaining models.
5.2.2 Population Dynamics
If U, V , and W represent the population of floaters, breeders without helpers, and breeders
with helpers, respectively, then the next generation of these populations is given by (U′,V ′,W ′,
respectively)
U′ =(1 − 1
1 + a(V + W)
)tU I
+ sB0V
∞∑
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k!
((k − 1)(1 − dk) + kdk) II
+ (1 − sB0)V
∞∑
k=2
exp(−λ)λk
k!
((k − 1)dk−1 + (k − 2)(1 − dk−1)) III
+ sBW
∞∑
l=1
exp(−α)αl
l!
((l − 1)(1 − dl) + ldl) IV
+ (1 − sB)(1 − sH)W
∞∑
l=2
exp(−α)αl
l!
((l − 1)dl−1 + (l − 2)(1 − dl−1)) VI
+ (1 − sB)sHW
∞∑
l=1
exp(−α)αl
l!
((l − 1)(1 − dl) + ldl) VII
+ sBsHW VIII
(I) The proportion of floaters that fail to obtain breeding sites.
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(II) The expected number of dispersing offspring from territories on which there is no helper
and the breeder survives.
(III) The expected number of dispersing offspring from territories on which there is no helper
and the breeder dies.
(IV) The expected number of dispersing offspring from territories on which there is a helper
and the breeder survives.
(V) The expected number of dispersing offspring from territories on which there is a helper
and both the breeder and the helper die.
(VI) The expected number of dispersing offspring from territories on which there is a helper
and the breeder dies.
(VII) The expected number of territories on which there is a helper who survives.
We can similarly define the recursive equations for breeders with helpers and floaters
V ′ =
1
1 + a(V + W)
tU
+ sB0V
∞∑
k=0
exp(−λ)λk
k!
dk
+ (1 − sB0)V
∞∑
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k!
dk−1
+ sBW
∞∑
l=0
exp(−α)αl
l!
dl
+ (1 − sB)sHW
∞∑
l=0
exp(−α)αl
l!
dl
+ (1 − sB)(1 − sH)W
∞∑
l=1
exp(−α)αl
l!
dl−1
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W ′ =WS B
∞∑
l=1
exp(−α)αl
l!
(1 − dl)
+ (1 − sB)sHW
∞∑
l=1
exp(−α)αl
l!
(1 − dl)
+ (1 − sB0)(1 − sH)W
∞∑
l=2
exp(−α)αl
l!
(1 − dl−1)
+ sB0V
∞∑
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k!
(1 − dk)
+ (1 − sB0)V
∞∑
k=2
exp(−λ)λk
k!
(1 − dk−1)
The above set of recursive equations can be written in the compact form
U¯ =
a(V + W)
1 + a ∗ (V + W)S 11U + F12V + F13W
V¯ =
1
1 + a(V + W)
S 21U + S 22V + S 23W
W¯ = S 32V + S 33W
The basic reproduction number is given by
R0 =
F12(1 − S 33)S 21
1 − (S 22 + S 33) + (S 22S 33 − S 23S 32) +
F13F32S 21
1 − (S 22 + S 33) + (S 22S 33 − S 23S 32) ,
and the population avoids extinction if R0 > 1.
Setting U = U¯, W = W¯, and V = V¯ , we can solve for the positive equilibrium (say UE,VE,WE).
We find
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VE =
(1 − S 33)(R0 − 1)
a(1 − S 11)(S 32 − S 33 + 1)
WE =
S 32(R0 − 1)
a(1 − S 11)(S 32 − S 33 + 1)
5.2.3 Mutant Fitness
Suppose a rare mutation causes heterozygous individuals to allocate p¯, rather than p, to off-
spring production once they become a breeder. For simplicity, assume there is no inbreeding.
While the mutant is rare, we have five classes of individuals, and can describe the population
as follows
• u1, density of mutant floaters
• u2, density of solitary mutant breeders
• u3, density of mutant breeders with wildtype helpers
• u4, density of mutant breeders with mutant helpers
• u5, density of wildtype helpers with mutant helpers
The fitness of the mutant is given by the largest eigenvalue of the 5 × 5 Jacobian matrix J1,
J1 =

j11 j12 j13 j14 j15
j21 j22 j23 j24 j25
0 j32 j33 j34 j35
0 j42 j43 j44 0
0 j52 j53 j54 0

,
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where each entry, ji j represents the proportion of individuals from class j that will move to
class i in the next season. Similar Jacobian matrices, J2 and J3, can be constructed for the
invasion of mutants that allocate q¯, rather than q, when they become a helper, and the inva-
sion of individuals that allocate p¯0, rather than p0, when they are breeding without helpers,
respectively.
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Table 5.1: Variables and parameters used in the main text
Symbol Explanation
p Proportion of breeder resources allocated toward reproduction
q Proportion of helper resources allocated toward reproduction
d Probability with which offspring are unwilling to help
λ Expected number of offspring produced per season by a breeder with a helper
α Expected number of offspring produced per season by a lone breeder
sB0 Probability that a lone breeder will survive the season
sB Probability that a breeder who is aided by an auxiliary will survive the season
t Probability that floaters survive from one season to the next
VE Population of lone breeders at equilibrium
WE Population of breeders with auxilliares at equilibrium
UE Population of floaters at equilibrium
The fitness of a mutant who allocates a deviant amount to offspring production, p¯, whenever
it is a breeder with a helper is given by the largest eigenvalue of J1, λ1. Here, λ1 measures
the growth rate of a rare mutant. Similarly, the fitness of mutant helpers (resp. mutant solitary
breeders) that allocate q¯ (resp. p¯0) to offspring production is given by the largest eigenvalue of
J2 (resp. J3), λ2 (resp. λ3). To verify that the Jacobian is correct, computer simulation reveals
λ1 = 1 when p¯ = p; that is to say, a neutral mutation introduced in the resident population will
be neither selected for nor against.
We can solve for the equilibrium strategy set by taking the derivative of λ1, λ2, and λ3 with
respect to p¯, q¯ and p¯0, respectively, setting each equal to zero evaluated at p = p¯, q = q¯, p0 = p¯0.
That is, the candidate evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) set, (p, q, p0), can be derived by
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solving the system of equations:
(
δλ1
δp¯
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
p= p¯,q=q¯,p0= p¯0
=0(
δλ2
δq¯
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
p= p¯,q=q¯,p0= p¯0
=0(
δλ3
δ p¯0
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
p= p¯,q=q¯,p0= p¯0
=0
This system can not be solved analytically, but convergent stable equilibria can be found
numerically. The convergent stable allocation strategy, (p, q, p0), can then be used to calculate
the expected clutch size of breeders with and without helpers, λ(p, q) and α(p0), respectively.
5.2.4 Breeder-auxiliary conflict
The above analysis tacitly assumes that breeders and helpers control only their own resource
allocation strategy. Breeders and helpers may differ in their optimal resource allocation strate-
gies. As such, clutch sizes at equilibria derived using the above method (henceforth called
the ‘realized’ clutch size) are the product of conflict between breeder and auxiliary over re-
source allocation. Hardling & Kokko, however, do not incorporate this conflict in their model,
and instead assume that realized clutch size is equivalent to breeder’s optimal clutch size. To
highlight the consequences of neglecting this conflict, we compare the breeder’s optimal clutch
size, the helper’s optimal clutch size, and the realized clutch size.
To determine breeders’ optimal clutch size, suppose a rare mutation causes breeders to
control both the proportion of resources that they and their helpers allocate toward offspring
production; that is, the mutant allocates p¯, rather than p, to offspring production, and its helpers
allocate q¯, rather than q. The method used to solve for candidate ESS sets is the same as that
delineated in Section 2.3, except the entries in the Jacobians may change. For example, con-
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sider the expected number of offspring produced by mutants breeders with wildtype helpers
(class u3). If we assume that breeders and helpers control only their resource allocation strat-
egy, then the number of offspring produced is λ( p¯, q), whereas if we assume breeder control
over helper allocation strategy, the expected number of offspring is λ( p¯, q¯).
Similarly, to calculate helpers’ optimal clutch size, we suppose a rare mutation causes
helpers to control both the proportion of resources that they and their breeder allocate toward
offspring production; that is, the mutant allocates q¯, rather than q, to offspring production, and
its breeder allocate p¯, rather than p.
5.3 Results
To understand how the emergence of cooperative breeding affects clutch size at evolutionary
equilibrium, we examined how clutch sizes changed as a function of offspring willingness to
help, 1− d. Before the emergence of cooperative breeding (i.e. d = 0), clutch size can be mea-
sured in only one way - the value of α, as all breeders are without helpers. After the emergence
of cooperative breeding, clutch size at equilibrium can be measured in two ways. The first mea-
sure of clutch size, λp, q, is the expected number of offspring produced by a breeder-auxiliary
pair per season. This is the measure studied in Hardling & Kokko’s model. Alternatively,
clutch size can be measured by, c = VEVE+WEα +
WE
VE+WE
λ, which denotes the weighted average
clutch size, or the expected number of offspring produced per season by a given breeder within
the population sampled uniformly at random. This was what is measured in comparative anal-
yses [12]. There is an important distinction between these two measurements: clutch size data
collected by empirical studies are very frequently derived from non-obligate cooperative breed-
ers. As such, when comparing the result of our model to empirical data, the weighted average
clutch size is most important, and when comparing Hardling & Kokko’s model to ours, λ is the
quantity of interest.
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For each of the models, whether or not the helper stays, and whether or not there is local
kin competition, there is a wide set of biological reasonable parameter conditions that allow
for both measurements of clutch size of cooperative breeders, c and λ, to be the same or larger
than that of non-cooperative breeders (Figures 5.3.1, 5.3.2). That is, biologically meaningful
functions of the model’s parameters (sB, sB0 , λ, and α) can be selected such that the convergent
stable clutch size (both c and λ) are uniformly larger once cooperative breeding has emerged
(d > 0) than before it evolves (d = 0). However, the effects of the emergence of cooperative
breeding on clutch are variable, and depend on parameter conditions. Ultimately we found that
clutch size can increase, decrease or remain unaffected by the emergence of helping behaviour.
That the emergence of cooperative breeding can affect the two different measurements of brood
size in different ways (Figure 5.3.1) highlights the importance of distinguishing c and λ: the
emergence of helping behaviour may not affect the clutch sizes of breeders without help and
breeders with help in same way. For example, if helpers are far more effective at increasing
breeder survival than fecundity, then the clutch size of breeders with helpers may smaller than
that of breeders before the emergence of helping behaviour. But after the emergence of help,
breeders without helpers may try to increase their clutch size in the attempt to gain greater
levels of help in subsequent seasons. The result is that while Hardling & Kokko’s model would
have accurately concluded that λ decreases after the emergence of cooperative breeding, em-
pirical studies, which instead measure c, may reach the opposite conclusion.
Whenever clutch size increases after the emergence of cooperative breeding, the cause is
frequently though not always the conflict between the breeder and the auxiliary over resource
allocation (Figure 5.3.1b). That is, if the realized allocation strategy was equivalent to the
optimal allocation strategy from the breeder’s perspective rather than a compromise between
the optimal strategies of the breeder and of the follower, there would be fewer conditions that
favour larger clutch sizes as the propensity to help increases. Still, in many situations the op-
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Figure 5.3.1: Cooperative breeders may have larger clutch sizes than non-cooperative breeders.
The dotted black line in (a) represents the expected clutch size created by a breeder-auxiliary
pair. The solid blue line (a) represents the expected clutch size of a given breeder in the pop-
ulation. In both cases, a population that does not breed cooperatively will have a smaller
clutch size than a non-cooperatively breeding population, under the same life-history condi-
tions. The dotted black line and the solid blue in (b) represent the expected clutch size created
by a breeder-auxiliary pair and by a given breeder in the population, respectively, if the out-
come of the conflict between breeder and helper was exactly equal to the strategy set favoured
by the breeder. Note that in the absence of the breeder-auxiliary conflict, one concludes that
clutch size does not increase (and indeed, may decrease) as helping behaviour becomes more
prevalent. Results were generated assuming both that helpers stay only temporarily and that
there is no local kin competition, and using sB = 0.7 + 0.1p + 0.25(2q − 1), sB0 = 0.7 + 0.1p0,
λ = 2(1 − p + 0.5(1 − q)), α = 2(1 − p0), sH = 1 − 0.1q − 0.3(1 − q).
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timal strategy of the breeder favours a decrease in brood size as helping behaviour increases
in frequency (Figure 5.3.3). For example, if indeed helping behaviour is truly beneficial to
the breeder, and if helpers are able to improve fecundity far more significantly than survival,
then breeders with greater levels or frequency of help should be expected to produce a greater
number of offspring.
On occassion, the emergence of helping behaviour affects clutch size in non-uniform ways:
in many cases, the clutch size of a cooperative breeding system may be higher than that of
breeders before cooperative breeding emerged only for certain dispersal rates. For example,
if helping behaviour is common (d is low) and clutch size can be significantly increased with
greater investment, then the probability of receiving helping is largely contingent upon allo-
cating a significant proportion of resources to offspring production. As helping becomes rarer,
producing more offspring does little to improve the chances of receiving help, so breeders use
a greater share of resources on survival rather than fecundity. This ultimately translates to a de-
crease in brood size as dispersal rates increase, and thus cooperative breeding promotes larger
clutch sizes only when d is sufficiently small.
5.4 Discussion
5.4.1 Revisiting Previous Theory
The influence of the emergence of cooperative breeding on clutch size is not as simple as
Hardling & Kokko’s model may suggest. In our model, the relationship between clutch size
and the emergence of cooperative breeding is highly variable, and depends heavily on how
resource allocation influences survival and fecundity. We therefore conclude that the effect of
cooperative breeding on clutch size is likely to vary between species. This result is supported
by Beauchamp’s comparative analysis, which indicates that while the difference between the
clutch size of pairs of closely related cooperative and non-cooperative breeders is, on average,
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Figure 5.3.2: The clutch size of cooperative breeders may be larger than that of non-cooperative
breeders under a wide variety of life-history assumptions. The dotted black line in (a) repre-
sents the expected clutch size created by a breeder-auxiliary pair. The solid blue line (a) rep-
resents the expected clutch size of a given breeder in the population. Results were generated
assuming helpers remain on their natal patch and that there is local kin competition, and using
sB = 0.7 + 0.1p + 0.25(2q − 1), sB0 = 0.7 + 0.1p0, λ = 2(1 − p + 0.5(1 − q)), α = 2(1 − p0),
sH = 1 − 0.1q − 0.3(1 − q).
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Figure 5.3.3: The breeder’s optimal clutch size for cooperative breeders may be significantly
larger than that of non-cooperative breeders. Under the conditions used to generate these re-
sults, the realized allocation strategy set was equivalent to that of the breeder’s optimal strategy
set. Note that brood size in this situation approaches zero as the propensity to help increases
because breeders with helpers have extremely low mortality, and thus it optimal for the breeder
to breed only through male function. Results were generated assuming helpers remain on
their natal patch and that there is local kin competition, and using sB = 0.7 + 0.3
√
1.3(p+q)
3.5 ,
sB0 = 0.7 + 0.3
√
1.3p0
3.5 , α = 3(1 − p0), sH = 1 − 0.1q + 0.2(1 − q).
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negligible, it varies considerately between pairs, with some cooperatively breeding species hav-
ing substantially larger clutch sizes than their non-cooperatively breeding counterparts, while
in other pairs the opposite trend is present.
The differences in the conclusions generated in our model compared to that of Hardling
& Kokko’s model are not simply the product of different assumptions about the ecology of
cooperatively breeding species. Indeed, even when the main assumption used in Hardling &
Kokko’s model - that philopatric offspring are better off than dispersing offspring - is main-
tained in our model (see Appendix 5.6), one still finds that clutch size does not necessarily
(Figure 5.3.1) decrease after the emergence of cooperative breeding.
It is also important to note that the emergence and frequency of helpful behaviour in our
model does not influence the carrying capacity of the population, which is a function only of
the constant a. Thus clutch size may increase after the emergence of cooperative breeding
even though there are diminishing returns on the reproductive value of each offspring. Put
simply, if helpers increase the reproductive output of breeder’s far more efficiently than they
improve breeder survival, a greater total amount of effort will be allocated toward fecundity by
a breeder-auxiliary pair than a lone breeder in a non-cooperatively species, all else being equal.
Even though each offspring is unlikely to ever become a breeder, and even though increasing
clutch size augments this competition, the cost on survival for the production of more offspring
is relatively small.
5.4.2 Conflict Over Helping Behaviour
The idea that conflict exists between breeder and auxiliary is not new. In addition to conflict
over breeding opportunities [21, 22], past research has noted and examined conflict between
breeder and auxiliary over helping effort [23, 16]. Although increased helping effort often
ultimately allows breeders to produce more offspring, thus providing auxiliaries with indirect
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fitness benefits, it is also associated with direct fitness costs in the form of decreased survival.
This sets the stage for conflict between breeder and auxiliary: the optimal level of help from the
perspective of the breeder often differs from that of the helper [16]. We propose that a similar
conflict can exist over the form, rather than the amount, of helping behaviour. Although many
forms of help increase both breeder survival and fecundity, certain forms of help from auxil-
iaries often play a relatively larger role in either increasing the reproductive output of breeders
(e.g. nest building, provisioning of offspring) or increasing the survival of the breeder (e.g.
territory defense), [24]. Often, the forms of help differ between individuals and across species.
Different forms of help provide different costs and benefits for both breeder and auxiliary. Thus
helpers may be selective in the forms of helping they which to provide. Breeders also can in-
fluence the total amount of effort dedicated toward survival and reproduction in the form of
load-lightening.
If territory inheritance is a primary incentive for helping behaviour, then for cooperative
breeding to evolve, helpers require a relatively high probability of inheriting the territory on
which they provide help. Should breeders exhibit load-lightening in response to the effort of
helpers, they increase their own survival, which decreases the probability that a given helper
will ever receive the benefits of philopatry. Increasing the reproductive output of breeders is
unlikely to affect the probability with which helpers inherit the territory (assuming queue is
determined by age), and is likely to increase the number of helpers available once the helper
becomes the dominant breeder. Thus in many situations helpers would fare better if breeders
do not lighten their load. Breeders on the other hand likely want to increase their survival
rather than increasing their annual reproductive effort because, as Hardling & Kokko suggest,
increasing brood size often translates to greater kin competition, and therefore diminishing re-
turns on increases in fitness with each additional offspring produce. Thus while load-lightening
may be advantageous to breeders in many situations, too much emphasis on survival rather than
reproduction will disincentivize the emergence of helping. While the influence of this conflict
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on the evolution of cooperative breeding was not fully studied here, it can easily be analyzed
by either allowing dispersal frequency, d, to evolve, in addition to p, q, and p0, or by allowing
the total helping effort, in addition to resource allocation strategies, to evolve. If resource al-
location strategies and cooperative breeding co-evolve, it is expected that the resolution of the
conflict between breeder and auxiliary will more highly favour helpers since they are able to
reduce helping effort whenever they are unlikely to inherit breeding territories.
In our model, conflict between breeder and auxiliary is not necessarily won by either
breeder or helper. Instead, the realized allocation strategies are the result of a compromise.
This compromise will favour the party whose fitness is more greatly influenced by the outcome
of the conflict. The favoured party will, in general, be the breeder, and this is true for two
reasons. First, the helper has some significant probability of never becoming a breeder. Thus
even if the helper wins the conflict, there is a greater probability that the direct fitness of the
helper rather than that of the breeder is unaffected by the outcome of the conflict. This explains
why the resolution of the conflict seems to favour the breeder more significantly if helpers only
temporarily assist the breeder, a situation in which helpers are less likely to inherit breeding
territories. Second, there is a significant probability that the allocation strategy employed by
the helper will also be used by the helper’s offspring. Thus, if the helper uses a strategy that is
significantly detrimental to the breeder, it may suffer for this strategy once it becomes a breeder.
That a mutant helper’s offspring are not guaranteed to use the same allocation strategy drives
the outcome of the conflict between breeder and helper to not uniformly favour the breeder’s
optimal strategy.
5.4.3 Limitations & Future Directions
Our model assumes that strategies regarding helpful behaviour are biologically rather than so-
cially acquired. That is, individuals have a single strategy set which they use regardless of the
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actions of those with whom they interact. While there has been suggestion that the type of
helpful behaviour individuals display can actually be influenced or determined by inherit per-
sonality traits [25], it is likely that in nature, both the degree and form helping behaviour and
load-lightening can be adapted based on interaction partners. Following McNamara et al. [26],
one can modify our model to incorporate a form of negotiation between breeder and auxiliary in
order to identify evolutionary stable negotation rules. However, since conflict between breeder
and helper is not necessary for the emergence of cooperative breeding to increase clutch size,
this modification will not alter the general conclusions of this study. However, it may help to
identify how ecological, life-history, and social factors influence load-lightening and both the
form and degree of helping behaviour, a topic which has received little attention.
Although in many species breeders commonly have multiple helpers, extending our model
to allow the presence of multiple auxiliary will likely serve only to highlight the fact that the
emergence of cooperative breeding increases clutch size so as to increase the expected level of
help breeders receive in subsequent seasons. It might, however, provide interesting insight into
how allocation strategies and helping effort change as a function of the number of auxiliaries
present [16].
Since this is a model of hermaphrodites rather than dioecious species, breeders are always
able to produce offspring through paternal function, and so clutch size - the number of off-
spring produced through maternal function - and total offspring produced are not equivalent
in our model. Thus the fitness of an individual is less affected by allocation strategies than
the parameters α and λ may indicate. Consequently, we are limited in our ability to directly
translate empirical data into parameter values in our model. One could extend our model to
describe the behaviour of dioecious species. Doing so may allow for direct and precise pre-
dictions regarding the relationship between the emergence of cooperative breeding and brood
size of specific species. This would also allow for greater exploration of the conflict between
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parents, in addition to the conflict between breeder and auxiliaries, over helping effort and form.
Modelling dioecious species populations may also allow one to examine how genomic im-
printing affects both auxiliary helping effort and the form of helpful behaviour (namely whether
help favours increase fecundity or survival). For example, in some cooperatively breeding
species, maternal investment is significantly higher than paternal investment [27, 16]. If in
these species males are frequently successful in finding new mates in the event that their current
mates die, then their fitness is relatively independent of the mother’s probability of surviving
to the next breeding season. Naturally, fathers will be concerned about offspring survival. This
may allow for genomic imprinting to influence helping behaviour [28]: if the father is only
concerned with the mother’s fecundity and not her survival, his genes may influence offspring
to focus their effort in increasing breeder fecundity rather than survival once they become aux-
iliaries. As we have shown here, it is unclear what resource allocation strategy is optimal for
the mother, though it may differ from the optimal allocations strategy of the father.
5.5 Conclusions
In agreement with recent empirical data but in contrast to previous theoretical work, our model
demonstrates that the emergence of cooperative breeding does not necessarily lead to smaller
clutch sizes. As such, even though small clutch sizes may predispose species to breeder coop-
eratively, clutch size may not be a trait that has a clear association with cooperative breeding.
While the connection between longevity and cooperative breeding has received greater support
from empirical studies, it too is a life-history trait whose association with cooperative breed-
ing been recently been questioned [29]. We echo Hardling & Kokko on the importance of
analyzing both how a life-history trait may pre-dispose a species to cooperative breeding and
how cooperative breeding influences the evolution of the life-history, but stress that to do so,
thorough inclusive-fitness models that incorporate population dynamics are required.
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5.6 Population Dynamics
5.6.1 Example calculations: Model #1 (No local kin competition; helper
leaves)
U′ =(1 − 1
1 + a(V + W)
)tU
+ sB0V
∞∑
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k!
((k − 1)(1 − dk) + kdk)
+ (1 − sB0)V
∞∑
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k!
k
+ sBW
∞∑
l=1
exp(−α)αl
l!
((l − 1)(1 − dl) + ldl)
+ (1 − sB)(1 − sH)W
∞∑
l=1
exp(−α)αl
l!
l
+ (1 − sB)sHW
∞∑
l=1
exp(−α)αl
l!
((l − 1)(1 − dl) + ldl)
+ sBsHW
V ′ =
1
1 + a(V + W)
tU
+ sB0V
∞∑
k=0
exp(−λ)λk
k!
dk
+ sBW
∞∑
l=0
exp(−α)αl
l!
dl
+ (1 − sB)sHW
∞∑
l=0
exp(−α)αl
l!
dl
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W ′ =WS B
∞∑
l=1
exp(−α)αl
l!
(1 − dl)
+ (1 − sB)sHW
∞∑
l=1
exp(−α)αl
l!
(1 − dl)
+ sB0V
∞∑
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k!
(1 − dk)
Suppose a rare mutation causes heterozygous individuals to allocate p¯, rather than p, when they
become a breeder (any terms with bars over them are a function of p¯, and therefore represent
mutant behaviour or the product of mutant behaviour). For simplicity, assume there is no
inbreeding. While the mutant is rare, we have five classes of individuals
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 1
j11 (1 − 11+a(VE+WE) )t
j21 t1+a(VE+WE)
Column 2
j12 12 (1 +
VE
VE+WE
)(sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 −
sB0)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! k) +
1
2
WE
VE+WE
((1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1 −
dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 − sB)(1 − sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k +
sB
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk))
j22 sB0
∑∞
k=0
exp(−α)αk
k! d
k
j32 12 sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 − dk)
j42 12 sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 − dk)
j52 12 ((1 − (1 − sB)(1 − sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) WEWE+VE +
S B0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 − dk) VEWE+VE )
Column 3
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j13 12 (1 − s¯B)s¯H
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ¯)λ¯k
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + 12 (1 −
s¯B)(1− s¯H) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ¯)λ¯kk! k+ 12 s¯B ∑∞k=2 exp(−λ¯)λ¯kk! ((1−dk)(k−1)+
kdk))+ 12 (
VE
VE+WE
(sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! ((1−dk)(k−1)+kdk)+ (1−
sB0)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! k)) +
WE
VE+WE
((1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1 −
dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 − sB)(1 − sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k +
sB
∑∞
k=2
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk))
j23 s¯B
∑∞
k=0
exp(−λ¯)λ¯k
k! d
k
j33 12 s¯B
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ¯)λ¯k
k! (1 − dk)
j43 12 s¯B
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ¯)λ¯k
k! (1 − dk)
j53 12 (1 − s¯B)s¯H
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ¯)λ¯k
k! (1 − dk) + 12 ((1 − (1 − sB)(1 −
sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) WEWE+VE + sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 −
dk) VEWE+VE )
Column 4
j14 s¯H s¯B + 12 (1− s¯B)s¯H
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ¯)λ¯k
k! ((1−dk)(k−1)+kdk)+ 12 (1−
s¯B)(1− s¯H) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ¯)λ¯kk! k+ 12 s¯B ∑∞k=2 exp(−λ¯)λ¯kk! ((1−dk)(k−1)+
kdk) + 12 (
VE
VE+WE
(sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! ((1−dk)(k−1) + kdk) + (1−
sB0)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! k)) +
WE
VE+WE
((1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1 −
dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 − sB)(1 − sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k +
sB
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk))
j24 s¯B
∑∞
k=0
exp(−λ¯)λ¯k
k! d
k + (1 − s¯B)s¯H ∑∞k=0 exp(−λ¯)λ¯kk! dk
j34 12 (1 − (1 − s¯B)(1 − s¯H))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ¯)λ¯k
k! (1 − dk)
j44 12 (1 − (1 − s¯B)(1 − s¯H))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ¯)λ¯k
k! (1 − dk)
j54 12 ((1 − (1 − sB)(1 − sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) WEWE+VE +
S B0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 − dk) VEWE+VE )
Column 5
j15 sBsH
j25 (1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=0 exp(−λ)λkk! dk
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j35 (1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=0 exp(−λ)λkk! (1 − dk)
Suppose a rare mutation causes heterozygous individuals to allocate q¯, rather than q, when
they become a helper(any terms with dots over them are a function of q¯, and therefore represent
mutant behaviour or the product of mutant behaviour).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 1
j11 (1 − 11+a(VE+WE) )t
j21 t1+a(VE+WE)
Column 2
j12 12 (1 +
VE
VE+WE
)(sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 −
sB0)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! k) +
1
2
WE
VE+WE
((1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1 −
dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 − sB)(1 − sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k +
sB
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk))
j22 sB0
∑∞
k=0
exp(−α)αk
k! d
k
j32 12 sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 − dk)
j42 12 sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 − dk)
j52 12 ((1 − (1 − sB)(1 − sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) WEWE+VE +
S B0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 − dk) VEWE+VE )
Column 3
j13 12 (1 − sB)sH
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + 12 (1 −
sB)(1− sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k+ 12 sB ∑∞k=2 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1−dk)(k−1)+
kdk))+ 12 (
VE
VE+WE
(sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! ((1−dk)(k−1)+kdk)+ (1−
sB0)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! k)) +
WE
VE+WE
((1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1 −
dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 − sB)(1 − sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k +
sB
∑∞
k=2
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk))
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j23 sB
∑∞
k=0
exp(−λ)λk
k! d
k
j33 12 sB
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk)
j43 12 sB
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk)
j53 12 (1 − sB)sH
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) + 12 ((1 − (1 − sB)(1 −
sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) WEWE+VE + sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 −
dk) VEWE+VE )
Column 4
j14 s˙H s˙B + 12 (1− s˙B)s˙H
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ˙)λ˙k
k! ((1−dk)(k−1)+kdk)+ 12 (1−
s˙B)(1− s˙H) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ˙)λ˙kk! k+ 12 s˙B ∑∞k=2 exp(−λ˙)λ˙kk! ((1−dk)(k−1)+
kdk) + 12 (
VE
VE+WE
(sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! ((1−dk)(k−1) + kdk) + (1−
sB0)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! k)) +
WE
VE+WE
((1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1 −
dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 − sB)(1 − sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k +
sB
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk))
j24 s˙B
∑∞
k=0
exp(−λ˙)λ˙k
k! d
k + (1 − s˙B)s˙H ∑∞k=0 exp(−λ˙)λ˙kk! dk
j34 12 (1 − (1 − s˙B)(1 − s˙H))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ˙)λ˙k
k! (1 − dk)
j44 12 (1 − (1 − s˙B)(1 − s˙H))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ˙)λ˙k
k! (1 − dk)
j54 12 ((1 − (1 − sB)(1 − sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) WEWE+VE +
S B0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 − dk) VEWE+VE )
Column 5
j15 s˙B s˙H
j25 (1 − s˙B)s˙H ∑∞k=0 exp(−λ˙)λ˙kk! dk
j35 (1 − s˙B)s˙H ∑∞k=0 exp(−λ˙)λ˙kk! (1 − dk)
Suppose a rare mutation causes heterozygous individuals to allocate p¯0, rather than p0,
when they become a helper(any terms with tildes over them are a function of ¯p01, and therefore
represent mutant behaviour or the product of mutant behaviour).
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Matrix Entry Expression
Column 1
j11 (1 − 11+a(VE+WE) )t
j21 t1+a(VE+WE)
Column 2
j12 12 ( ˜sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α˜)α˜k
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 −
˜sB0)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α˜)α˜k
k! k) +
1
2
VE
VE+WE
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! ((1 − dk)(k −
1) + kdk) + (1 − sB0)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! k) +
1
2
WE
VE+WE
((1 −
sB)sH
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 − sB)(1 −
sH)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! k + sB
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk))
j22 ˜sB0
∑∞
k=0
exp(−α˜)α˜k
k! d
k
j32 12 ˜sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α˜)α˜k
k! (1 − dk)
j42 12 ˜sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α˜)α˜k
k! (1 − dk)
j52 12 ((1 − (1 − sB)(1 − sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) WEWE+VE +
S B0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 − dk) VEWE+VE )
Column 3
j13 12 (1 − sB)sH
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + 12 (1 −
sB)(1− sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k+ 12 sB ∑∞k=2 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1−dk)(k−1)+
kdk))+ 12 (
VE
VE+WE
(sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! ((1−dk)(k−1)+kdk)+ (1−
sB0)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! k)) +
WE
VE+WE
((1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1 −
dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 − sB)(1 − sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k +
sB
∑∞
k=2
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk))
j23 sB
∑∞
k=0
exp(−λ)λk
k! d
k
j33 12 sB
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk)
j43 12 sB
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk)
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j53 12 (1 − sB)sH
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) + 12 ((1 − (1 − sB)(1 −
sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) WEWE+VE + sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 −
dk) VEWE+VE )
Column 4
j14 sH sB + 12 (1− sB)sH
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1−dk)(k−1)+kdk)+ 12 (1−
sB)(1− sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k+ 12 sB ∑∞k=2 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1−dk)(k−1)+
kdk) + 12 (
VE
VE+WE
(sB0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! ((1−dk)(k−1) + kdk) + (1−
sB0)
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! k)) +
WE
VE+WE
((1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! ((1 −
dk)(k − 1) + kdk) + (1 − sB)(1 − sH) ∑∞k=1 exp(−λ)λkk! k +
sB
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! ((1 − dk)(k − 1) + kdk))
j24 sB
∑∞
k=0
exp(−λ)λk
k! d
k + (1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=0 exp(−λ)λkk! dk
j34 12 (1 − (1 − sB)(1 − sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk)
j44 12 (1 − (1 − sB)(1 − sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk)
j54 12 ((1 − (1 − sB)(1 − sH))
∑∞
k=1
exp(−λ)λk
k! (1 − dk) WEWE+VE +
S B0
∑∞
k=1
exp(−α)αk
k! (1 − dk) VEWE+VE )
Column 5
j15 sBsH
j25 (1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=0 exp(−λ)λkk! dk
j35 (1 − sB)sH ∑∞k=0 exp(−λ)λkk! (1 − dk)
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Chapter 6
Concessions and the Evolution of
Coalitionary behaviour
Koykka, C. & Wild, G. (2016) Concessions, lifetime fitness consequences, and the evolution
of coalitionary behaviour. Behav. Ecol. 28(1): 20-30.
Abstract
The relationship between the costs of coalitionary behaviour and the evolution of such
behaviour has not been closely examined by theoretical studies. Here, we create a set
of life-history models for species whose coalitionary behaviour is genetically determined
to investigate how different types of costs aﬄicted upon members of failed coalitions,
in terms of survival, fecundity, and social rank, may influence the nature of coalitionary
behaviour that emerges at evolutionary equilibrium. We also extend previous theory by
examining the coevolution between coalitionary behaviour and concessions granted by
dominant individuals to prevent dominants from being targeted by coalitions. We show
that species that form coalitions to contest social rank evolve to regularly form bridging
coalitions under a vast majority of social and ecological settings, whereas species that con-
test fecundity form all-up coalitions under most conditions. Further, dominant individuals
concede resources to subordinates to prevent coalitionary attacks only in very few circum-
stances, and these concessions occur only to ensure another individual is a more attractive
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coalition target. We compare and contrast results to empirical data to provide an evolu-
tionary context for commonly observed coalitionary behaviours in the animal kingdom.
6.1 Introduction
In behavioural ecology, coalitions generally refer to two or more individuals that temporarily
cooperate in joint action against a third party [1]. This widespread and complex phenomenon
has been thoroughly studied by a large number of game theoretical models [for review see 2].
However, a recent comprehensive comparison [3] between these models and a vast amount of
data collected by field biologists reveals an important lack of communication between theorists
and empiricists. An aspect of coalitionary behaviour which has largely been left unexamined
in the theoretical literature is the cost of forming coalitions [3], particularly if the coalitions are
unsuccessful. Yet empiricists rely on theoretical models to identify the types of costs related
to coalition formation and coalition failure since these costs are frequently intangible, difficult
to observe directly [4], and may manifest in a variety of forms [5], such as decreased survival
[6, 7] and opportunity costs (e.g. decreased fecundity or rank in the social hierarchy) [8, 7].
As has been demonstrated previously [9, 10], the evolution of certain social behaviours, such
as altruism, is largely contingent upon how the particular life-history trait (fecundity vs. sur-
vival) is affected by the behaviour. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that different forms
of consequences resulting from coalitionary behaviour may influence the types of coalitionary
behaviour (all-up, bridging, all-down) that evolves.
A second aspect of coalitionary behaviour that remains neglected especially by theoreti-
cal work is its connection to concessions — resources given to subordinates by dominants in
order to prevent coalitionary action from targetting the dominant. It is challenging to study
concessions empirically since it is difficult to distinguish between concessions and a domi-
nant’s inability to completely control subordinates, although theoretically it has been shown
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that dominants can evolve to concede to their subordinates and that these concessions have the
potential to influence group stability and dynamics. For example, concession models of co-
operative breeders have demonstrated that the benefits of group augmentation and philopatry
under certain conditions may encourage the dominant to concede fecundity to subordinates in
the hopes of retaining them [11]. Whereas theoretically it has been shown [12, 13] that under
certain conditions it may be favorable for dominant individuals to provide concessions to avoid
conflict (i.e. peace incentives [12]), it is unclear whether and under what conditions domi-
nants evolve to provide concessions in order to prevent coalitions from targeting them. Indeed,
some animals, such as lions [14, 15], that exhibit coalitionary behaviour also engage in lethal
competition over resources and, consequently, dominants of such species may provide peace
incentives to prevent these costly engagements, which would explain the relatively low repro-
ductive skew found in these species. In species whose coalitionary behaviour is governed by
simple, genetically determined rules, concessions cannot be used to entice coalition formation
because coalitionary behaviour does not respond dynamically to concessions; instead, conces-
sions and coalitionary behaviour effectively manifest simultaneously. As such, we hypothesize
that concessions will not evolve in species that are incapable of sophisticated cognitive ability.
Here, we create a suite of relatively simple models to better understand the influence of
certain social and life-history characteristics on the evolution of coalitionary behaviour. We use
these models to show how different types of costs (i.e. survival, fecundity, and rank-changes)
affect the types of coalitions (i.e. all-up, all-down, bridging) that emerge. We also investigate
the conditions that facilitate the coevolution between coalition formation and the concessions
granted to subordinates by dominant individuals to prevent coalitions among subordinates. Our
model provides important general conclusions regarding how simple social and life-history
characteristics can influence the types of coalitions that form in species that may use simple
rules when forming coalitions – species whose coalitionary behaviour has been largely left
unexamined in empirical and theoretical studies [7, 3] despite being relatively common [16, 7].
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6.2 Model
We follow previous work [17, 2] of many coalition models by focusing on triadic interactions
in species with strict hierarchies. Consider a large number of territories, each inhabited by a
trio consisting of an alpha, beta, and gamma individual (i.e. individuals in the top, middle, and
bottom rank of the social hierarchy, respectively). Suppose initially that apart from their posi-
tions in social hierarchies this population is homogeneous, and that rank is simply determined
by the order in which individuals arrive on each territory. Each trio produces a large number
of offspring each season, and the alpha individual of each group initially has sole control over
the distribution of the group’s reproductive opportunities. At the beginning of each season,
the alpha allocates portion p of all reproductive opportunities to the beta, and portion q to the
gamma, and is left with the remaining portion 1 − p − q for its own use. We assume that these
concessions are genetically controlled, and may evolve over time. Following the distribution of
fecundity, individuals on the territory may choose to form a coalition. Each coalition is com-
prised of two individuals, and each trio can contain at most one coalition. The individual that
is not a member of the coalition is the coalition’s target. Three types of coalitions are possible
in this model: alpha-beta (‘all-down’), alpha-gamma (‘bridging’), and beta-gamma (‘all-up’).
6.2.1 Coalition Solicitation
We create two sets of models that describe two different types of social dynamics. The first
set assumes a specific pattern of coalition solicitation: following Stamatopoulos et al. [18], we
assume that individuals higher in the hierarchy are socially dominant position and are thus able
to prevent the formation of certain coalitions that may target them by first themselves forming
a coalition (Figure 6.2.1). With probability x1,2, the alpha first offers the beta the opportunity
to form a coalition. We assume that both parties must be willing participants for a coalition
to form. The beta individual accepts the alpha’s offer with probability x2,1. Should either be
unwilling to form the coalition, the alpha next extends the coalition offer to the gamma with
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Alpha solicits 
beta
Alpha-beta 
coalition
Alpha solicits 
gamma
Alpha-gamma 
coalition
Beta solicits 
gamma
Beta-gamma 
coalition
No coalitions
Figure 6.2.1: Scheme outlining sequential coalition solicitation. The probability of each sce-
nario, which are functions of the trio’s phenotypic values, is listed above each error. For ex-
ample, for alpha-gamma coalitions to occur, the alpha must either not offer the beta a chance
to form a coalition or the beta must decline (probability 1 − x12x21), then the alpha must offer
the gamma an opportunity to form a coalition and the gamma must accept (probability x13x31),
and thus the probability of alpha-gamma coalitions is (1 − x12x21)x13x31. It follows that higher
ranked individuals are afforded more opportunities to prevent the formation of coalitions that
target them.
probability x1,3, and the gamma accepts with probability x3,1. If either declines, the beta now
gets the opportunity to offer the gamma the opportunity to form a coalition, and does so with
probability x2,3, while the gamma accepts with probability x3,2. Each of these probabilities
is genetically determined and may evolve over time. The loci controlling each phenotype is
assumed to be on separate chromosomes, such that these phenotypes evolve independently of
one another.
The second set of models assumes a scramble solicitation such that no individual has a so-
cial advantage during coalition formation. Let xi,c represent the probability that the individual
in rank i is willing to form a coalition. Let xi,h represent the probability that the individual in
rank i is willing to form a coalition with the higher ranked individual; with probability 1 − xi,h,
the individual is willing to form a coalition with the lower ranked individual. With scram-
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ble coalition formation, the probability that an alpha-beta coalition will form, for example, is
x1,cx2,cx1,hx2,h. Since individuals in the population are homogeneous apart from rank, we as-
sume the probability that coalitions between individuals i and j succeed is constant, given by
ci, j. The assumption that coalition success is rank-dependent rather than individual-dependent
is made of mathematical convenience. Effectively, we assume that while individuals do not
vary in intrinsic resource holding potential (RHP), differences in rank may provide individuals
with different amounts of resources, information, and motivation [19] which ultimately affects
the probability that specific coalitions are successful.
6.2.2 Coalition Consequences
Empirical observations suggest that coalitions can form to contest and maintain either tangi-
ble resources such as fecundity (non-rank-changing coalitions) [20, 21] or higher ranks in the
hierarchy (rank-changing coalitions) [22, 23, 24]. Further, evidence suggests the cost of be-
ing a target of a successful coalition or a member of a failed coalitions may be in the form
of reduced fecundity, lower survival and/or lowered rank in the hierarchy [3]. For each set of
models (sequential and scramble solicitation), we create a separate model for each situation:
(i) non-rank-changing coalitions with fecundity costs, (ii) non-rank-changing coalitions with
survival costs, (iii) rank-changing coalitions with fecundity costs, (iv) rank-changing coalitions
with survival costs, and (v) rank-changing coalitions with rank-lowering costs (that is, mem-
bers of failed coalitions are assumed to usurped by the target, should the target not already be
the residing alpha).
When coalitions form to contest fecundity, a successful coalition will obtain portion h of
the target’s resources. For example, should an alpha-beta coalition be successful, it is assumed
that the gamma individual loses portion h, leaving it with portion (1 − h)q of all breeding
opportunities. This loss in fecundity is divided – not necessarily evenly – between the members
of the coalition, with the higher-ranked (dominant) individual receiving portion h1 of the spoils,
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such that the alpha would receive h1hq, in addition to the 1− p− q that it retained, and the beta
would receive an additional (1− h1)hq. Should the coalition fail, the dominant individual loses
portion (1−h1)h(1− p−q) and the beta loses h1h(1− p−q), and this is given to the target of the
failed coalition. A similar construction was used for survival cost, where the losing party lost
portion h of its survival, although it the victorious party was not assumed to gained increased
survival.
6.2.3 Selection gradient
Following coalition formation and the division of fecundity, offspring production occurs. All
offspring become floaters that queue for opportunities to join these breeding trios. It is assumed
that the reproductive value of all offspring is equal, and the population is at demographic equi-
librium (i.e. the population is of constant size), such that the reproductive value of offspring
is also equal across seasons. Following reproduction, individuals on breeding territories then
have some probability of dying each season. An individual in rank i survives the season with
probability si. Since each trio collectively produces a very large number of offspring, we as-
sume that there is a sufficient number of individuals in queue to join these hierarchies, such
that at the beginning of each season there are always three individuals on each territory (Figure
6.2.2). Hierarchies are determined by the order in which individuals arrive on each territory:
individuals who have been on the territory the longest obtain more favorable positions in the
hierarchy. Should individuals arrive at the same time, we assume the contest over hierarchy
positions is randomly resolved. As relatives tend to form long-term alliances [1], coalitions
are rarely observed among relatives [25, 3], and so we will ignore kinship. All variables in the
main text are described in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Variables and parameters used in the main text
Symbol Explanation
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p Portion of resources allocated to the beta individual
q Portion of resources allocated to the gamma individual
xi, j Willingness of individual in rank i to form a coalition with rank j
ci, j Probability that coalition of i and j defeat its target
si Per-season probability of survival for individuals in rank i
h Proportion of resources lost by losing party
h1 Proportion of resources lost by dominant individuals in
unsuccessful coalitions
Wi, j Future reproductive success of an individual in rank j in a trio in
state i
Mi, j The probability that an individual in state i will be in state j in
the following season
Ii, j Probability that an individual begins in rank j in a trio in state i
We demonstrate how to calculate the selection gradient for the scenario with sequential so-
licitation, non-rank-changing coalitions and fecundity costs. Analogous calculations can be
applied to the remaining models (see supplementary data).
For each of the models, there are 12 states in which individuals may reside:
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Triad
Alpha allocates resources
Coalitions form
Reproduction
DeathFloaters fill vacancies
Offspring become floaters
Figure 6.2.2: Lifecycle of individuals in the model. At the beginning of each generation, there
is a triad on each territory. First, the alpha proposes a distribution of resources (assumed to
directly translate to fecundity). Coalitions may then form, which can alter this distribution of
resources or the ranks of individuals. Next, reproduction based on this adjusted distribution of
fecundity occurs, with all offspring dispersing to become floaters. At the end of the breeding
season, individuals on each territory may die, in which case it is assumed that floaters fill these
vacancies, and thus a triad resides on each territory, and the cycle begins. Note we assume that
there are a very largely number of territories and that the production of offspring is sufficiently
large such that individuals on each territory are unrelated. Note that the population size is
unchanging.
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Table 6.2: List of positions each individual can hold in the triad
i=1 alpha in an alpha-beta coalition trio
i=2 beta in an alpha-beta coalition trio
i=3 gamma in an alpha-beta coalition trio
i=4 alpha in an alpha-gamma coalition trio
i=5 beta in an alpha-gamma coalition trio
i=6 gamma in an alpha-gamma coalition trio
i=7 alpha in a beta-gamma coalition trio
i=8 beta in a beta-gamma coalition trio
i=9 gamma in a beta-gamma coalition trio
i=10 alpha in a no-coalition trio
i=11 beta in a no-coalition trio
i=12 gamma in a no-coalition trio
To calculate the selection gradient acting on each phenotype, we first derive the future
reproductive success associated with each state. We define Wi as the future reproductive suc-
cess for an individual in state i (e.g. W6 represents the residual fitness of a gamma in a trio
that has formed an alpha-gamma coalition). Let Fi represent the fecundity of an individual
in state i; that is, Fi is equal to the number of offspring produced by an individual in state i
per season (e.g. F10 = (1 − p − q)). Lastly, let Mi, j represent the probability that an indi-
vidual in state i transitions into state j in the next generation (e.g. in order for an alpha in
trio that contains an alpha-beta coalition in one generation to remain the alpha in a trio that
contains an alpha-beta coalition in the next generation, it must survive [probability s1] and an
alpha-beta coalition must then form [probability x1,2x2,1]; that is, M1,1 = s1x1,2x2,1). The values
of each Mi, j and Fi for this model are provided in the appendix (see supplementary data for
these values in the remaining models). Following Kokko & Johnstone [11], we calculate the
fitness of each state by adding the fecundity of an individual in the current breeding season to
the future components of fitness, which are weighted by transition probabilities for each state;
equivalently, Wi = Fi +
∑12
j=1 Mi, jW j. The solution to these equations is derived analytically
using computer software (not shown because of their length). We next use the reproductive
success of each state to calculate the fitness of a wild type individual in a wild type popula-
tion. Let Ii represent the probability that an individual begins its tenure in a trio in state i (e.g.
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I10 = (1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3)(1 − x1,2x2,1)(1 − x1,3x3,1)(1 − x2,3x3,2)). Then the fitness of a
wild type individual is given by W =
∑12
i=1 IiWi. In this way, we are able to track the lifetime
fitness consequences of coalitionary behaviour, and understand how these consequences vary
with respect to life-history and social characteristics.
Suppose now a mutant enters this wild type population and it exhibits deviant behaviour
with respect to one of the eight phenotypes under selection; wild type individuals use strat-
egy s = (p, q, x1,2, x1,3, x2,1, x2,3, x3,1, x3,2), whereas mutants use a deviant strategy s¯. We will
demonstrate the calculation of the selection gradient acting on a mutant phenotype by consid-
ering a mutation in phenotype, x1,2. We now seek to calculate the mutant’s future reproductive
success in each state, W¯i. Instead of transition probabilities, Mi, j, being purely a function of the
wildtype phenotypes, s, certain entries will be a function of the mutant gene, s¯. The entries in
which this particular mutation manifests itself are M¯1,k, M¯4,k, M¯7,k, M¯10,k for all k – the remain-
ing transition probabilities remain the same, since the mutant needs to be in the alpha position
for its mutation ¯x1,2 to potentially influence its reproductive output. We then solve the system
of equations to calculate W¯i. We apply similar changes to the initial state vector, I to get the
mutant’s initial state vector, I¯. Putting this together, we derive the expected lifetime fitness of
an individual with a x¯1,2 mutation. We do this for each phenotype under selection in order to
develop the following system of equations
∂W
∂x¯1,2
|s¯=s, ∂W
∂x¯1,3
|s¯=s, ∂W
∂x¯2,1
|s¯=s, ∂W
∂x¯2,3
|s¯=s, ∂W
∂x¯3,1
|s¯=s, ∂W
∂x¯3,2
|s¯=s, ∂W
∂p¯
|s¯=s, ∂W
∂q¯
|s¯=s (6.1)
This system cannot be solved analytically, but the ESS can be derived numerically by follow-
ing the effect of the selection gradient given in (6.1) in an iterative fashion [26]. Effectively,
under the assumption of weak selection, offspring may have small mutations, and beneficial
mutations changes in phenotypic values which would increase an individual’s fitness emerge
and become fixed in the population [27], such that changes in phenotypic values over time
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are travelling along the selection gradients given by (6.1). Specifically, we change the value
of each phenotype by some amount proportional to its selection gradient and repeat until, for
each of the phenotypes, the selection gradient approaches zero or reaches a boundary imposed
by the biologically relevant parameter space 0 ≤ p, q, xi, j ≤ 1 (see supplementary material).
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Non-rank-changing coalitions
We first examine coalitionary behaviour arranged to contest fecundity with the costs of failed
coalitions shared evenly among members (i.e. h1 = 0.5). Regardless of whether coalition
solicitation is performed sequentially or in a scramble, and regardless of whether the costs of
failed coalitions are losses in fecundity or survival, alphas generally evolve never to concede
any fecundity to the beta and gamma, and beta-gamma coalitions form in response; in fact, this
is always the ESS whenever c1,2 > c1,3 > c2,3, a condition expected to hold true whenever those
higher in the hierarchy have greater success rates in fights – a common although by no means
universal trait of animal hierarchies [7]. The exception is if the probability of alpha-gamma
coalition success is substantially lower than the probability of beta-gamma coalition success,
c1,3 < c2,3, in which case oscillations in the degree of concessions as well as the frequency
of beta-gamma and alpha-beta coalitions occur (Figure 6.3.3); alphas concede some fecundity
to the gamma individual, and consequently both beta-gamma and alpha-beta coalitions evolve.
Note that such cyclic equilibria may be the product of the homogeneous population assumption.
Survival rates, as well as the degree of fecundity lost by failed coalitions and the targets of
successful coalitions have no effect on the outcome of evolution. The fact that the relation
between c1,3 and c2,3 but not the absolute value of c1,3 perturbs the system from a pure beta-
gamma ESS despite not affecting the payoff structure of an beta-gamma equilibrium suggests
that the transient dynamics are important to consider. However, it should also be noted that all
listed results are not contingent upon initial conditions.
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Figure 6.3.3: Change in coalition types and concessions over time when the probability of suc-
cess for alpha-gamma coalitions is lower than that of beta-gamma coalitions. The solid black
and blue lines represent concessions granted to the beta and gamma, respectively. The dashed
red, blue, and black lines represent the frequency of alpha-beta, alpha-gamma, and beta-gamma
coalitions, respectively. The cycle can be described as follows. Alphas have initially evolved
to concede to the gamma and in turn alpha-beta coalitions are initially frequent. However,
gamma individuals are then receptive to coalition offers from the beta in order to retain their
share of fecundity; beta individuals are willing to align with gammas because alphas are still
retain a larger share of fecundity. Eventually, as beta-gamma coalitions become more frequent,
the alpha is gaining less from concessions and so concedes less to the gamma, and soon more
alpha-beta coalitions occur coalitions occur. The cycle then repeats. Results were generated
using s1 = 0.9, s2 = 0.85, s3 = 0.8, h = 0.9, c1,2 = 0.95, c1,3 = 0.55, c2,3 = 0.75, h1 = 0.5, and
a mutation rate of 0.01.
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A relatively common feature in some species [28] is that subordinates bear a greater cost
for failed coalitions than do dominants, and dominants receive a greater benefit for successful
coalitions than do subordinates (i.e. h1 < 0.5). As before, all-up coalitions are the ESS when-
ever c1,2 > c1,3 > c2,3 even when h1 , 0.5. Little changes because alphas do not share fecundity
and are thus usually the target of coalitions; as such, regardless of the value of 0 < h1 < 1, sub-
ordinate can only improve their fecundity by forming a coalition against the alpha. If c1,3 < c2,3
and higher-ranked individuals in coalitions receive substantially more than lower-ranked indi-
viduals (0.5 >> h1 > 0), then the alpha evolves to concede some fecundity to the gamma,
and although beta-gamma coalitions are still the only coalition type to form, the frequency of
this coalition oscillates (Figure 6.3.4). In contrast, if lower-ranked individuals in coalitions
receive substantially more than higher-ranked individuals (1 > h1 >> 0.5), oscillating levels
of beta-gamma coalitions occur but the alpha concedes some fecundity to the beta instead. By
conceding to the subordinate that receives the greatest penalty as a result of a failed coalition,
the alpha is assured to re-obtain a significant portion of these concessions back if the beta-
gamma coalition fails, and by making these concessions the alpha also loses a smaller portion
of its fecundity should the coalition succeed.
6.3.2 Rank-changing coalitions
When coalitions are formed with the intent to alter ranks and solicitation occurs sequentially,
we once again find that generally alpha individuals evolve to concede nothing to their sub-
ordinates; however, alpha-gamma coalitions evolve under a wide range of conditions. There
are two exceptions. First, if the survival of beta individuals is significantly less than the sur-
vival of gamma individuals, alpha-beta coalitions evolve (while dominant individuals in many
species experience greater survival, there are certain species in which dominant individuals
suffer greater mortality [29, 30]). Second, if the probability of alpha-gamma coalition success
is lower than beta-gamma success, then oscillating levels of beta-gamma and alpha-gamma
coalitions evolve.
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Figure 6.3.4: Frequencies of coalition types and concessions when dominants bear a greater
cost and gain less from coalitions (panel a, h1 = 0.9) compared to when subordinates bear a
greater cost and gain less from coalitions (panel b, h1 = 0.1). The solid black and blue lines
represent concessions granted to the beta and gamma, respectively. The dashed red, blue, and
black lines represent the frequency of alpha-beta, alpha-gamma, and beta-gamma coalitions,
respectively. Results were generated using s1 = 0.9, s2 = 0.85, s3 = 0.8, h = 0.9, c1,2 = 0.95,
c1,3 = 0.55, c2,3 = 0.75, and a mutation rate of 0.01.
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Alternatively, when coalitions form with scramble solicitation, beta-gamma coalitions evolve
unless the survival of beta individuals is low relative to gamma individuals, in which case os-
cillating levels of alpha-beta coalitions occur.
6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 Rank-changing vs. non-rank-changing coalitions
Our model provides the general, testable prediction that, among species in which dominants
are able to monopolize resources, species that use coalitions to contest rank should be more
likely to form alpha-gamma, or ‘bridging’ coalitions, compared to species that form coalitions
primarily to contest fecundity, in which beta-gamma, or ‘all-up’ coalitions, should be favored.
The fact that under the majority of parameter conditions alpha-gamma coalitions form when
social ranks are being contested and sequential solicitation occurs is expected. The gamma
can automatically ascend to the beta position by forming an alliance with either the beta or the
alpha. Since the only way for the beta to immediately take over the alpha position is to form a
coalition with the gamma, the beta is willing to form a coalition with the gamma. As such, the
alpha seeks to pre-empt the opportunity for the beta-gamma coalition to form by themselves
forming a coalition with the gamma. With scramble solicitation, the alpha is unable to prevent
the beta-gamma coalition, and so beta-gamma coalitions generally evolve. Alternatively, beta-
gamma coalitions generally form when fecundity is contested simply because the alpha tends
to monopolize resources, and thus there is little for subordinates to lose and much to gain by
forming a beta-gamma coalition.
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6.4.2 Costs of coalitions
It is difficult to theoretically investigate the costs of coalitionary behaviour because technically
it requires models that track the fitness consequences of an individual’s decisions through its
entire life cycle, rather than identifying evolutionarily stable strategies in single situations, as
most previous analytic models have done [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 2]. By finding what is
rational behaviour at each stage of an individual’s life cycle in isolation, previous models ex-
amine only the immediate, direct fitness consequences of coalitionary behaviour rather than the
influence of coalitionary behaviour on an individual’s lifetime fitness. The potential need for
thorough life-history models of coalitionary behaviour is made further evident by the fact that
previous theory has established that in social hierarchies with heritable rank, future benefits
and costs may affect current behaviour [11, 38].
Available data suggests that the time and energy invested in coalition formation is negligi-
ble, and that injuries and especially death as a consequence of failed coalitions are rare, yet it
is unclear whether this is because such events have gone unrecorded or whether they are in fact
unusual [7]. There are, however, data to suggest that there may be opportunity costs, including
failure to achieve higher ranks, reduced mating access, and various other consequences that
can only be addressed with models that capture entire life cycles, associated with coalition
formation, particularly if the coalition fails [4]. Yet our model, which does track the fitness
consequences of behaviour thorough an individual’s entire life cycle, suggests that whether or
not coalitions are rank-changing is far more influential in affecting the evolution of coalitionary
behaviour than the types of costs (fecundity versus survival) experienced by failed coalitions
or the targets of successful ones. Future empirical research may benefit from identifying dif-
ferences in the frequency of types of coalitions that emerge in species that regularly engage
in rank-changing coalitions compared to species in which rank-changes as a result of coalition
formation is rare.
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6.4.3 Concessions
Our model predicts that the threat of all-up coalitions may lead high-ranked individuals to con-
cede a greater amount of resources toward lower ranked individuals, without changing ranks,
only in a specific set of circumstances. Concessions only occur when alpha-gamma coalitions
are unlikely to succeed compared to beta-gamma coalitions, implying (under the assumption
that the competitiveness of a coalition is the sum of the competitiveness of its members) that
the beta must be more competitive than the alpha for concessions to be granted. In this case, the
alpha evolves to concede fecundity to one of the subordinates; which subordinate the dominant
concedes to depends on the division of risk and reward between dominants and subordinates in
coalitions. In doing so, the subordinate that receives the concession then becomes an excellent
target for the coalition, which encourages the remaining subordinate to form a coalition with
the alpha. Ultimately, selection never favors alphas that concede to both subordinates; instead,
the alpha concedes to only one subordinate. Further, our model suggests that these concessions
do not occur so that the subordinate afforded a portion of fecundity will have more to lose and
should therefore be less willing to be a part of beta-gamma coalitions, since generally they
hold more risk for the beta than alpha-beta coalitions; instead, concession are made so that the
subordinate receiving the concession is a more compelling target for coalitions.
Our work differs from most previous reproductive skew theory because it focuses on the
influence of direct aggression, rather than the threat of departure of eviction; our work is unique
because this aggression is in the form of coalition formation, rather than binary conflict [13].
Since our model is triadic, we are able to clearly demonstrate that dominants may be willing
to concede fecundity, but we consistently find that this concession is to a single subordinate
only. It is thus likely true that should other concession models be extended to three or more
individuals, one would find that the dominant concessions to subordinates likely follow an
uneven distribution, and the amount that each subordinate receives will depend on rank and
various other social and ecological factors. For example, dominants likely need to concede
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less to subordinates in higher rank since they are more likely to inherit breeding territories
and therefore need less incentive to remain in the group. We have ignored factors related to
ecological constraints, which often motivate concessions in models of cooperative breeders,
in order to exclusively investigate and precisely describe the relationship between concessions
and coalitions.
6.4.4 A Comparison to Empirical Data
A comparison between our results and empirical data yields mixed agreement. In what fol-
lows we explore some of the similarities between our results and empirical observations, and
provide an evolutionary context for these findings. We also highlight discrepancies between
our results and the data, identify possible deficiencies in the available data and limitations of
our model, and propose future studies of coalitionary behaviour and concessions that may help
resolve the disagreement between theory and data.
It is difficult to compare our results to previous models and empirical data since the relation
between concessions and coalitions has not previously been investigated. Comparisons are par-
ticularly problematic for non-rank-changing coalitions because it is unclear whether the social
hierarchy as it is recorded by field biologists coincides with the rank as it is imposed in our
model or rather the distribution of fecundity – these hierarchies are not necessarily equivalent.
Indeed, there are no rank changes in our models if fecundity is contested (aside for succession
due to deaths), yet based on the outcome of coalitionary behaviour individuals in lower ranks
may actually have greater fecundity and thus may appear to be of higher social rank if their
coalitions are successful. This stated, we make comparisons where possible.
The frequency of certain types of coalitions is known to vary significantly across [25] and
within species [3], and our model does suggests that the type of coalitions that evolve may
vary with survival, the manner of coalition solicitation, and whether it is social rank or fecun-
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dity that is being contested. However, observations indicate that among unrelated individuals
all-down coalitions are the most common form of coalitionary behaviour [39]. In contrast, our
model suggests that coalitions contesting fecundity should be all-down only when c1,3 < c2,3,
and coalitions contesting rank should be all-down only if the survival of beta individuals is
generally much lower than that of gamma individuals (s2 << s3). In our model, few conditions
favor alpha-beta coalitions because, assuming dominants have control over resource allocation,
alpha individuals will naturally evolve to take a greater share of resources, which makes them
an excellent target for coalitions. We find this to be true regardless of whether the cost of
failed coalitions is survival or fecundity. If the costs and benefits are unequal for individuals
within coalitions (i.e. the dominants both gain more and risk less relative to subordinates), no
coalitions other than beta-gamma coalitions evolve under any parameter conditions; however,
oscillating levels of beta-gamma coalitions evolve, as well as oscillating amounts that alpha
individuals concede to the gamma individuals.
Whereas previous studies [1, 40] have assumed that the distribution of fecundity (or whichever
limiting resource is being contested) is environmentally determined, here we assume the de-
gree of despotism – at least before the formation of coalitions – is controlled by the dominant
individual. The degree to which the dominant individuals in species exhibiting coalitionary
behaviour are actually able to monopolize resources is of course variable and difficult to de-
termine, as it is often unclear whether subordinates who reproduce are able to do so due to
concessions or a lack of control from dominant breeders [41]. At least in certain species, there
are high degrees of monopolization which seem to be dominant-controlled [42, 43, 44, 45].
Our results, in contrast to empirical data, suggest that all-up coalitions should be common un-
der a wide range of parameter conditions, and this may indicate that the type of coalitions that
evolve may be related to the ability for the dominant individuals of a species to make conces-
sions, which naturally is contingent upon the ability of dominant individuals to monopolize
resources if dominant individuals are unable to control the distribution of resources, they are
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unable to make concessions, and thus the results of our models are not applicable. Our models
suggest then that the variance in the prevalence of all-down coalitions between species may be
due to species-level differences in the ability of dominant individuals to monopolize resources
and their willingness to concede resources to subordinates as peace offerings, and this may be
a promising direction for future empirical work.
Bissonnette et al. [3] state that their unpublished data reveals all-up coalitions are particu-
larly uncommon across species in mixed-sex groups, in which coalitions to contest fecundity
are common. They posit that this is likely the result of unequal distribution of mating oppor-
tunities among successful coalitions, which is in agreement with the fact that when h1 in our
model deviates significantly from 0.5 (an equal distribution), beta-gamma coalitions are no
longer ubiquitous.
All-up, rank-changing coalitions have also been found to be relatively rare, and it has been
proposed that this is the result of high-costs involved with contesting rank [3]. The existence
of other types of rank-changing coalitions is often more difficult to prove because they may not
result in readily observable changes (e.g. alpha-beta coalitions formed to prevent rank-changes
are unlikely to produce rank-changes). There has, however, been recordings of the alpha male
forming coalitions with lower-ranking members to remove higher-ranking social threats to the
alpha [46, 3], and this is the very type of coalition (i.e. bridging) our model predicts is most
likely to form.
All-down, rank-changing coalitions are fairly common in both primate and non-primate
species [3], which is in contrast to our findings that the formation of coalitions among high
ranking individuals to pre-emptively deter all-up coalitions should be relatively rare. Again,
this discrepancy may be the result of the assumption that the alpha is able to control resources,
and we expect that the frequency of all-down coalitions should vary with the alpha’s ability
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to monopolize resources. Another possible explanation for the dissimilarities between our
model and the data is the fact that our model population has been divided into triads. Al-
though alpha-gamma coalitions evolve in our rank-changing model while all-down coalitions
are most common in nature, both of these coalitions can, from the perspective of the alpha,
be viewed as rank-stabilizing: they are formed so that the alpha can preserve its rank. The
reason all-down coalitions may be more prevalent in reality than our model suggests is that in
many populations exhibiting coalitionary behaviour group sizes are larger than three [3], and
in such groups there are a greater number of viable all-up coalitions that can target the alpha
and, indeed, the beta. As such, there may be greater incentive for all-down coalitions. Unfor-
tunately, creating models of coalitionary behaviour that calculate lifetime fitness consequences
become exponentially more complex with larger group sizes, and thus agent-based simulation
would likely be required. Models as well as empirical data that are able to describe changes in
coalitionary behaviour as a function of group size are profitable lines of inquiry for future work.
Other theories for the relative rarity of all-up coalitions include the high cost of targeting
dominant individuals, and the fact that all-up coalitions can be countered by all-down coali-
tions, which often consist of more dominant individuals [3]. Yet our models show that all-up
and bridging coalitions can readily emerge even when the probability with which alpha-beta
coalitions succeed is much higher than that of other coalitions. This is due to the dominant’s
general tendency to retain most of the group’s fecundity, ensuring that subordinates have much
to gain from targeting alpha individuals, but also little to lose in the event that the coalition fails.
The general conclusions derived from our model are unlikely to apply to species with facul-
tative and highly sophisticated coalitionary behaviour that are able to flexibly and dynamically
respond to the behaviour of others, such as many primates. However, our model does describe
coalition formation in the growing number of species with lower cognitive capacities that have
been observed to regularly form coalitions, including many species of birds and social carni-
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vores [7]. Indeed, there is mounting evidence to suggest that cognition is not as important as
socioecology in determining whether a species will evolve to use coalitions [7]. Based on our
results, we expect that species incapable of sophisticated cognition are far more likely to form
all-up and bridging rather than all-down coalitions. Our model calculates the influence of coali-
tionary behaviour on an individual’s lifetime fitness rather than the fitness that may be gained
from separate stages of an individual’s life cycle. Few studies [25] have sought to understand
the relationship between coalitions and lifetime fitness; that is, previous models do not account
for the fact that individuals may adjust behaviour based on their future reproductive success
[47, 48].
From its inception [17], theory regarding coalition formation has focused extensively on
the effects of initial ranks and RHP distributions of a group on coalition formation [2] with few
exceptions [49], yet empirical studies have regularly demonstrated across species that coalition
partners are often selected based on features related to but distinct from RHP such as kinship
[50, 51, 52, 53], sex [54], and age [55, 24].The call for models to delineate the relationship
between coalitionary behaviour and life-history characteristics would require a class-structure
analogue of the model provided here. Each distinct class would then require a separate set of
phenotypes controlling for behaviour in each distinct group structure. Unfortunately, such a
model is unlikely to be numerically, much less analytically, tractable; agent-based models are
likely to be more profitable for this endeavor. While agent-based modelling has been previ-
ously used to investigate coalitionary behaviour, those models have focused on how individual
differences in RHP rather than pertinent life-history traits may affect coalitionary behaviour
[56].
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6.5 Appendix
6.5.1 Complete Fitness Calculation
To calculate the selection gradient acting on each phenotype, we first derive the future repro-
ductive success associated with each state. We define Wi as the future reproductive success
for an individual in state i (e.g. W6 represents the residual fitness of a gamma in a trio that
has formed an alpha-gamma coalition). Let Fi represent the fecundity of an individual in state
i; that is, Fi is equal to the number of offspring produced by an individual in state i (e.g.
F10 = (1 − p − q)). Lastly, let Mi, j represent the probability that an individual in state i transi-
tions into state j in the next generation (e.g. M1,1 = s1x1,2x2,1). We calculate the fitness of each
state by adding the fecundity of an individual in the current breeding season to the future com-
ponents of fitness, which are weighted by transition probabilities for each state; equivalently,
we solve the solution vector [W1,W2, ...,W12] to the following system of equations

W1
...
W12
 =

M1,1 M1,2 · · · M1,12
M2,1 M2,2 · · · M2,12
...
...
...
...
M12,1 M12,2 · · · M12,12


W1
...
W12
 +

F1
...
F12
 .
6.5. Appendix 211
6.5.2 Entries in System of Equations
In a homogeneous, wild type population of constant size
M1,1 = s1x21x12
M1,2 = 0
M1,3 = 0
M1,4 = s1s1(1 − x21x12)x31x13
M1,5 = 0
M1,6 = 0
M1,7 = s1s1(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)x23x32
M1,8 = 0
M1,9 = 0
M1,10 = s1(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)(1 − x23x32)
M1,11 = 0
M1,12 = 0
M4,1:12 = M7,1:12 = M10,1:12 = M1,1:12.
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M2,1 = (1 − s1)s2x21x12
M2,2 = s1s2x21x12
M2,3 = 0
M2,4 = (1 − s1)s2(1 − x21x12)x31x13
M2,5 = s1s2(1 − x21x12)x31x13
M2,6 = 0
M2,7 = (1 − s1)s2(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)x23x32
M2,8 = s1s2(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)x23x32
M2,9 = 0
M2,10 = (1 − s1)s2(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)(1 − x23x32)
M2,11 = s1s2(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)(1 − x23x32)
M2,12 = 0
M5,1:12 = M8,1:12 = M11,1:12 = M2,1:12.
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M3,1 = (1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3x21x12
M3,2 = s3(s1(1 − s2) + s2(1 − s1))x21x12
M3,3 = s1s2s3x21x12
M3,4 = (1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3(1 − x21x12)x31x13
M3,5 = s3(s1(1 − s2) + s2(1 − s1))(1 − x21x12)x31x13
M3,6 = s1s2s3(1 − x21x12)x31x13
M3,7 = (1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)x23x32
M3,8 = s3(s1(1 − s2) + s2(1 − s1))(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)x23x32
M3,9 = s1s2s3(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)x23x32
M3,10 = (1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)(1 − x23x32)
M3,11 = s3(s1(1 − s2) + s2(1 − s1))(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)(1 − x23x32)
M3,12 = s1s2s3(1 − x21x12)(1 − x31x13)(1 − x23x32)
M6,1:12 = M9,1:12 = M12,1:12 = M3,1:12.
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Entries in the reproductive output vector are given by
F1 = (1 − p − q) + h1c1,2hq − (1 − c1,2)(1 − h1)h(1 − p − q)
F2 = p + (1 − h1)c1,2hq − (1 − c1,2)h1hp
F3 = q − c1,2hq + (1 − c1,2)h(h1q + (1 − h1)(1 − p − q))
F4 = (1 − p − q) + h1c1,3hp − (1 − c1,3)(1 − h1)h(1 − p − q)
F5 = p − c1,3hp + (1 − c1,3)h((1 − p − q)(1 − h1) + qh1)
F6 = q + (1 − h1)c1,3hp − h1(1 − c1,3)hq
F7 = (1 − p − q) − c2,3h(1 − p − q) + (1 − c2,3)h((1 − h1)p + h1q)
F8 = p + h1c2,3h(1 − p − q) − (1 − c2,3)h(1 − h1)p
F9 = q + (1 − h1)c2,3h(1 − p − q) − (1 − c2,3)hh1q
F10 = (1 − p − q)
F11 = p
F12 = q.
6.5. Appendix 215
Entries in the initial state vector are given by
I1 = (1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3)x1,2x2,1
I2 = ((1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3) + (1/2)((1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3
+ (1 − s1)(1 − s3)s2 + (1 − s2)(1 − s3)s1))x1,2x2,1
I3 = ((1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3) + (1/2)((1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3
+ (1 − s1)(1 − s3)s2 + (1 − s2)(1 − s3)s1)
+ s1s2(1 − s3) + s1(1 − s2)s3 + (1 − s1)s2s3))x1,2x2,1
I4 = (1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3)(1 − x1,2x2,1)x1,3x3,1
I5 = ((1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3) + (1/2)((1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3
+ (1 − s1)(1 − s3)s2 + (1 − s2)(1 − s3)s1))(1 − x1,2x2,1)x1,3x3,1
I6 = ((1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3) + (1/2)((1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3
+ (1 − s1)(1 − s3)s2 + (1 − s2)(1 − s3)s1)
+ s1s2(1 − s3) + s1(1 − s2)s3 + (1 − s1)s2s3))(1 − x1,2x2,1)x1,3x3,1
I7 = (1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3)(1 − x1,2x2,1)(1 − x1,3x3,1)x2,3x3,2
I8 = ((1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3) + (1/2)((1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3
+ (1 − s1)(1 − s3)s2 + (1 − s2)(1 − s3)s1))(1 − x1,2x2,1)(1 − x1,3x3,1)x2,3x3,2
I9 = ((1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3) + (1/2)((1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3
+ (1 − s1)(1 − s3)s2 + (1 − s2)(1 − s3)s1)
+ s1s2(1 − s3) + s1(1 − s2)s3 + (1 − s1)s2s3))(1 − x1,2x2,1)(1 − x1,3x3,1)x2,3x3,2
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I10 = (1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3)(1 − x1,2x2,1)(1 − x1,3x3,1)(1 − x2,3x3,2)
I11 = ((1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3) + (1/2)((1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3
+ (1 − s1)(1 − s3)s2 + (1 − s2)(1 − s3)s1))(1 − x1,2x2,1)(1 − x1,3x3,1)(1 − x2,3x3,2)
I12 = ((1/3)(1 − s1)(1 − s2)(1 − s3) + (1/2)((1 − s1)(1 − s2)s3
+ (1 − s1)(1 − s3)s2 + (1 − s2)(1 − s3)s1)
+ s1s2(1 − s3) + s1(1 − s2)s3 + (1 − s1)s2s3))(1 − x1,2x2,1)(1 − x1,3x3,1)(1 − x2,3x3,2)
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Throughout this thesis, we created evolutionary models to better understand a variety of scenar-
ios involving social groups wherein resources and control over resources were asymmetrically
divided. Motivated largely by empirical studies which indicate cooperation commonly occurs
among individuals in different social ranks [1, 2, 3, 4], even when they are in conflict, we de-
veloped theory to better explain unintuitive mixes of conflict and cooperation throughout the
animal kingdom.
Our work began by exploring what may motivate the evolution of social groups involving
individuals with asymmetries in resources and social roles. In Chapter 2, we investigated the
emergence of leader-follower relationships in the context of group dispersal, a common biolog-
ical phenomenon [5], by examining the inclusive fitness incentives for leading and following.
Our work showed that leader-follower relationships are more likely to evolve among groups
with high relatedness, especially when there were significant group augmentation benefits as-
sociated with participating in leader-follower relationships. Despite the common perception
that leaders monopolize resources [6], these relationships were found to be more likely to
evolve when reproductive skew in favour of followers. Our results were used to conclude that
at evolutionary equilibrium the incentives for leading can be either selfish or altruistic, de-
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pending on ecological and social conditions, like relatedness between leaders and followers.
Ultimately, our model revealed that kin selection is sufficient and that individual differences in
condition and ability are not necessary for the evolution of leader-follower relationships.
We next explored conflict and cooperation in non-egalitarian groups of kin. The most basic
unit of non-egalitarian kin groups is the parent-offspring pair, and these relationships can be
subject to intense conflict over parental care [7]. Our work in Chapter 3 evaluated that offspring
begging has on resolving this conflict. Our work here shows that whether offspring begging
conveys need or demonstrates quality depends on environmental conditions. Motivated by a re-
cent meta-analysis of begging behaviours in bird species [4], we constructed a model to show
that in stable environments, needy offspring beg and are preferentially fed, while in unpre-
dictable environments, high-quality offspring beg and are fed when conditions are poor. This
shift occurs fundamentally because in poor and unpredictable environments, parents often have
more offspring than they can possibly rear, and so it is frequently best for parents to invest their
meager resources in the highest quality offspring, as these are frequently the offspring to gain
most from small amounts of investment. In contrast, parents provide greater care for needier
offspring when environmental conditions are stable, since parents are more reliably able to
successfully raise their entire brood. High signalling costs coupled with lower relatedness be-
tween offspring, or low signalling costs together with moderate levels of relatedness between
siblings, allow for the shift between signals of need and signals of quality to occur in more
volatile environments. Species whose offspring are highly dependent on parents for survival
are not expected to use both signals of need and of quality.
Chapter 4 was dedicated to understanding how asymmetric outcomes to conflict between
parents over provisioning can lead to sex differences in behaviour in the begging behaviour
of offspring. We validate the previously untested hypothesis that sex differences in long-term
need can cause selection to favour sex differences in begging behaviour [8]. However, these
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results do not seem to match empirical data [9]. By tracking the full lifetime inclusive fitness
consequences of begging behaviour, we develop a more parsimonious theory — females, who
often provide greater care for their offspring, ultimately suffer larger costs compared to males
by increasing their begging intensity. As such, even when females are in greater need, they
may evolve to beg at lower intensities than males.
In Chapter 5, we explored conflict between helpers and breeders in cooperatively breeding
species. Smaller brood sizes were previously thought to be a precursor to cooperative breeding
[10], though recent empirical evidence does not support this theory [11]. Our thorough inclu-
sive fitness model reveals that while small clutch sizes may predispose species to cooperative
breeding, cooperative breeding itself can affect the evolution of clutch size. We show that, in
contrast to previous theoretical work, cooperative breeding does not need to lead to smaller
clutch size and under very general conditions may actually increase clutch size at evolutionary
equilibrium. Conflict between breeder and auxiliary may motivate the helper to promote larger
clutch sizes, which may harm the breeder’s survival to increase the probability of territory in-
heritance. Moreover, clutch sizes can lead to increases in the expected level of help breeders
will receive in the future.
We then shift focus to cooperation and conflict in non-egalitarian social groups comprised
of unrelated individuals. In Chapter 6 we attempt to resolve the lack of agreement between
empirical observation and theoretical research on coalitionary behaviour in the animal king-
dom [3]. Using a life-history model, we explore how coalitionary behaviour may differentially
evolve depending on the types of costs aﬄicted upon members of failed coalitions, in terms of
survival, fecundity, and social rank. We find that bridging coalitions under a clear majority of
social and ecological settings are formed to contest social rank, whereas species that contest
fecundity should be expected to form all-up coalitions under most conditions. We then model
the coevolution of coalitionary behaviour and dominant concessions toward subordinates to
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demonstrate that dominant individuals rarely evolve to make concessions to their subordinates,
even when threatened by coalitions.
Social interactions, particularly among relatives, can make the inclusive fitness conse-
quences of certain traits difficult to predict. A theme common to the models presented in
this thesis is the importance of properly calculating the inclusive fitness consequences of a trait.
This is accomplished by building models which tracks the consequences of a trait through an in-
dividual’s full life-cycle. That there is a requirement for models which track the consequences
of a behaviour throughout an individual’s lifetime explains why some of the behaviours being
modelled appear, at first glance, counterintuitive and even maladaptive. Evolutionary models
often seek to determine whether a trait can be expected to evolve by measuring the inclusive
fitness associated with the trait. Unfortunately, with inclusive fitness frequently being defined,
even in textbooks [7], as the genetic contribution to the gene pool of the population in next
generation, the true currency of evolutionary biology – the contributions to the gene pool of
populatons in the distant future – is sometimes neglected, and thus the trajectory of evolution
is frequently miscalculated.
Conflict and cooperation sometimes appear to be arbitrary distinctions, particularly from
a gene’s perspective of evolution. For instance, the helping behaviour of auxiliaries studied
in Chapter 5 revealed that while auxiliaries may appear to help breeders raise their offspring,
territory inheritance can motivate them to do so in ways that are not optimal for the parent,
even reducing the parent’s survival. However, as outlined in Chapter 2, if both parties gain
in terms of inclusive fitness by participating in voluntary cooperative behaviour, the cooper-
ative behaviour can evolve. Cooperation can emerge even when certain individuals enjoy a
complete monopoly over resources. These dominant individuals are motivated to share their
resources for a wide variety of resources, from kin selection — as is evident with parental care
in Chapters 3 and 4, — to appeasement — studied through the concessions made by domi-
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nant individuals in Chapter 6 — to group augmentation — referenced in the leader-follower
relationships in Chapter 2. Conflict, however, can still arise even with cooperative behaviours
as each party attempts to maximize their gains from their interaction, usually at the cost of
their social partners. Modelling and understanding how these conflicts within cooperation are
resolved is core of much of the work presented here.
Many of these models also demonstrate the importance of communication between empiri-
cists and theoreticians. The work in Chapter 6, for example, was motivated by a lack theoret-
ical literature that analyzed how certain social and ecological conditions, such as the costs of
failed coalitions, influenced the evolution of coalitionary behaviour, even when an abundance
of empirical data indicated their importance to coalition formation [3]. Chapter 3 was, in part,
motivated by a lack of realism in the fitness functions of offspring used in previous models [12].
Unfortunately, there is a trade-off between biological realism and analytic tractability. Even so,
as demonstrated by the offspring fitness functions in Chapter 3 and the full life-cycle models
in Chapter 5, simplifying biological assumptions sometimes need to be more rigorously tested.
When simple analytic results cannot be generated in this pursuit, even general results from
numerical analysis can provide important insights into the evolutionary biology of the systems
being studied.
Naturally, this thesis did not examine all observed cooperative behaviour among individuals
in conflict in non-egalitarian groups. Possible avenues for future research specific to each be-
haviour examined are outlined in the discussion of each chapter. Left almost unexplored in this
thesis is conflict and cooperative behaviour unique to humans. Due to the unique cognitive ca-
pacity of humans, the evolution of human conflict and cooperation is influenced by behaviours
and traits that are exclusive to or uncommonly extensive in our species. For example, humans
frequently engage in cooperative behaviour even in large groups of unrelated individuals when
interactions are not repeated [13]. No theory has yet been able to definitively explain this
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phenomenon, although many have been proposed and tested theoretically [14, 15]. These the-
ories and mechanisms used to explain the phenomenon – including extensive rewarding [16]
and punishment [17] on the individual and institutional level [18, 19], and reputation and reci-
procity [20] – rely on the fact that humans are uniquely able to rapidly recognize, remember,
and adapt social behaviour by observing the behaviour and payoffs of others [13, 21].
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